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Abstract 
Organised labour continues to play a prominent role in shaping employment relations in South 
Africa. The individual worker is powerless and in a weaker bargaining position against his 
employer. The advent of democracy was accompanied by numerous interventions to level the 
historically uneven bargaining field. 
 
The trade union movement has made and consolidated significant gains since the advent of 
democracy. It however faces a plethora of new challenges, such as the negative forces of 
globalisation, declining membership (often associated with high levels of unemployment and the 
changing nature of work from standard to atypical employment), the resurfacing of 
adversarialism in the bargaining process, and numerous shortcomings inherent in forums 
established to facilitate corporatism. Business is intensifying its calls for investor-friendly 
policies, which effectively mean a relaxation of labour policies. The trade union movement faces 
an enormous task of rebuilding confidence and credibility among its members and at the same 
time showing some commitment to other social actors, government and business, that it is 
committed to contribute to economic growth and employment creation.  
 
The central focus of this thesis will be to highlight the gains made by the trade union movement, 
the numerous challenges threatening their existence, and how they have attempted to redefine 
their role in the face of these challenges. It will attempt to offer advice on how trade unions can 
continue to play a prominent role in shaping relations of work in South Africa. 
 iii 
 
The study begins with a historical overview of trade unionism in South Africa. It then attempts to 
establish how trade unions have made use of the institution of collective bargaining, the 
importance of organisational rights to the trade union movement, the effectiveness of industrial 
action, and the emerging challenges threatening the vibrancy of trade unions. The overall aim is 
to assess whether the trade union movement is still a force to be reckoned with and its future role 
in influencing employment relations in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Contextual Background 
Organised labour played a pivotal role in the birth of a new labour relations dispensation in 
South Africa. The labour movement militantly lobbied for radical changes to the pre-1994 
labour market and industrial relations dispensation and played an instrumental role in the 
determination and formulation of numerous post-1994 labour relations policies. Whilst trade 
unions militantly lobbied for basic labour rights during the apartheid era,1 their role has 
dramatically changed in the new constitutional and labour relations dispensation. The role of 
trade unions in shaping the labour market and the employment relations system is now fairly 
entrenched and it now extends beyond traditional labour issues, such as negotiating for better 
wages and working conditions. 
 
The concept of tripartism and social dialogue2 embraced by the 1994 democratically elected 
government strengthened the role of trade unions in the employment relationship. They have 
a responsibility to complement the efforts of other social actors, government and business, 
aimed at promoting, inter alia, peaceful labour relations and the competitiveness and growth 
of the South Africa economy. Despite their broad brief, trade unions remain custodians of the 
rights and interests of their members and their primary role is to service such rights and 
                                                            
1 For example, the right to organise without interference from the state and employers, a less onerous right to 
engage in industrial action and the right to engage in collective bargaining. 
2 The International Labour Organisation (ILO) acknowledges that although tripartism cannot be defined with 
precision, it “could be regarded as a modality inherent to its structure and one of its main recommendations in 
terms of labour policy to its member States”. Available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/ampro/cinterfor/temas/dialogo/dsoc_fp/tripart.htm#definition (accessed 
17 October 2010). ILO describes social dialogue as including “all types of negotiation, consultation or simply 
exchange of information between, or among, representatives of governments, employers and workers, on issues 
of common interest relating to economic and social policy. It can exist as a tripartite process, with the 
government as an official party to the dialogue or it may consist of bipartite relations only between labour and 
management (or trade unions and employers’ organisations) with or without indirect government”. Available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/themes/sd.htm (accessed 17 October 2010). 
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interests. They should however be dynamic in order to effectively safeguard and promote the 
interests of their members. 
 
The South African trade union movement has strong English roots. As observed by Grogan, 
the initial reaction to trade unionism worldwide was generally that of resentment. They were 
regarded as: 
“[M]utinous interlopers by early capitalists, and a significant part of domestic policies 
in many capitalist states during the 19th century consisted of attempts by government 
to discourage, or even crush, incipient labour collectives”.3  
South Africa inherited this system of industrial relations and has developed from an era 
where trade unions were given scant recognition to the present contemporary labour relations 
dispensation where they have assumed a prominent role in the employment relations 
landscape. The statutory framework regulating trade unionism before the coming into effect 
of the Constitution,4 which ushered a new labour relations landscape, was generally 
inadequate. Although recognising trade unions and granting them certain rights, they were 
attempts by government to use labour legislation to curtail the powers and activities of trade 
unions.  
 
This chapter will commence with a cursory overview of the significant phases which had an 
impact in the development of trade unionism in South Africa. As an introductory chapter, it 
will also outline the general purpose of the study, specific goals of the research, methods of 
research, literature review, limitations of the research, and the organisation of the rest of the 
study. 
 
 
 
                                                            
3 J Grogan Collective Labour Law (2007) 2. 
4 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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1.1.1 The development of trade unionism in South Africa 
a. The development of trade unionism pre-1867 
The period before the industrial revolution did not have any significant developments in the 
field of employment relations and trade unionism in particular. Although a small number of 
strikes were recorded, relations between employers and employees were generally peaceful.5 
The economy was agriculture-oriented with domestic servants and agricultural workers 
constituting the majority of the labour force.6 Although a number of laws were passed to 
remedy an inadequate common law system, they “related to the bilateral individual 
relationship and naturally did not provide for matters such as trade unions, collective 
bargaining, strike action and the many others pertaining to the collective relationship”.7  
 
b. Trade unionism between 1867-1920 
This period was marked by the discovery of gold and diamonds. This discovery saw the 
beginning of industrial revolution which resulted in economic growth. As put by the Wiehahn 
Report: 
“The discovery of diamonds and gold, apart from catapulting the country into a 
dramatic era of industrial and economic development, immediately exposed the 
virtual non-existence of skilled and expert human resources as well as infrastructural 
and other essential services to unlock, process and market the new found riches of the 
subcontinent.”8 
                                                            
5 JA Slabbert and BJ Swanepoel Introduction to Employment-Relations Management: A Global Perspective 2 ed 
(2002) 26.  
6 See N Wiehahn The Complete Wiehahn Report: Parts 1-6 (1982) 449. 
7 Ibid. Legislation regulating the relationship between masters and servants was passed as early as 1841. This 
piece of legislation which was called the Master and Servant Act was amended in 1856 and was followed by 
similar laws and ordinances in other pre-Union territories, all with a view of regulating the master-servant 
relationship. As put by S Bendix Industrial Relations In South Africa (1989) 286, “[t]here were no collective 
labour relations and no concerted attempts at organization by workers.” 
8 Wiehahn The Complete Wiehahn Report 449. 
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The period saw an expansion of labour activities and a large influx of immigrants mainly 
from Europe and in lesser numbers from America and the East. The industrial revolution and 
a growing economy resulted in the migration of black workers surviving on a subsistence 
agriculture-oriented economy to the mines to satisfy shortages of unskilled labour as well as 
an influx of “poor Whites” in search of work.9 The artisans and other skilled workers who 
came from Britain “brought the British system of trade unions with them”.10 According to the 
Wiehahn Report, “[f]rom the outset these workers put their experience of trade unionism to 
work in their endeavours to protect their skills and trades against a lowering of standards and 
against the admittance of Non-Whites to their closed circle.”11  
 
The first trade union to be established in South Africa was the Amalgamated Society of 
Carpenters and Joiners (ASCJ).12 The increase in labour activities complicated employment 
relationships. Grogan states that although there was “a succession of labour laws issued from 
the South Africa parliament … these were mainly paternalistic, and neither recognised nor 
sought to regulate organised labour”.13 They regulated individual relationships and were 
inadequate when it came to “more complex and collective relationships which had resulted 
from the surge of industrial development”.14  
 
                                                            
9 Wiehahn The Complete Wiehahn Report 450. 
10 Slabbert and Swanepoel Employment-Relations Management 26. See also Bendix Industrial Relations in 
South Africa 287. The author states that these skilled “workers brought with them the European, and especially 
the British, brand of trade unionism, at that time based on the ideal of a universal worker movement, but 
balanced by a British sense of individualism”. 
11 Ibid. According to the Wiehahn Report, “the characteristic pattern of whites performing the skilled work and 
non-whites performing the unskilled work-and of ploys to perpetuate this division of privilege-found its origin 
in those early times”. 
12 It was established in 1881 and a Natal branch was established in 1882. See Slabbert and Swanepoel 
Employment-Relations Management 26. 
13 Grogan Collective Labour Law 3. 
14 Wiehahn The Complete Wiehahn Report 450. 
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The first “big strike” in South Africa occurred in the Transvaal in 1907 by white 
mineworkers aggrieved by the indifference of mine management to their grievances.15 
Another strike soon followed in Natal by railway workers and these labour unrests saw the 
intervention of government with the enactment of the Transvaal Disputes Prevention Act.16 
According to Slabbert and Swanepoel,17 the Transvaal Disputes Prevention Act was modelled 
on the Canadian system of managing conflict. The Canadian system compelled the parties to 
accept mediation and prohibited strikes and lockouts pending the investigation of the merits 
of the disputes by the mediator who was to report to government. The prescribed interval 
should have elapsed after the publication of the report and the system did not compel 
acceptance of the finding. If the finding was not accepted, a strike and a lock-out could be 
declared.18 
 
Another significant event during this period was the 1913 strike by white mineworkers in 
Kleinfontein mine in Benoni. This strike “led to greater solidarity amongst employees”.19 The 
strike was precipitated by a decision by management to dismiss two employees working as 
mechanics and forcing “remaining mechanics to work longer shifts”.20 Attempts by trade 
unions to discuss the dispute with management were futile. In an act of solidarity, workers in 
other mines also went on a strike and an estimated twenty thousand workers were involved.21   
 
This period also saw the formation of the first black trade union,22 the Industrial Workers of 
Africa (IWA), in 1917. According to the Wiehahn Report, the union was “moribund virtually 
                                                            
15 See Slabbert and Swanepoel Employment-Relations Management 27. 
16 20 of 1909. 
17 Slabbert and Swanepoel Employment-Relations Management 27. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 The term “black trade unions” should be generally understood to mean trade unions whose majority 
membership was black African workers.  
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from the outset, and by 1920 had all but faded away”.23 Another trade union, the Industrial 
and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) was formed in 1918 and had a membership of one 
hundred thousand by 1927 making it “the largest trade union ever to have taken root in the 
continent of Africa”.24 Its viability was however threatened by “the absence of adequate 
controls to ensure that its activities remained confined to labour matters ….”25 It involved 
itself in political and non-labour activities and its collapse in the early thirties was attributed 
to its “lack of organisation”.26  
 
c. The period from 1921-1947 
The inadequacy of the statutory framework culminated in the revolt of white mineworkers on 
the Rand in 1922 (popularly known as the Rand Rebellion).27 The revolt was precipitated by 
a “confrontation between the White Mineworker’s Union and the Chamber of Mines as a 
result of the latter’s intention to open certain semi-skilled jobs to black workers”.28  Although 
the government successfully used force to manage the rebellion, it realised that organised 
labour had strength and that serious attention was to be given to the then labour relations 
system. The rebellion marked a major change in South Africa’s industrial relations system 
and necessitated the intervention of the state in the employment relationship through the 
enactment of the Industrial Conciliation Act (hereinafter ICA).29 As put by Slabbert and 
Swanepoel, the intervention by the State in the form of this piece of legislation signalled the 
commencement of “triplicity in employment relationships ... when the State entered the 
conflict arena in the State’s industrial area”.30 This piece of labour legislation was a 
                                                            
23 Wiehahn The Complete Wiehahn Report 29. 
24 See “The Decline and fall of the ICU-a case of Self-Destruction?” http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-
resources/articles_papers/decline_fall_icu.htm (accessed 18 October 2010). 
25 Ibid. 
26 Slabbert and Swanepoel Employment-Relations Management 26. 
27 See D du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 4 ed (2003) 6.  
28 Slabbert and Swanepoel Employment-Relations Management 27. 
29 11 of 1924. 
30 Slabbert and Swanepoel Employment-Relations Management 28. 
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watershed in employment relations. Apart from providing for the registration of trade unions 
and organisations for employers, it also provided for a framework for collective bargaining as 
well as a system for settling labour disputes whilst also regulating strikes and lock-outs.31 
 
The ICA promoted voluntary centralised bargaining by providing for the establishment of 
industrial councils by agreement between an employer’s organisation and a registered trade 
union or unions.32 The agreements reached at industrial councils could, at the discretion of 
the Minister, be gazetted if the parties so wished with the effect that they became legally 
binding.33 In terms of s 9(1) (b) of the Act, the agreements had the potential of being 
extended to all employers and employees who were within the jurisdiction of the council if 
the Minister was satisfied that the parties were sufficiently representative and that it was 
expedient to do so. Section 9(3) provided that non-compliance with agreements which were 
binding constituted a criminal offence and s 7 provided for the creation of an ad hoc 
conciliation board for bargaining and dispute resolution between parties when there was no 
industrial council. Agreements reached at conciliation boards had the same effect as those of 
industrial councils: they could be gazetted and extended to other employers and employees 
within the jurisdiction of the board.34  They were also legally binding and non-compliance 
constituted a criminal offence.35 In terms of s 12(1) a strike was illegal during the currency of 
any agreement between employers and employees or their organisations, if the agreement 
prohibited such action and the issues in dispute had been submitted to the Industrial Council 
for settlement or to a conciliation board. 
 
In terms of s 2(1), the dispute settlement system of councils was restricted to the parties and- 
s 4(1) provided that the boards could not be appointed for disputes involving a number of 
actions taken against individual employees. As put by Du Toit et al, “[t]he emphasis of the 
                                                            
31 D du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 6.  
32 S 2(1). 
33 S 9(1) (a). 
34 S 9(1) (a) and (b). 
35 See s 9(3). 
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dispute resolution system was … on the settlement of collective disputes rather than those 
involving individual employees.”36 This was the first comprehensive piece of labour 
legislation and its “support for voluntary centralised collective bargaining as the primary 
means to regulate relations between employers and organised (mainly white) labour, and to 
limit the potential causes of disputes, proved to be one of its most enduring features”.37 One 
of its glaring shortcomings was, however, its exclusion of black workers from the definition 
of ‘employee’.38 
 
The Act created a dual labour relations system which was racially determined by barring 
African workers from being members of registered trade unions. Section 24 of the ICA 
defined the term “employee” as excluding “pass-bearing African workers” which effectively 
meant that this category of workers was excluded from the mainstream industrial relations 
system with no representatives in industrial councils and also barred from using conciliation 
boards.39 The disenfranchisement of the African worker from the machinery of the ICA: 
“[S]ignified ‘a convergence of employer interests … and the interests of white 
workers’, which ‘served to establish a ‘joint monopoly’ of employers and registered 
trade unions at the expense of African workers”.40  
 
The dual labour relations system established by the ICA was one of its enduring legacies, 
characterising labour market policies for many years.41 The Act was however a successful 
intervention as it saw a decline of industrial actions as “trade unions became reliant on 
institutional supports rather than on their members’ organised power”.42 As put by Van 
                                                            
36 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 6. 
37 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 7. 
38 See s 24. 
39 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 7. 
40 Ibid. The authors quote E Webster (ed) Essays in South African Labour History (1978) 68. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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Jaarsveld and Van Eck, “the system of industrial councils and conciliation boards was 
accepted with alacrity”.43 The period saw an increase in trade union membership, especially 
during the years of depression in the 1930s.44 
 
The ICA was amended in 1930. A Commission45 was established in 1934 with a mandate to 
investigate the influence of the old ICA and the Wage Act46 on labour. The recommendations 
of the Commission led to the promulgation of a consolidated ICA 36 of 1937. Among the 
numerous recommendations of the Commission was “the formation of industrial unions 
representing all classes of employee” and a proposal that the interests of black employees 
should be represented by two government officials.47 The Commission also recommended 
that the dual labour relations system be retained by arguing that the inclusion of African 
workers into the mainstream industrial relations system was not a “viable option”.48 The Act 
provided for an inspector of Department of Labour without voting rights to represent pass-
bearing African workers at industrial council meetings.49 Apart from this aspect, there were 
no significant changes brought by the Act impacting on trade unionism.  
 
d. The period from 1948-1976 
This period saw the entrenchment of the apartheid policy and as put by Slabbert and 
Swanepoel, “it became clear that the country’s political system was inextricably linked to its 
employment-relations system”.50 The significant event during this period was the 
appointment of the Botha commission in 1948 “to investigate the entire spectrum of measures 
                                                            
43 F van Jaarsveld and S van Eck 3 ed (2005) Principles of Labour Law 206. 
44 Ibid. 
45 The Van Reenen Comission. 
46 25 of 1927. 
47 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 8. 
48 Ibid. 
49 See s 27(9). 
50 Slabbert and Swanepoel Employment Relations-Management 28. 
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pertaining to industrial law”.51 The recommendations led to the promulgation of such pieces 
of legislation as the ICA 28 of 1956, the Wage Act 5 of 1957 and the Settlement of Disputes 
Act 48 of 1953.52 An important recommendation in the field of trade unionism, which was 
rejected by government, was that black trade unions be regulated in separate legislation and 
that there should be measures for the effective control and guidance over such unions.53 
 
As outlined in the Wiehahn Report, the submissions made to the Commission against the 
registration of black trade unions included the following: 
i. Black employees were unsophisticated to make use of “the trade union system 
properly and to appreciate its value”. They needed training and education 
before being granted full trade union rights. 
ii. Black employees outnumbered “the workers of other population groups and 
would swamp existing unions, dictate union structure, distort wage patterns 
and endanger the position of non-Black workers in the economy”. 
iii. Allowing Black trade unions to the mainstream industrial relations system will 
precipitate “infiltration by political agitators and thus pave the way for the 
introduction of foreign ideologies” which would most likely lead to “[t]he 
disruption of industrial peace …” and that such a disruption was likely to have 
a far-reaching negative impact on “the economy and, in the long run, the 
country as a whole”. 
iv. The urge for unionism could not be explained as “spontaneous” but was a 
calculated move “by non-black instigators with ulterior motives”. Unionism 
was unknown or “foreign to the labour tradition and culture of the Black 
workers and should therefore not be artificially encouraged by permitting 
Black trade unions to register”. 
                                                            
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Slabbert and Swanepoel Employment-Relations Management 29. 
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v. The registration of black trade unions was going to result in the agricultural 
sector being unionised, which had the potential of disrupting an important 
sector in the South African economy. 
vi. The whites were “trustees of the Black people” and this meant that they had a 
responsibility to negotiate their employment conditions and wages. Legislating 
the “recognition of Black trade unions would be tantamount to an admission of 
failure in discharging the duties of this stewardship”.54 
 
The reasons advanced for the registration and recognition of Black trade unions were that the 
system of discrimination which existed then was untenable and that a dual labour relations 
system was going to generate conflict as it fuelled a perception that the conditions of 
employment for Blacks were inferior compared to those of other employees who were 
enjoying the benefits of the mainstream industrial relations system.55 The recommendation of 
the Commission that black trade unions be recognised subject to effective measures and 
guidance was rejected by the government which opted for the establishment of workers 
committees for Black employees implemented by the Bantu Labour Act.56 This system not 
only strengthened the dualistic employment relations system which was already in existence 
in South Africa, “but also integrated the system of segregation in the labour situation”.57  
 
The system however failed to achieve its intended objective and this was partly due to the 
fact that it sought to represent workers in a “paternalistic way in matters which affected their 
employment conditions and their wages”.58 The ICA 28 of 1956 made numerous amendments 
to the old Act which included, amongst other things, categorically excluding black workers 
                                                            
54 Wiehahn The Complete Wiehahn Report 30-31. 
55 Wiehahn The Complete Wiehahn Report 30. 
56 48 of 1953. 
57 Slabbert and Swanepoel Employment-Relations Management 29. 
58 Ibid. 
12 
 
from the statutory trade union system, statutory work reservation59 and prohibiting the 
registration of mixed unions unless there was ministerial permission. Section 36 provided that 
existing trade unions with white and ‘coloured’60 members were required to establish separate 
branches for the members, to hold separate meetings and that only white members could hold 
executive office. 
 
According to Du Toit et al, the ICA of 1956 marked the completion of a racially determined 
employment relations system.61 The calm which followed the promulgation of the Act did not 
last long. Political activism was suppressed with the banning of the African National 
Congress (ANC) and other organisations in 1961.62 Trade unions with black membership 
ceased to operate mainly because of their leaders fleeing into exile or being imprisoned.63 
The 1970s saw the re-awakening of the black working class. There were mass strikes which 
spread from Durban to other areas of the country and workers began to acknowledge the 
importance of organising rather than solely relying on militant actions to make their 
demands.64 The countrywide labour unrests necessitated the renaming of the Bantu Labour 
Act to the Regulation of Black Labour Relations Act which provided for, amongst other 
things, the establishment of liaison committees and co-ordinating work committees as well as 
for the right of black workers to strike under certain circumstances.65 
 
Despite numerous changes brought by the amendment of the Bantu Labour Act, the 
government’s position on excluding black trade unions from the mainstream industrial 
                                                            
59 See s 77. 
60 See s 1 of the ICA which defined a ‘coloured person” as a non-white or African person. 
61 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 9. 
62 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 9-10. 
63 Ibid. 
64 See “Overview of South African labour History” http://www.lrs.org.za/salhap/history.htm (accessed 20 
August 2009). 
65 Slabbert and Swanepoel Employment-Relations Management 30. The introduction of liaison and works 
committees was an attempt “to restrict union organisation by African workers”. See Du Toit et al Labour 
Relations Law 10. 
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relations system remained unchanged. This, however, did not put a damper on the 
determination of black workers to organise themselves. Apart from rejecting the committee 
system established by the amended and renamed Bantu Labour Relations Act, African 
workers also rebelled against the system by joining the unregistered trade unions.66 This 
period was generally characterised by increasing organisation and militancy of black trade 
unions. Some employers succumbed to the resilience of the factory based organisation and 
recognised unregistered trade unions.67 As observed by Du Toit et al, the repressiveness of 
the system was ultimately going to culminate in its destruction as its success was largely 
attributed to the political system which existed then.68 
  
e. Trade unionism between 1977-1989 
A significant event during this period which had an impact on the development of trade 
unionism in South Africa was the appointment of the Wiehahn Commission in 1977. The 
brief of the Commission was to investigate the employment relations system in South Africa 
and to make recommendations to ensure that there was industrial peace in the future. The 
appointment of the Commission was motivated by a dual industrial relations system which 
was increasingly becoming complex and unworkable.69 As put by Slabbert and Swanepoel, 
the Commission, apart from attempting to find solutions on the unworkable dualistic system 
of industrial councils and work committees, was also necessitated by, inter alia, the growth 
of the economy which saw the increasing use of black labour to satisfy shortages of skilled 
labour, the fact that black or African workers outnumbered workers from other population 
groups and the emergence of unregistered trade unions some of which were receiving help 
                                                            
66 Ibid. The authors state that these non-official trade unions, being barred from making use of the institutions 
provided for by the mainstream industrial relations system, shifted their attention to the workplace where they 
pressured employers to recognise them for the purpose of negotiating plant-level agreements and also built 
strong structures of shop stewards. 
67 Slabbert and Swanepoel Employment- Relations Management 30. 
68 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 10. The authors further state that “[i]t became evident that the system had 
created a high long-term cost in the shape of deeply-rooted adversarialism and an overlapping of workplace and 
political struggle that characterised industrial relations during and after the 1970s.” 
69 Wiehahn The Complete Wiehahn Report 2. As outlined in the Report, “[t]he dualistic structure in which the 
industrial council system for non-Black workers and the committee system for Black workers co-exist in the 
same industries [was] becoming complex and problematic in its operation.” 
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from outside and were not only seeking to advance labour interests but were also increasingly 
taking part in activities aimed at bringing political change.70 
 
The Commission submitted its findings in 1979 and made numerous far-reaching 
recommendations on the South African industrial relations system and trade unionism in 
particular. It dealt with diverse issues such as black workers and trade unionism, freedom of 
association, the trade union structure and trade union management.  The most significant 
recommendation in the field of trade unionism was that African workers be allowed to join 
registered trade unions and thus to make use of the institutions of the mainstream industrial 
relations system.71 
 
A comprehensive report was submitted by the Commission on the South African industrial 
relations system and black trade unionism in particular.72 The numerous recommendations 
submitted by the Commission included, amongst other things, an acknowledgement that 
black workers were “a permanent part of the South African economy”,73 that black trade 
unions were to be also subjected “to the protective and stabilising elements of the system 
[and] … its essential discipline and control” to ensure that their activities do not spill over to 
the political field, that the continued exclusion of black trade unions not only “deprive[d] 
black trade unions of the protection and impetus for growth … but prejudice[d] existing 
unions”. The Commission also noted that the unregistered black trade unions were recipients 
of large amounts of money from internal and external funders and that their exclusion from 
the machinery of the ICA meant that they were not obliged “to account for their income and 
                                                            
70 Slabbert and Swanepoel Employmen- Relations Management 31. 
71 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 10. Other proposals included the replacement of the industrial tribunal by 
an industrial court with “an extensive unfair labour practice jurisdiction”. 
72 For detailed recommendations particularly on black trade unionism see Wiehahn The Complete Wiehahn 
Report 29-36. 
73 Ibid. 
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expenditure, as in the case with registered trade unions, which [was] … an undesirable state 
of affairs”.74 
 
The Commission went further to note that apart from the financial support, black trade unions 
were constantly being exposed “to trade union philosophies and disciplines foreign to South 
Africa” through visits by international and foreign trade unionists. It opined that although 
there was nothing wrong with such exposure, what was undesirable was “that this should be 
the foundation of the training and orientation they obtain”. It warned that the “moral and 
financial support” was “instilling in black trade unionists ideas, approaches and skills which 
could well give rise to a new form of dualism in South African industrial relations: an alien 
system existing side by side with a local one”. The Commission cautioned that the continued 
exclusion of black trade unions from “the statutory industrial relations system, could well 
bring extreme stress to bear on the existing statutory system” and that this posed “a grave 
danger to industrial peace”.75 
 
The Commission argued that prohibiting black workers from forming or joining trade unions 
“would constitute a serious infringement of a worker’s freedom of association and thus be in 
direct conflict with one of the fundamental principles underlying self-governance in a free-
enterprise economic system”. It went further to warn that such a: 
“[B]an would prepare the ground for confrontation between, on the other hand, 
employers and their employees-particularly those in multinational enterprises which 
have already established liaison with the existing unregistered trade unions-and on the 
other hand the state”.76  
It cautioned that a statutory prohibition would “have the effect of  driving black trade 
unionism underground and uniting black workers not only against the authorities but, more 
                                                            
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
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important, also against the system of free-enterprise in South Africa”.77 The net effect of this 
was that “it would certainly add fuel to the flames of radicalism on the part of those who wish 
to overthrow the system”.78  
 
The Commission also cautioned that such a ban negatively impacted on the image of the 
country as it drew international criticism. The majority of the recommendations tabled by the 
Commission, however, leave one with the question whether it was genuinely concerned with 
the plight of black workers or whether it was merely trying to protect the then government 
from black trade unions which were increasingly becoming powerful and unmanageable, an 
unintended consequence of their exclusion from the mainstream legislative framework.  
 
Dissenting from the majority view of the Commission that black trade unions be allowed to 
join and participate in trade union activities, Commissioner Arthur Niewoudt argued, 
amongst other things, that such trade unions were likely to involve themselves in activities 
not related to labour matters, which was generally going to result in “untenable pressures” on 
the political and social arena, that black trade unionism was inevitably going to result in 
tightened controls over the entire trade union movement thereby further making “inroads into 
existing rights and freedoms”, that the unreasonable demands most likely to be made by 
black trade unions were going to jeopardise the economy and rights and interests of persons 
who were presently members of legally recognised trade unions, and that the militancy of 
black trade unions could not be entirely attributed to their non-recognition in the mainstream 
industrial relations system but was precipitated by “instigators and agitators outside the trade 
union movement”.79 
 
The recommendations of the Commission were accepted by the government, which, as put by 
Du Toit et al, was “clearly hoping to repeat the success of the 1924 Act by incorporating the 
                                                            
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Wiehahn The Complete Wiehahn Report 37. 
   
17 
 
militant new unions into the industrial relations system and thereby taming them”.80 The 
recommendations were incorporated as amendments to the ICA over four years and they 
were contained in the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act81 and the Labour Relations 
Amendment Act.82  Although black trade unions were now allowed by statute to register, they 
remained sceptical about their new rights and there was a genuine fear that this was a ploy by 
the government to co-opt and control them. They refused to register, fearing that this was 
going to subject them to the onerous legal framework. They were also protesting the framing 
of the definition of ‘employee’, which excluded ‘non-residents’ and contract workers.83  
 
Although the 1981 amendments forced the new unions to register,84 they did not make use of 
the main institution of the mainstream industrial relations system, the industrial council. 
Instead, they bargained at plant or enterprise level. According to Du Toit et al, bargaining at 
plant level, which constituted the strongest base for trade union organisation, proved to be 
advantageous in that it consolidated their strength and trade union members were involved in 
the negotiation processes.85 Basson et al,86 argue that the hesitancy by new trade unions to 
actively participate in the institutions created by the labour legislation could be attributed to 
the fact that such institutions were once part of the repressive machinery of the government 
and also had a history of being utilised by employers and trade unions opposed to black trade 
unionism. The authors also reiterate that the trade unions were still yet to make inroads in 
industry level organising and were more organised and powerful at individual workplaces. 
   
                                                            
80 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 11. 
81 94 of 1979 and 95 of 1980. 
82 57 of 1981, 51 of 1982 and 2 of 1983. 
83 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 11. 
84 In terms of  the Labour Relations Amendment Act 57 of 1981, unregistered trade unions were also subjected 
to the controls that applied to registered trade unions. 
85 Du Toit et a Labour Relations Law 11. 
86 A Basson et al Essential Labour Law Volume 2: Collective Labour law 3 ed (2002) 11-12. 
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A shift in policy of black trade unions occurred in 1982 when the Federation of South African 
Trade Unions (FOSATU), while remaining opposed to the system of industrial councils, 
decided that its affiliates could join and participate in councils as long as such participation 
did not prejudice their interests and the unions could continue bargaining at plant level.87 The 
“unofficial unions” were increasingly becoming a vibrant force and they challenged the 
practices of the more established unions and employers in industrial councils.88 
 
The formation of the Congress of South African Trade unions (COSATU) in 1985 was 
another milestone in the development of labour relations and black trade unionism in 
particular. The federation lobbied for, inter alia, the formation of national, industry-wide 
councils in all sectors and the establishment of one union per industry.89  As put by Bendix, 
“COSATU set itself a broad role to influence the economic and political dispensation that 
existed then”.90 Giving an opening address at the organisation’s inaugural congress, Cyril 
Ramaphosa of the National Mineworkers Union (NUM) stressed the importance of building 
militant and strong organisations at the workplace as the basis of the political strength of 
workers. He reiterated that the struggle for liberation could not be separated from the struggle 
of workers and the political nature of industrial issues. The aims and objectives of the 
federation as spelled out at the inaugural congress, included inter alia, securing economic and 
social justice for workers, striving to build “a united working class movement regardless of 
race, colour, sex or creed”, encouraging workers to join trade unions and developing “a spirit 
of solidarity among workers” and the facilitation and co-ordination of education and training 
of all workers to further the interests of the working class.91 
 
                                                            
87 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 12. 
88 Ibid. The authors point out that their rapid growth, although with many advantages, strained the unions’ 
organisational and human resources.  
89 Ibid. 
90 Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 335. 
91 Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 335-336. 
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Although black trade unions were now recognised and enjoyed numerous rights, the 
industrial relations continued to be characterised by adversarialism and employees who 
engaged in illegal industrial action were victimised. The Industrial Court developed a body of 
laws to settle industrial disputes and this meant that parties could not exclusively rely on their 
collective strength to make their demands.92 Employers were strongly opposed to the practice 
of unions to bargain at both industrial council and plant level and this was followed by 
attempts to curtail the powers of trade unions in the form of amendments to the LRA 
published in 1987.93 Restrictions were also placed on COSATU’s political activities as well 
as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and various civic, youth and student organisations.94 
The proposed amendments were met with protests and COSATU held a conference to decide 
on a stay-away to attempt to force the government and employers to abandon their plan to go 
ahead with the proposed far-reaching changes to the LRA.95 The stay-away, which was hailed 
as the biggest in the South African labour history, did not derail the government from going 
ahead with its proposed plans and the amendments were promulgated in the LRA 83 of 
1988.96 
 
In summary, this period was generally characterised by attempts to liberalise the employment 
relations landscape, the rise of militant and strong black trade unions, an intensely politicised 
workplace, high levels of conflict between stakeholders in the tripartite employment 
relationship and the formation of COSATU, the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA), 
the Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions (AZACTU),  the United Workers Union of South 
Africa (UWUSA) and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), formed as a result of 
a merger between CUSA and AZACTU.97 
                                                            
92 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 12. 
93 See Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 14.  
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. A complaint was also lodged by the trade union federation with ILO that the unilateral amendments 
violated the principle of freedom of association. COSATU requested the Fact-Finding and Conciliation 
Commission (FFCC) of the ILO to investigate the alleged violations, which it did in 1991. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Slabbert and Swanepoel Employment Relations-Management 32-33. 
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f. Trade unionism in the 1990s and beyond 
The early 1990s saw a major shift in the policy of government and marked the beginning of a 
new political dispensation in South Africa. The shift was basically premised on the idea that 
all South Africans should enjoy equal opportunities in all aspects of life, be it social, 
economic or political. A new era was dawning in South Africa and a series of legislation 
were passed to redress the past imbalances and inequalities in the social, economic and 
political landscapes. The watershed moment was the undertaking made by the government in 
1990 to do away with the apartheid system and to pursue the goal of fair governance.  This 
undertaking was followed by the unbanning of political parties such as the ANC, the Pan 
African Congress (PAC), the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the lifting of 
restrictions placed on various trade unions such as COSATU.98 
 
There were various attempts to construct a new political dispensation. Apart from the 
unbanning of political parties and the lifting of restrictions placed on trade union 
organisations, a number of other events also occurred. An important development in the field 
of labour, industrial relations and trade unionism in particular, was the formation of a 
tripartite alliance by the ANC, the SACP and COSATU, the establishment of organisational 
structures by the ANC and SACP, the abolishment of apartheid laws, the disbanding of the 
South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), formed in 1955, to merge with COSATU 
and the establishment of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), and the 
reaching of an agreement on various issues such as a new Constitution, transitional structures,  
and an election date.99 
 
The predominantly black trade unions, such as COSATU and NACTU, did not waste time in 
seizing the opportunities presented by the transitional phase to participate in various forums 
created to facilitate discussions on various reforms essential for the birth of a new democratic 
and constitutional South Africa.100 Black trade unions became active participants in the 
                                                            
98 See generally Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 16. 
99 See Slabbert and Swanepoel Employment-Relations Management 34-35. 
100 See Slabbert and Swanepoel Employment-Relations Management 35. 
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formulation of policies aimed at redressing past imbalances in the economic, social and 
political spheres. They “began to accept responsibility for the reconstruction of a post-
apartheid South Africa”.101 The labour movement continued to play an active political role in 
the early 1990s with COSATU going as far as suggesting that a Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) be entered between its alliance partners in exchange for its 
support of the ANC’s election campaign.102  
 
The RDP, which was a brainchild of COSATU, committed the alliance partners to, inter alia, 
formulate detailed policies and to give special attention to workers’ rights. The partners were 
obliged under the programme to, amongst other things, produce:  
“A single set of statutes that would provide equal rights for all workers, basic 
organising rights (including the right to organise and join trade unions, the right to 
strike and picket on all economic and social matters, and the right to information from 
companies and the government) … a system of collective bargaining at national, 
industrial and workplace levels with industrial councils empowered to negotiate 
industrial policy including the implementation of the RDP at sectoral level … and 
greater worker participation in decision-making in the workplace”.103 
 
A momentous event was the 1994 elections which saw the ANC becoming the majority party 
in a Government of National Unity (GNU). The RDP, which was the basis of the ANC’s 
campaign, did not just remain a vision of the alliance partners but became a national 
agenda.104 A discussion document titled “A Strategic Approach for the Ministry of Labour” 
was produced by the then Minister of Labour, Tito Mboweni, highlighting fundamental 
changes to be effected in the labour market within a period of five years.105 The most 
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102 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 17. 
103 See Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 17. 
104 Slabbert and Swanepoel Employment-Relations Management 36. 
105 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 17. 
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important issues prioritised by the document were the drafting of a new labour relations 
statute to bring labour laws into conformity with the interim Constitution and the 
recommendations of the FFCC,106 “the creation of a single system of labour law for the whole 
country” and “a framework for collective bargaining at industry and workplace level” as well 
as the incorporation of the RDP.107 The document also emphasised the importance of 
tripartism and the involvement of labour in policy formulation and implementation 
processes.108  
 
As envisaged in the discussion document, the National Manpower Commission (NMC) and 
the National Economic Forum (NEF) were merged,109 which led to the formation of the 
National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac) in 1995. The formation of 
Nedlac signified the embracement of the concepts of corporatism, social dialogue and 
tripartism, which generally mean co-operation, co-responsibility, participation and co-
decision making between the role players or stakeholders in the tripartite employment 
relationship.110 The labour market chamber of Nedlac consists of representatives of the state, 
organised business and organised labour. As put by Van Niekerk et al, although the mandate 
of the council is broad, its main function is to consider all proposed labour legislation and 
significant changes to social and economic policy before introduction and implementation in 
parliament.111 
 
                                                            
106 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1993.  
107 See Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 17. 
108 Ibid. 
109 The NMC was established as a result of the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission. It comprised of 
representatives of state, business and labour, appointed by the Minister of Labour. Its mandate was “to 
continually survey and analyse the labour market, evaluate the effectiveness of labour legislation and make 
recommendations to the Minister on these and any other matters affecting labour policy”. Du Toit et al Labour 
Relations Law 10. The NEF was established by COSATU and some sectors in business largely in response to 
the “anti-VAT campaign” and was launched in 1992 (Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 16). 
110 Slabbert and Swanepoel Employment-Relations Management 19 and 36. More information about the 
institution is available at http://www.nedlac.org.za/home.aspx (accessed 03 August 2009). 
111 A Van Nierkerk et al Law @ Work (2008) 14. See also s 5(1)(c) of the NEDLAC Act 34 of 1994. 
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Another important event in the development of trade unionism, and employment relations in 
general, was the coming into effect of the interim and the 1996 Constitutions. The interim 
Constitution precipitated the promulgation of the LRA,112 which ushered in a new labour 
relations dispensation in South Africa. The interim Constitution guaranteed numerous rights 
with a bearing on employment relations and trade unionism in particular. Section 27 has 
various ‘labour relations rights’, which include the right to fair labour practices, to form and 
join trade unions and employers organisations, to organise and bargain collectively and to 
strike. The final Constitution guarantees these rights in s 23. It provides that workers have a 
right to form and join trade unions.113 It further provides that trade unions have the right to 
determine their own administration, programmes and activities,114 to organise,115 and to form 
and join a federation.116 
 
The Constitution remains an important source and a “frame of reference” for labour law.117 
Olivier argues that, “labour law is an area which will be the subject of continued 
constitutional challenge”.118 Constitutional provisions are important in the field of labour law 
for many reasons. The Constitution has numerous provisions on how courts should interpret 
fundamental rights and legislation. Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the 
Constitution is the supreme law of the country. The Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds 
all organs of the state,119 and every court, tribunal or forum is enjoined to promote its spirit, 
purport and object when interpreting any legislation and when developing common law.120 
According to Slabbert and Swanepoel, the labour rights guaranteed by the Constitution 
                                                            
112 66 of 1995.  
113 See s 23(2) (a). 
114 Section 23(4) (a). 
115 See s 23(4) (b). 
116 See s 23(4) (c). 
117See Slabbert and Swanepoel Employmen- Relations Management 47. 
118 M Olivier “Fundamental Rights and Labour Law: Some Recent Developments” (1996) De Rebus 436. 
119 S 8(1). 
120 S 39(2). 
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constitute the basis for the interpretation of any labour legislation by the appropriate 
institutions.121 
 
In terms of s 233 of the Constitution, “[w]hen interpreting any legislation, every court must 
prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law 
over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law”. Section     
39(1)(b) further provides, inter alia, that “[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, 
tribunal or forum-must consider international law”. South African courts often rely on the 
ILO standards to interpret various labour rights. In SA National Defence Union v Minister of 
Defence case,122 the Constitutional Court made use of the ILO conventions in its attempt to 
test the constitutionality of a provision in the Defence Act123 which barred members of the 
South African National Defence Force from forming and joining trade unions and 
participating in public protest.124 
 
On the basis of Article 2 and Article 9 of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise Convention,125 and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention,126 the court made a finding to the effect that the jurisprudence of the ILO 
recognises members of the defence forces and the police to be workers “but consider[s] their 
position … special, to the extent that it leaves it open to member states to determine the 
extent to which the provision of the conventions should apply to members of the armed 
forces and the police”.127 In Minister of Defence v SA National Defence Force Union,128 the 
                                                            
121 Slabbert and Swanepoel Employment-Relations Management 46. 
122 (1999) 20 ILJ 2265 (CC). See chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the case. 
123 S 126B of Act 44 of 1957. 
124 See paras 25, 26 and 27. 
125 87 of 1948. 
126 98 of 1949. 
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128 (2006) 27 ILJ 2276 (SCA). 
   
25 
 
court also relied extensively on the wording of ILO conventions, particularly Convention 87, 
98 and 154 to establish whether the failure by national legislation (the LRA), to “incorporate 
a compulsion to bargain” was an infringement on the right to engage in collective bargaining 
provided by the Constitution.129 
 
South Africa also has international obligations by virtue of being a member of the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). The regional bloc has a Charter of Fundamental 
Social Rights which provides, inter alia, that member states should create an enabling 
environment consistent with ILO conventions on freedom of association, the right to organise 
and collective bargaining, to give effect to basic labour rights.130 The Charter also obliges 
member states to prioritise conventions on core labour standards so as to take necessary 
action to ratify and implement these standards.131 The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) also has an important Article on trade unionism. Article 23(4) of the 
Declaration provides that “everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests”. 
 
The LRA, which is the centre-piece of labour legislation and was enacted to, amongst other 
things, give effect to and regulate the rights conferred by the Constitution,132 is worded 
almost in the same manner as the Constitution. It provides, inter alia, that all employees have 
the right to participate in forming a trade union or federation of trade unions,133 and to join a 
trade union, subject to its constitution.134 The Act not only recognises and protects the right to 
join and form trade unions but goes further to grant union members the right to participate in 
                                                            
129 See also Van Niekerk et al Law @ Work 28. 
130 Article 4. 
131 Article 5. 
132 See s 1(a). It should be highlighted that the LRA was enacted when the interim Constitution was in force and 
therefore refers to the rights conferred by s 27. Such rights are now contained in s 23 of the final Constitutional 
and any further mention of constitutional labour rights will be in reference to the rights in the final Constitution. 
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union activities.135 The LRA defines a trade union as “an association of employees, whose 
principal purpose is to regulate relations between employees and employers, including any 
employers’ organisation”.136 Although trade unions have diverse functions, their primary role 
is to engage in collective bargaining on behalf of member employees and to represent them in 
grievance and disciplinary matters.137 Apart from reflecting and confirming the rights 
contained in s 23 of the Constitution, the LRA also accommodates the Constitution in another 
way: its provisions must conform to those of the Constitution.138 
 
The LRA was also enacted to give effect to various obligations incurred by South Africa 
when it became a member state of the ILO.139 There are a number of conventions,140 ratified 
by South Africa, which have a bearing on trade unionism. Convention 87 provides for the 
freedom of association, the right of employees and employers to join organisations, 
federations or confederations without previous authorisation and interference. It also obliges 
member states “to take all appropriate measures to ensure that workers and employers may 
exercise freely the right to organise”. Article 1 of Convention 98 provides, inter alia, that 
there must be protection of workers “against acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of 
their employment”. It goes on to list such acts as those “calculated to make the employment 
of a worker subject to the condition that he shall not join a union or shall relinquish trade 
union membership” and those that “cause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker by 
reason of union membership or because of participation in union activities outside working 
                                                            
135 S 4(2), (a) and (d) has numerous rights which members of trade unions are entitled to. Employees who are 
members of trade unions have the right to participate in the lawful activities of unions and in the election of 
office bearers, officials or trade union representatives. They can also stand for election and be eligible for 
appointment as an office-bearer or official and if so elected or appointed, to hold office. The section further 
provides that they are also eligible for appointment and can stand for election as trade union representatives, and 
if appointed or elected, to carry out the functions of trade union representatives in terms of the Act or any 
collective agreement. 
136 S 213. 
137 See J Grogan, Workplace Law 7 ed (2003) 272.  
138 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 19. 
139 S 1(b). South Africa rejoined the ILO in 1994. 
140 See a full list of ILO conventions available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm (accessed 28 
August 2009). 
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hours or, with the consent of the employer, within working hours”. Article 2 of the 
Convention provides for adequate protection of workers and employers organisations from 
interference by each other. It provides that any act putting workers organisations under 
control or domination of employers or their organisations shall be construed as interference.  
 
Article 3 provides for the establishment of machinery unique to each member state’s 
conditions to promote the culture of respect of the right to organise. Article 4 relates to 
collective bargaining and states that: 
“Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to 
encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for 
voluntary negotiation between employers or employers' organisations and workers' 
organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by 
means of collective agreements.” 
 
According to Van Niekerk et al,141 the FFCC which investigated the South African labour 
relations was a significant intervention by ILO. The Commission was responding to a 
complaint by COSATU about the 1988 LRA amendments. The Commission did not only file 
a report on the South African labour law and labour relations landscape but also 
recommended numerous changes consistent with the standards of ILO and these were 
influential in the drafting of the LRA.142 
 
Whilst the Wiehahn Commission had far-reaching recommendations on trade unionism, it is 
the Constitution and the LRA which ended prospects of further debate about the future of 
trade unions in South Africa. Not only was the right to join trade unions fully recognised, the 
Act went on further to regulate this right and to grant trade unions various organisational 
rights which serve the purpose of assisting unions “in building up a presence in the workplace 
                                                            
141 Van Niekerk et al Law @ Work 20. 
142 Ibid.  
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and thereby lay the foundations of a collective bargaining relationship with the employer”.143 
Trade unions therefore enjoy sufficient recognition under the current constitutional and 
labour legislation framework. What remains to be seen is whether the movement has seized 
the various opportunities presented by the new dispensation to safeguard the gains made and 
to continue to militantly protect and promote the rights and interests of employees. 
 
1.2 The general purpose of the study 
The primary purpose of the study is to critique the effectiveness of the trade union movement 
in advancing the interests and rights of workers. In attempting to make this evaluation, the 
research will interrogate various issues pertaining to trade unions such as, their bargaining 
power under the current labour legislative framework, the nature and content of various 
organisational rights, their participation in institutions designed to promote corporatism and  
the general state of trade unionism in South Africa. The study will explore the challenges 
besetting the trade union movement in post-apartheid South Africa, the strategies, if any, 
devised by the movement to counter or meet these challenges and an assessment of the 
effectiveness of such strategies. 
 
The broad aim of the research is to establish whether the trade union movement still remains 
a vibrant and a relevant force in the current labour relations dispensation. The research will 
attempt to establish whether the movement is adaptable to respond to a variety of challenges 
and to explore whether the trade union movement has seized all the opportunities offered by 
the current labour relations dispensation to strengthen its vibrancy in advancing the rights and 
interests of workers. The researcher hopes that an assessment of the legal framework and the 
various ways in which the trade union movement seeks to achieve the realisation and 
protection of workers’ rights and interests will help to inform the development of trade union 
law. 
 
 
                                                            
143 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 36. 
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1.3 The specific goals of the research 
The study seeks to achieve the following specific goals: 
i. To establish the nature and extent of various organisational rights and how unions 
have made use of these rights to protect and promote the interests of their members. 
ii. To explore the architecture of the institution of collective bargaining, its purpose, and 
the participation and bargaining powers of trade unions. 
iii. To give an overview of the regulatory framework for strikes and other related forms 
of industrial action, how they have been used by trade unions in the process of 
collective bargaining, and whether they still serve a useful purpose in a contemporary 
labour relations dispensation. 
iv. To explore the various challenges besetting the trade union movement, such as 
negative aspects of globalisation, high levels of unemployment, slow economic 
growth and to establish whether the strategies devised by the labour movement are 
effectively countering such challenges. 
 
1.4 Research methodology 
There was extensive reliance on desktop research and sources of information consulted 
include labour legislation, the Constitution, relevant legal texts, cases, and journal articles. 
No empirical research was conducted on the subject. The subject of trade unionism has 
numerous subdivisions and great care was taken to ensure that the overarching subject of the 
research is the legal framework and how it impacts the effectiveness of trade unions in South 
Africa. This is not to say, however, that other aspects with a bearing on trade unionism have 
been given scant attention. The sociological, political and economic dynamics directly impact 
the legal framework regulating trade unions and are important factors to be taken into account 
if one is to attempt an informed speculation about future developments or trends in labour 
legislation. Reference has been made to previous empirical research on issues such as 
collective bargaining, and organisational and other challenges impacting the effectiveness of 
trade unions. The Internet was also used to source relevant online material. 
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1.5 Literature review 
This is not intended to be a pioneering research. A lot of literature has been written on the 
subject of trade unionism in South Africa.144 Most recommended labour law texts however 
give a cursory overview on the subject of trade unions in South Africa. They do not provide 
extensive information on the effectiveness of trade unions in continuing to protect and 
promote the rights of member employees in post-apartheid South Africa. The information 
that they provide does not go beyond such issues as their historical development, their 
recognition under the Constitution and the LRA and the nature and extent of various 
organisational rights that they enjoy. 
 
This research will not just outline the legal framework regulating trade unions. It will attempt 
to interrogate the vibrancy of unions in the new labour relations dispensation and will 
highlight the various challenges faced by unions in post-apartheid South Africa. It will 
attempt to offer ideas on the strategies that trade unions can employ to continue to maintain a 
robust presence in the tripartite employment relationship. 
 
1.6 Limitations of the research 
The bulk of this study will be confined to trade unionism and related legal aspects. Although 
trade unions serve many purposes in post-apartheid South Africa, the sociological or political 
subdivisions of trade unionism will generally be beyond the scope of this research. This study 
will also not extensively cover the internal governance and administrative issues of trade 
unions.  
1.7 Organisation of the study 
The research has been planned into six chapters including the foregoing chapter. Chapter two 
will explore in detail the most important role of trade unions, which is to participate in the 
collective bargaining process on behalf of members. It will highlight the bargaining powers 
                                                            
144 Leading researchers in the field include, inter alia, S Buhlungu, E Webster, K von Holdt and J Maree. These 
authors have undertaken impressive well-rounded conceptual and empirical research on the state of trade 
unionism in South Africa. 
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of unions, the nature and extent of the right to engage in collective bargaining, and the 
various platforms of collective bargaining. 
 
Chapter 3 will focus on the importance of organisational rights to trade unions. It will 
highlight the nature and content of such rights, their importance in the collective bargaining 
process and the procedure regarding their acquisition and exercise. Chapter 4 will focus on 
the various forms of industrial action and how they are used by trade unions as weapons to 
bring pressure on employers or employer’ organisations to accept their demands. It will 
critique the effectiveness of industrial action and whether it still serves a useful purpose in the 
contemporary South African labour relations landscape. 
 
Chapter 5 will attempt to explore the general state of trade unionism in South Africa, how 
trade unions have seized the opportunities presented by a new constitutional democracy to 
further the rights and interests of  workers, the extent of the effects or forces of globalisation 
on the South African and global trade union movement, how South African trade unions are 
attempting to redefine their role and reinvent themselves in the face of numerous challenges; 
and their future role in shaping relations of work in South Africa. Chapter 6 will be a 
summary of the dissertation and it will offer recommendations on how trade unions can 
continue to maintain a robust presence in the South African labour relations landscape. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TRADE UNIONS AND THE INSTITUTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Trade unions in South Africa developed from an era where they were regarded as interlopers 
in management affairs, to the present day contemporary labour relations system where they 
have an important role; to promote the interests of workers and peaceful labour relations. The 
current South African labour relations system is premised on the acknowledgment that 
peaceful labour relations can only be achieved if trade unions are allowed to function without 
interference and that the pre-1994 labour relations dispensation, characterised by repressive 
laws and other measures designed to suppress trade unionism, failed in this regard. 
 
The institution of collective bargaining plays a critical role in promoting peaceful labour 
relations in South Africa and worldwide. Bendix describes it as “the central process 
emanating from the conduct of a collective labour relationship”.145 It is an innovative 
institution and its indispensability in any contemporary labour relations system is attributable 
to the reality that a conflict of interests between workers and employers is inevitable. 
Although the process is characterised by antagonism and adversarialism, it nevertheless takes 
place because “its purpose is to contain conflict and even to promote co-operation”.146 
 
Kahn-Freund summarises the purpose of collective bargaining as follows: 
“[B]y bargaining collectively with organised labour, management seeks to give effect 
to its legitimate expectations that the planning of production, distribution … should 
                                                            
145 Bendix Industrial Relations In South Africa 76. An important observation by the author is that “its conduct 
[collective bargaining] and outcome as well as the power of either party at a particular time, is subject to a 
number of environmental influences in the form of economic, socio-political and other practices and 
developments. Equally, the bargaining process itself will impact on the environment and particularly on the 
economy of a country”. 
146 Bendix Industrial Relations In South Africa 77. 
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not be frustrated through interruptions of work. By bargaining collectively with 
management, organised labour seeks to give effect to its legitimate expectations that 
wages and other conditions of work should be such as to guarantee a stable and 
adequate form of existence and as to be compatible with the physical integrity and 
moral dignity of the individual, and also that jobs should be reasonably secure.”147 
 
Grogan describes the concept as a “process by which employers and organised groups of 
employees seek to reconcile their conflicting interests and goals through mutual 
accommodation”.148 What can be gleaned from these descriptions is that both management 
and labour recognise the need to participate in this institution. However, the competing 
interests of labour and management means that parties would often resort to their strength and 
power to make demands on each other. 
 
 It is trite law that collective bargaining is a voluntary process and that the drafters of the 
LRA intended that the effectiveness of the institution should not be influenced by judicial 
pronouncements. Courts have a limited role in the bargaining arena as the process of 
collective bargaining is not hinged on obscure legal rules which proved to be a complication 
in the pre-1994 labour relations dispensation. The current labour relations system allows 
parties to use their strength to seek concessions from each other and the recourse to strikes 
and other related forms of industrial action by trade unions is an integral part of the 
bargaining process.  
 
The main aim of this chapter is to attempt to establish the complexities of the collective 
bargaining process, how trade unions have made use of this institution, and whether it is still 
the preferred method of promoting the rights and interests of employees. The chapter will 
explore the nature and extent of the right to engage in collective bargaining, more 
                                                            
147 Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law 2 ed (1977) 5. 
148 J Grogan Collective Labour Law 86. The author also states that “the central objective of all modern industrial 
relations legislation is to promote collective bargaining as a means of regulating relations between employers 
and employees and for resolving disputes between them”. 
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particularly, the controversies regarding the absence of the duty to bargain. It will dwell on 
the structure or architecture of the institution of collective bargaining, the bargaining powers 
of trade unions and whether the institution has been effective in promoting peaceful labour 
relations under the current labour relations dispensation. 
 
2.2 Bargaining levels under the current legislative framework 
There are two levels of bargaining under the current labour relations framework; sectoral and 
plant-level bargaining. The dichotomy between managements and trade union interests means 
that levels of bargaining will always remain a contentious issue. Du Toit et al attempt to 
highlight why unions find the system of centralised bargaining attractive and the arguments 
advanced in support of bargaining at enterprise or plant level.149 The common arguments 
advanced by the unions in favour of the system of centralised bargaining include, inter alia, 
the following: 
i. It is the only process through which minimum and reasonably fair 
employment standards can be established for the entire industry or sector. 
ii. The negotiation processes at industry or sectoral level attracts highly skilled 
trade unionists and employer representatives. 
iii. Collective agreements concluded at sectoral or industry levels are less likely to 
open floodgates for litigation or to be contested at courts because the use of 
highly skilled negotiators means that the possibility of “a plethora of poor 
quality collective agreements” is averted. 
iv. Industry level bargaining promotes the development of a culture of pro-active 
trade unionism. The role of trade unions is widened beyond their often 
“narrow, defensive and reactive approach”. 
 
 
                                                            
149 D du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 244. 
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The arguments in favour of bargaining at enterprise level include the following:150  
i. The conditions that cover an entire sector are often unproductive particularly 
for small enterprises and they have negative economic implications. 
ii. The “key actors at plant-level” are disenfranchised from the bargaining 
processes. 
iii. Trade unions which have strong organisational strength at enterprise level but 
poorly represented at industry or sectoral level are denied the access of 
participating in bargaining forums. 
iv. There is no flexibility as the process is not sensitive to “regional and enterprise 
differences”. 
 
The conflicting and competing interests of business and labour mean that levels of bargaining 
are going to remain a contested issue. The courts cannot compel parties to bargain at 
particular levels as the scheme of the LRA favours a voluntary system of bargaining, which 
allows parties to use their economic strengths in determining bargaining arrangements. 
 
2.3 Constitutional and legislative framework 
The right to engage in collective bargaining is provided for in the Constitution and the LRA. 
Section 23(5) of the final Constitution provides, inter alia, that “[e]very trade union, 
employers’ organisation and employer has the right to engage in collective bargaining”.151 
The right is given effect to by the LRA; the principal national legislation referred to in the 
Constitution. The Act provides that its primary objectives are, amongst other things, to 
provide a framework within which trade unions and employers can bargain collectively,152 
                                                            
150 Ibid. 
151 The section further provides that “national legislation may be enacted to regulate collective bargaining” and 
that “to the extent that the legislation may limit a right in this Chapter, the limitation must comply with section 
36(1)’’. 
152 See s 1(c) (i). 
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“to promote orderly collective bargaining … and bargaining at sectoral level”,153 and, “to 
promote employee participation in decision-making in the workplace”.154 
 
2.3.1 The nature and extent of the right to engage in collective bargaining 
The nature and extent of the right to engage in collective bargaining was extensively dealt 
with in what are now popularly known as the SANDU cases.155 The issue that was common in 
all cases was whether there existed a justifiable duty on the South African National Defence 
Force (SANDF) to engage in collective bargaining with the South African National Defence 
Union (SANDU), a union set up by and comprising members of the defence force and 
allowed to function as a union by the decision of the Constitutional Court.156 Another issue 
that was dealt with in SANDU 1 was the question: if there was a justiciable duty to bargain, 
was there an unfair refusal by the SANDF to engage in collective bargaining with the military 
union?157  
 
The military union relied heavily on s 25(5) which has already been cited above. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal per Conradie JA held that the “right to engage in collective 
bargaining” may be subject ‘to more than one interpretation’ which might be that the piece of 
legislation to regulate it “must provide for an employer or a union called upon to bargain to 
comply with the demand on pain of being ordered to do so”. Another possible interpretation 
mooted by the court was “that the envisaged national legislation must provide the framework 
within which employers, employers’ organisations and employees may bargain’’ or that “it 
                                                            
153 See s 1(d) (i) and (ii). 
154See s 1(d) (iii). 
155Referred to as SANDU 1, 2 and 3. 
156 See the decision of the Constitutional Court in South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1999/7.html (accessed 28 September 2009) cited as 1999 (4) 
SA 469 (CC).  
157 See para 2 of the concise judgment of the cases, available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2006/95.pdf. 
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may mean no more than that no legislative or other governmental act may effectively prohibit 
collective bargaining”.158 
 
The court stressed the importance of s 39 of the Constitution which serves as guidance for the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights.159 Section 39(1) (a) provides that “[w]hen interpreting the 
Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”. Section 39(1)(b) obliges 
courts, tribunals or forums to “consider international law” and s 39(1)(c) provides for an 
interpretative approach which “may consider foreign law”. The Constitution also provides 
that “[w]hen interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable 
interpretation of legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative 
interpretation that is inconsistent with international law”.160 The court also made reference to 
s 39(2) which provides that any interpretive approach employed to develop customary or 
common law or for any legislation “must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights”. It ruled that legislation affecting the rights of military labour must be reflective of 
established international standards and their normative value system.161 
 
In interpreting the nature and extent of “the right to engage in collective bargaining”, the 
international law which is most relevant and helpful is the Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention 1949, which reinforces the ILO Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948. The most important Article of 
Convention 1949 in as far as the nature and extent of the right to engage in collective 
bargaining is concerned is Article 4 which provides that: 
“Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to 
encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for 
                                                            
158 Para [5]. 
159 Para [6]. 
160 See s 233. 
161 Para [6]. 
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voluntary negotiation between employers or employers’ organisations and workers’s 
organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by 
means of collective agreements.” 
 
Conradie JA observed that the numerous international provisions relevant in interpreting the 
nature of the right to engage in collective bargaining clearly favour a voluntaristic system 
which functions without reliance on a justiciable duty to bargain.162 Although the court was 
seized with many issues to deliberate upon, an important decision was the affirmation that 
whilst the Constitution recognises and protects the right to engage in collective bargaining, a 
justiciable duty to bargain does not exist in the current labour relations dispensation. 
Commenting on the argument by counsel of SANDU that the functions of the Military 
Bargaining Council (MBC), which included concluding and enforcing collective agreements 
and preventing and resolving labour disputes, implied that it could also compel parties to 
bargain, Conradie JA stated as follows:  
“Having regard to the prevailing labour relations philosophy on collective bargaining, 
it would be surprising if such bland language were thought sufficient to achieve the 
suggested object of judicially enforcing collective bargaining.”163 
 
The framework provided by the LRA, in as far as the nature and extent of the right to engage 
in collective bargaining is concerned, does not infringe on the constitutional right to engage 
in collective bargaining. Although this decision was made in respect of military unions, it 
also applies to all unions. The scheme of the LRA, which favours a voluntaristic system of 
collective bargaining, does not make it unconstitutional. The constitutional right to engage in 
collective bargaining is not violated by the failure of the LRA to provide a collective 
bargaining framework which recognises a judicially enforceable duty to bargain. 
 
                                                            
162 Para [10]. 
163 Para [32]. 
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2.3.2 The importance of industrial action and organisational rights in the collective 
bargaining process 
The Court also emphasised the importance of organisational rights and the right to strike in 
the collective bargaining process. The LRA provides for numerous organisational rights for 
trade unions which serve the purpose of assisting them “in building up a presence in the 
workplace” and facilitating the development of a collective bargaining relationship with 
employers.164 As put by Du Toit et al, “[o]rganisational rights were enacted as a corollary to a 
voluntarist collective bargaining regime” and their aim is to assist “unions to build up a 
sufficient degree of power to persuade employers to negotiate”.165 The minimum 
requirements to be met by trade unions in order to qualify for the rights set out in the Act are 
that they must meet the required thresholds of representativity and that they must be 
registered.  Trade unions which are sufficiently representative of the employees employed by 
an employer are entitled to the right to access the workplace, deduction of subscriptions and 
leave for trade union activities.166 In addition to these rights, trade unions representing the 
majority of employees are entitled the right to elect trade union representatives (shop 
stewards) and to disclosure of information.167 
 
It is worth noting that the LRA does not provide a precise definition as to what constitutes 
“sufficient representivity” for the purposes of acquiring the minimum organisational rights 
provided in sections 12, 13 and 15. The closest that the drafters of the LRA came to in 
attempting to give meaning to this concept is a provision in the Act “which deals with the 
criteria for the establishment of a statutory council” which states that the concept should be 
construed to mean “a registered trade union, or two or more registered trade unions acting 
                                                            
164 A Basson et al Essential Labour Law 5 ed (2009) 259. See chapter 3 for a detailed discussion on 
organisational rights. 
165 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 198. 
166 See ss 12, 13 and 15 of the LRA respectively. 
167 See s 14 and 16 of the LRA respectively. 
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jointly, whose members constitute at least 30 per cent of employees in a sector and area”.168 
Regarding the definition of a workplace, the Act provides that it is: 
“[T]he place or places where employees of an employer work. If an employer carries 
on or conducts two or more operations that are independent of one another by reason 
of their size, function or organisation, the place or places where employees work in 
connection with each independent operation, constitutes the workplace for that 
operation.”169 
 
With regards to the question whether insufficiently representative unions may strike to 
demand organisational rights, the issue was dealt with extensively in National Union of Metal 
and Allied workers of SA v Bader Bop (Pty).170 The brief facts of the case were that Bader 
Bop (the “employer”), granted organisational rights provided for in s 14 of the Act (the right 
to elect shop stewards) to the majority trade union, the General Industries Workers Union of 
South Africa (GIWUSA). The National Union of Metal and Allied workers (NUMSA), which 
represented 25% of the workforce, was only granted the s 12 and 13 rights which are the right 
to access the workplace and deduction of trade union subscriptions or levies.   
 
The employer denied NUMSA the right to elect shop stewards and the dispute was referred to 
the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) but conciliation failed. 
                                                            
168 See s 39(1) (a). See also generally S Vermaark “Organisational Rights-Sufficient Representivity”. 
http://www.deneysreitz.co.za/index.php/news/organisational_rights_sufficient_representivity (accessed 28 
September 2009). The author opines that this section is helpful in providing “some guidance” as to what 
constitutes a ‘sufficiently representative’ trade union. The article also makes reference to CCMA cases dealing 
with the issue of sufficient representivity. In SA Clothing and Textile Workers Union v Sheraton Textiles (Pty) 
Ltd 1997  (3) SALLR 48 (CCMA), the “Commissioner found that, generally, a union should be considered 
sufficiently representative if it can influence negotiations, the financial interests of those engaged in the industry 
or peace and stability within the industry or any section of the industry. Emphasis was placed on “the interests 
represented by the union” and that reliance should not be on “numerical representativeness”. The Commissioner 
contended “that insofar as a numerical threshold is relevant, guidance may be obtained from the requirement of 
30 per cent for all unions wanting to establish councils at sectoral level”. Commissioners therefore do have a 
discretion in determining whether a union is sufficiently representative or not and they are guided by broad 
guidelines in the Act. 
169 See s 213. 
170 (2003) ILJ 305 (CC). 
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The union threatened to call a strike and the employer approached the Labour Court to seek 
an interdict barring the union from participating in a strike in support for demands of 
organisational rights on the basis that the strike was not protected. The Labour Court ruled 
against the employer and an appeal against the decision was made to the Labour Appeal 
Court (LAC). The latter Court found for the employer and granted the interdict. 
 
The Constitutional Court heard an appeal against the decision of the LAC. The Court, per 
Ngcobo J set out the issues to be decided as follows:171 
i. Whether minority unions, in this case NUMSA, were entitled to acquire 
organisational rights outside the statutory framework. 
ii. If so entitled, whether such unions could resort to strike action to demand such 
rights. 
iii. Whether the strike was “limited by section 65(1) (c)” which section states that 
“no person may take part in a strike … or in any conduct in contemplation or 
furtherance of a strike if the issue in dispute is one that a party has the right to 
refer to arbitration or to the Labour Court in terms of this Act”. 
iv. “Whether section 21 provides an exclusive mechanism for the enforcement of 
organisational rights, including those that fall outside Part A”. 
 
The finding of the court per O’ Regan J was to the effect that there were no provisions in the 
LRA which precluded unions which do not meet the required thresholds of representivity 
from having recourse to collective bargaining and therefore concluding collective agreements 
granting them organisational rights. The court also put emphasis on the fact that the right to 
strike is an integral part of the collective bargaining process and that an interpretation that 
does not attenuate this constitutional right, but rather expands it, must be preferred. Under the 
current LRA, unions can acquire organisational rights through a collective agreement, by 
                                                            
171 Para [58]. 
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being a member of the statutory or bargaining council and by following the prescribed LRA 
procedure.172  
 
In terms of s 21(1) of the LRA, “[a]ny registered trade union may notify an employer in 
writing that it seeks to exercise one or more of the rights … in a workplace”. The notice must 
be lodged with a certificate of registration and must contain all the prescribed information.173  
The legislative framework for the acquisition and exercise of organisational rights, as well as 
their nature and content, is dealt with in detail in chapter 3. Trade unions cannot engage 
effectively with employers on matters of mutual interests without the support of 
organisational rights. These rights can be described as constituting a firm base from where 
unions can build collective bargaining relationships with employers and they are a vital 
element for trade unions during bargaining processes and other engagements with employers. 
 
2.3.3 The architecture of the institution of collective bargaining 
The most popular avenue or mechanism through which collective bargaining is conducted in 
South Africa is the bargaining council. Bargaining councils are described as “centralised 
structures on sectoral level which are directed at bargaining and settlement of disputes”.174 
The LRA provides that “[o]ne or more registered trade unions and one or more registered 
employers' organisations may establish a bargaining council for a sector and area”.175 This 
can be done by “adopting a constitution that meets the requirements of section 30” and 
“obtaining registration of the bargaining council in terms of section 29”.176 The minimum 
provisions of a bargaining council constitution are set out in s 30 whilst s 29 sets out the 
procedure for registration. The powers and functions of bargaining councils are wide ranging, 
but the most important for the purposes of this research are, “to conclude collective 
                                                            
172 See Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 201. 
173 See s 21(2) (a), (b) and (c).  
174 Slabbert and Swanepoel Introduction to Employment-Relations Management 87. 
175 See s 27(1). 
176 See s 27(1) (a) and (b) respectively.  
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agreements; to enforce those collective agreements; to prevent and resolve labour disputes; to 
perform dispute resolution functions referred to in s 51” and “to establish and administer a 
fund to be used for resolving disputes”.177 
 
The Act also provides for another avenue for collective bargaining called statutory 
councils.178 The statutory council system is described as a “compromise” avenue to address 
the demands by the unions, particularly COSATU, for compulsory centralised bargaining in 
all sectors of the economy.179 The powers of statutory councils include, performing “dispute 
resolution functions referred to in section 51”, promoting and establishing “training and 
educational schemes”, establishing and administering “pension, provident, medical aid, sick 
pay, holiday, unemployment schemes or funds or any similar schemes or funds for the benefit 
of one or more of the parties to the statutory council or their members” and lastly “to 
conclude collective agreement”.180 In terms of s 43(2) of the LRA, a statutory council may 
agree to include a function of a bargaining council in its constitution. 
 
Another relatively new avenue created under the new labour relations dispensation is the 
workplace forum. It is described as “a relatively new concept and innovating aspect of the 
new labour dispensation”.181 Van Niekerk et al state that these “forums are not essentially 
collective bargaining agents and their purpose is to supplement the institution of collective 
bargaining by expanding worker participation in managerial-decision making”.182 The 
                                                            
177 See s 28(1) (a)-(e). 
178 See sections 39, 40, 41 and 42 which generally deal with the registration of statutory councils and other 
related issues. 
179A Van Niekerk et al Law @ Work (2008) 355. The authors state that the rationale behind the establishment of 
statutory councils is that they might be established in sectors where union representivity is relatively low and 
where there are no bargaining councils established. 
180See s 43(1) (a)-(d). 
181Van Jaarsveld and Van Eck  Principles of Labour Law 257. 
182Van Niekerk et al Law @ Work 362. The authors cite the Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations 
Bill, published in 1995 in the International Labour Journal which states, inter alia, that “workplace forums are 
designed to facilitate a shift at the workplace, from adversarial collective bargaining on all matters to joint 
problem solving and participation on certain subjects”. As further stated in the Memorandum “they are designed 
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function of workplace forums is therefore to promote a consultative relationship between 
labour and employers on issues which fall outside the normal collective bargaining 
process.183 The Act provides that the general functions of workplace forums include, seeking 
to “promote the interests of all employees in the workplace, whether or not they are trade 
union members”, seeking “to enhance efficiency in the workplace”, being “consulted by the 
employer, with a view to reaching consensus” on various matters referred to in s 84, and 
“participating in joint-decision making about matters referred to in section 86”.184 
 
Section 80 of the LRA sets out how a workplace forum may be established. They can be 
established in any workplace where an employer employs more than one hundred employees 
and “any representative trade union may apply to the Commission in the prescribed form for 
the establishment of a workplace forum” and, “the applicant must satisfy the Commission 
that a copy of the application has been served on the employer”. The Act provides for 
specific matters for consultation in s 84 which include matters such as, the restructuring of 
the workplace which includes the introduction of new technology and new operational 
methods, changes in the organisation of work, mergers and transfers of ownership which 
could affect workers, education and training, grading of jobs, the termination of employers’ 
services based on operational requirements and exemptions from any collective agreements 
or any law. The consultative and joint-decision making functions are dealt with in detail in    
s 85 and s 86 respectively. Apart from the statutory system of collective bargaining provided 
in the LRA, collective bargaining also occurs at non-statutory centralised bargaining forums 
and enterprise or plant level. 
 
There is debate about the effectiveness of the collective bargaining process envisaged by the 
LRA. An empirical and conceptual study done by the University of Cape Town Labour and 
Enterprise Policy Research Group published in 2007 reveals that the institution of collective 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
to perform functions that collective bargaining cannot easily achieve: the joint solution of problems and the 
resolution of conflicts over production”. 
183 Slabbert and Swanepoel Introduction to Employment-Relations Management 70. 
184 See generally s 79(a)-(d). 
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bargaining faces serious challenges which cannot be left unattended.185 The study outlines the 
challenges in both the statutory and non-statutory system. 
 
2.3.4 Bargaining councils 
Formerly known as “industrial councils” under the old LRA, bargaining councils are the 
central pillar of the institution of collective bargaining.186 The voluntary process of collective 
bargaining envisaged in the LRA means that participation in bargaining councils is also 
voluntary. The Act however provides that a council may make a request to the Minister that 
an agreement concluded be extended “to any non-parties to the collective agreement that are 
within its registered scope and are identified in the request”.187 This can only happen when a 
council holds a meeting and: 
“one or more registered trade unions whose members constitute the majority of the 
members of the trade unions that are party to the bargaining council vote in favour of 
the extension; and … one or more registered employers’ organisations whose 
members employ the majority of the employees employed by the members of the 
employers’ organisations that are party to the bargaining council, vote in favour of the 
extension”.188 
 
                                                            
185 S Godfrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa: An Empirical and Conceptual Study of 
Collective Bargaining” (2007) http://www.commerce.uct.ac.za/research_units/dpru/.../WP_07-130.pdf  
(accessed 27 September 2009). 
186 Godfrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa” 1. 
187 See s 32(1). The Act provides that the Minister has no discretion but to extend the agreement if the council 
meets the representivity requirement, if the collective agreement provides for an independent body to pronounce 
on appeals brought by non-parties for applications for exemptions and the withdrawal of exemptions by the 
bargaining council and if the agreement “contains criteria that must be applied by the independent body when it 
considers an appeal” which criteria must be fair and also be seen to promote the objectives of the Act and that 
“the terms of the agreement do not discriminate against non-parties”. See s 32(3)(e), (f) and (g) respectively. 
The Minister can however exercise his discretion and extend the agreement even if the council does not meet the 
representivity requirement. This can only happen “if the parties to the bargaining council are sufficiently 
representative within the registered scope of the bargaining council” and also if “the Minister is satisfied that 
failure to extend the agreement may undermine collective bargaining at sectoral level or in the public service as 
a whole” (See s 32(5)(2) (a) and (b)).   
188 See s 32(1(a)-(b). 
46 
 
The possibility of extending collective agreements to non-parties coerces, to a certain extent, 
both labour and employers to participate in bargaining councils. The Minister is obliged to 
extend the collective agreement if the majority of employees covered by the collective 
agreement are members of the trade union which is a party to the collective agreement and 
the majority of the employees are employed by an employer who is a member of the 
employers’ organisation.189  
 
A challenge which threatens the existence and vibrancy of bargaining councils, as outlined in 
the study,190 is the strict interpretation of the representivity requirement for the purposes of 
extending agreements. Simply put: 
“The more employers and employees that do not join the employers’s organisations 
and trade unions that participate on councils, the harder it is for bargaining councils to 
maintain the necessary level of representivity to have their agreements extended to 
non-parties.”191 
The effect of not having agreements extended due to lack of representivity is the threat of 
undercutting of the employer party to the agreement by competitors who are not parties to the 
bargaining council. Godfrey et al state that when faced with this threat, employers who are 
parties to the collective agreement respond by terminating their membership with the 
employers’ organisation in an attempt to avoid being covered by collective agreements.192 As 
more employers cease to be members of the employers’ organisation, the ultimate result is 
the collapse of the council. Although the Minister has discretion to extend agreements to non-
parties in cases where parties are not “sufficiently representative”, the interpretation of 
‘sufficiently representative’ by the department of Labour is strict.193 The reason mooted for 
                                                            
189 See also “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa: An Empirical and Conceptual Study of 
Collective Bargaining”.http://www.commerce.uct.ac.za/research_units/dpru/PBriefsPDF/PDFs/PolicyBrief08-
18.pdf (accessed 28 September 2009). 
190 Godfrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa” 16. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
   
47 
 
such a strict interpretation is that employers who are not parties to the collective agreements, 
particularly small enterprises, are opposed to such extensions.194 
 
The issue of representivity almost caused the winding up of the Southern and Eastern Cape 
Building Bargaining Council, a case study in the conceptual and empirical study by Godfrey 
et al. In East Cape Masterbuilders And Allied Industries Association v Building Industrial 
Bargaining Council (Southern and Eastern Cape),195 the Labour Court dealt with an 
application from the employer party (East Cape Master Builders and Allied Industries 
Association (MBA) and the Electrical Contractors and Allied Industries Association) in the 
council to have it wound up, on amongst other grounds, that the Amalgamated Union of 
Building Trade Workers of South Africa and the National Union of Mine Workers (NUM), 
“were not sufficiently representative”. The dispute was precipitated by the unwillingness of 
the employer party to consent to the extension of a previous main agreement which expired 
or lapsed on 30 September 2001. The other reasons advanced by the employer party were that 
its members were forced to provide subsidies to ensure that the council enforced collective 
agreements; that the council was failing to monitor the compliance of the agreement by the 
parties, that the councils’ assets had shrunk; and that bargaining councils in the building 
industry in other provinces were closing.196 
 
In exercising its discretion, the court refused to grant the application. It made the following 
important ruling: 
“In the Applicants’ own submission they desired not to terminate their bargaining 
relationship with the Unions as they realised and acknowledge the crucial importance 
of such relationship in the building industry. All that the Applicants required was to 
have the collective bargaining process conducted not from the present statutorily-
created council but from a non-statutory and informal bargaining forum which would, 
                                                            
194 Ibid. 
195 Available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALC/2004/4.pdf and cited as 2004 ZALC (4) (accessed 28 
September 2009). 
196 See the arguments of the Applicants in Para [3]. 
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seemingly, be structured in the Applicants’ own terms. Their proposed bargaining 
mechanism would not … augur well for the interests of all the parties, particularly the 
employees…. [S]uch arrangement would not be within the spirit and objective of the 
Act.”197  
 
The court further stated as follows: 
“In the event of any representative trade union party to the Council having lost such 
number of membership that it no longer had the requisite threshold which entitled it to 
admission to and membership of the Council then, any other party to the Council have 
the right, it seems …, to challenge the continued membership of the representative 
trade union party concerned. That challenge should be directed to the Council. Be that 
as it may, this factor also appears to be irrelevant to the question of winding-up of the 
Council.”198 
Although the bargaining council is still in existence, it has ceased to serve the function of 
bargaining as the employer party is refusing to negotiate. It administers various funds and 
performs dispute resolution and secretariat functions.199 
 
Another challenge which threatens the effectiveness of bargaining councils is that most 
agreements prohibit bargaining at plant-level on matters covered in the collective agreement. 
As put by Godfrey et al “[f]irm and plant-level bargaining … [seem] to have largely 
disappeared within the jurisdictions of bargaining councils.200 The other concern, according 
to the policy document is that the assistance that bargaining councils are getting for dispute 
                                                            
197 Para [21]. 
198 Para [20.3]. 
199 Godfrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa” 26. 
200 Godfrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa” 99. 
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resolutions functions, in the form of subsidies, is inadequate and that this function has proved 
to be a drain on the finances of the council.201  
 
 
There are other wide ranging criticisms about bargaining councils. There is a general feeling 
or perception among small enterprises that “large companies use the system to raise barriers 
to entry into their industry, thereby eliminating threats of competition emerging from smaller 
players” and that “the bargaining council system is the very basis of the trade union 
federation’s inordinate power”.202 Bargaining councils are therefore seen by smaller 
businesses as nothing but “a way of killing off competition”.203 Du Toit et al warn that “the 
extension of an agreement of a council whose parties are merely sufficiently representative is 
potentially vulnerable to constitutional challenge on the grounds of a violation of employers’ 
property rights or the right to engage in economic activity”.204 The authors however argue 
that “the policy considerations justifying extension … will generally amount to legitimate 
social objectives, outweighing competing interests”.205 They argue further that “[t]he key 
issue for decision will be whether the exemption procedures and practices are a satisfactory 
guarantee against any alleged disproportionate interference with interests not adequately 
represented by the council” and that “a more inclusive investigation introduces greater 
proportionality and insulation against a constitutional challenge”.206  
 
 
                                                            
201 Godfrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa” 105. 
202 See “Bargaining Councils: Major Showdown Looms” BusinessOwner 08 March 2005 
http://www.businessowner.co.za/Article.aspx?Page=23&type=23&Item=2404 (accessed September 2009).The 
article argues that “central bargaining is union paradise” because “only the few large factories have to be 
mobilised and one agreement negotiated to cover an entire industry”. 
203See “Bargaining Council Is Competition Killer”BusinessOwner 08 December 2004 
http://www.businessowner.co.za/Article.aspx?Page=23&type=23&Item=2360 (accessed 28 September 
2009).The article argues that the fear of being forced to pay “holiday bonus and full corporate perks” forces 
would be entrepreneurs to “stick to their corporate careers and never start a business”. 
204Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 267. 
205 Ibid. 
206 D du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 3ed (2002) 216. 
50 
 
Basson et al state that although the extension of bargaining council agreements to non-parties 
has the potential of violating the rights of non-parties to bargain collectively, there are some 
benefits to be derived from such extensions. They outline some of the benefits as follows:207 
 
i. Uniform standards can be established in small workplaces where very few 
employees are members of trade unions and where there is no collective 
bargaining. 
ii. Extending agreements averts the possibility of employers in the same sector 
“from competing with each other on the basis of the terms and conditions of 
employment that they offer their employees-these matters are taken out of 
competition”. 
iii. “Employers can therefore agree with unions to maintain reasonable conditions 
of employment without the fear that their production costs (in the form of 
wages and conditions of employment) will undermine their competitiveness in 
the market.” 
iv. On the possible unconstitutionality of such a process, the authors argue that 
the extensions promote “equality throughout a sector and area” and the right to 
fair labour practices which is also entrenched in the Constitution. The process 
does “not represent an undue infringement of the right to bargain collectively-
collective bargaining is not prohibited or limited” as “the positive aspects of 
collective bargaining (such as the collective regulation of terms and benefits of 
employment) and benefits of collective bargaining are extended to employees 
who would not normally have these benefits”. 
 
 
 
2.3.5 Statutory councils 
The idea behind creating this avenue of collective bargaining was to attempt to appease trade 
unions, particularly COSATU, which were demanding compulsory centralised bargaining in 
all sectors. Statutory councils were established “to provide a compromise between the 
voluntarism of the bargaining council system and the compulsion that was demanded by 
                                                            
207 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 299. 
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COSATU”.208 The system of statutory council is criticised for failing to promote one of the 
most important objectives of the LRA, which is to promote centralised bargaining.209 Only a 
few statutory councils have been registered210 and the system might not achieve its intended 
objectives unless deliberate strategies are formulated to improve its efficacy. The idea behind 
their formation is to a large extent plausible and if their shortcomings are addressed, the 
councils can efficiently serve as a “compromise” between the system of voluntarism and 
compulsion. Godfrey et al state that the system needs to be modified or a viable alternative 
should be developed. The authors argue that there is little enthusiasm displayed by the DoL to 
revisit the system despite its glaring shortcomings.211 
 
The failure of this system cannot be attributed to the fact that its architecture was not well 
planned. If the Department comes up with mechanisms and incentives for the unwilling 
parties, particularly employers to participate, the system can complement the bargaining 
council system.  
 
2.3.6 The quasi-statutory system of collective bargaining 
 
There is an interesting trend in some sectors where unions do not meet the required threshold 
of representivity which therefore means that bargaining councils cannot be formed because 
the agreements reached risk not being extended to parties which are not members. The fear of 
                                                            
208 Godfrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa” 13. 
209 See s 1(d) (ii) of the LRA. 
210Godfrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa” 37. At the time when the policy document 
was written there were only two councils set up and registered, the Statutory Council for the Printing, 
Newspaper and Packaging Industry of South Africa and the Amanzi Statutory Council. The Amanzi statutory 
council has since become a bargaining council. The constitution of the bargaining council was signed on 17 
June 2010. The majority trade union in the sector is the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) 
which played a critical role in the establishment of the council. The other unions are the National Education, 
Health and Allied Workers’ Union (NEHAWU) and the United Association of South Africa (UASA). The 
employers’ organisation is the South African Association of Water Utilities (SAAWU). 
http://www.samwu.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=626&Itemid=1 (accessed 22 June 
2010). 
211 Godfrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa” 102. 
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“undercutting” forces employers in such sectors to agree to some form of centralised 
bargaining outside the statutory framework. This quasi-statutory system is prevalent in the 
security and cleaning sectors and its hallmarks are that “collective bargaining takes place in a 
forum constituted in terms of the draft constitution of a yet to be established bargaining 
council” and that agreements reached by parties at such forum are given effect to by way of 
sectoral determinations issued by the Minister at the request of the Minister of Labour.212 
 
2.3.7 Workplace forums 
Workplace forums are extensively dealt with in Chapter 5 of the LRA. Their role is largely to 
supplement the collective bargaining process by promoting the participation of workers in 
management decisions. They serve the purpose of reducing adversarialism which is inherent 
in the collective bargaining process. Van Niekerk et al cite the Explanatory Memorandum to 
the Labour Relations Bill published in 1995, which states amongst other things that: 
“Workplace forums are designed to facilitate a shift at the workplace, from 
adversarial collective bargaining on all matters to joint problem solving and 
participation on certain subjects. They are designed to perform functions that 
collective bargaining cannot easily achieve … the joint solution of problems and the 
resolution of conflicts over production.”213 
 
                                                            
212Godfrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa”. The sectors which have made use of this 
system of bargaining, according to the study, are mainly the cleaning and security sector. In the security sector, 
the general challenges frustrating the collective bargaining process were, amongst other things, “that there is no 
guarantee that unions can achieve unity amongst themselves during negotiations” because there are more than 
15 unions in the sector. There is also the problem of low union representivity and organising challenges. There 
are also questions about the “collective bargaining competencies” of the parties, that is, employers and 
employees. In the 1996 security guard strike, often referred to as probably the bloodiest strike in the labour 
history of South Africa, employers often resorted “to the old divide and rule tactic” and this did not help matters. 
The reality is that “collective bargaining is neither entrenched nor stable” in the sector. See also “Security 
strikes lessons must be learnt” Business Report, 12 October 2006 
http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=553&fArticleId=3481854 (accessed 29 September 2009). 
213 Van Niekerk et al Law @ Work 362. 
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The question therefore is whether this “relatively new concept and innovating aspect of the 
new labour dispensation”214 is achieving its purpose or objective of promoting the 
participation of employees in the decisions made by management and thereby promoting 
peaceful relations at the workplace. The general feeling among labour law experts and 
commentators is that workplace forums have failed in this regard.215 There are wide ranging 
criticisms against workplace forums. There is the criticism that if the legislature intended to 
increase participation of workers in decisions made by management and thereby promote 
industrial democracy, then why can workplace forums only be established at the request of 
majority unions and not just any registered union.216 The only justification might be that 
employers can use such forums “to forestall unionization” which is not a convincing 
argument since “unions have much to offer beyond the reach of the workplace forum”.217 
Another criticism is that there should not have been an enumeration of issues for consultation 
as the result is that the reach of workplace forums is narrowed.218 
 
The legislature also failed to sufficiently distinguish the process of collective bargaining from 
other models aimed at increasing or promoting worker participation at the workplace, 
particularly the workplace forum. The result is “the establishment of two overlapping 
channels of employee representation in the workplace … the union and the workplace 
forum”.219 A possible solution to this confusion created by the legislature is to abandon the 
workplace forum altogether and to place all its functions under trade unions, but such a move 
obviously defeats “the goal of providing a forum divorced from the adversarial bargaining 
process”.220  
                                                            
214 Van Jaarsveld and Van Eck Principles of Labour 257. 
215 For example Godrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa” 5. 
216 C Summers “Workplace Forums from a Comparative Perspective” (1995) 16 ILJ 806 at 811. 
217 Ibid. The author opines that “the workplace forum will give workers a realisation of the possibility and 
potential for organisation, and provide an opening for union organisation”. 
218 Summers 1995 ILJ 812.  The authors argues that if trade unions can force employers to bargain and to 
embark on strike action on any matter of mutual interest, there is no justification why the legislature opted to 
narrow  “the reach of the workplace forum”. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Ibid. 
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Another criticism is that the LRA provides for the establishment of a trade union based 
workplace forum. In terms of s 8(1) of the LRA, “[i]f a representative trade union is 
recognised in terms of a collective agreement by an employer for the purposes of collective 
bargaining in respect of all employees in a workplace, that trade union may apply … for the 
establishment of a workplace forum”. The LRA further provides that members of the 
workplace forum may be chosen from “its elected representatives in the workplace”.221 It also 
provides that such issues as the nomination, election and removal of representatives are 
governed by the constitution of the trade union. The result is that such a trade union will 
exercise total control over such a workplace forum and they ultimately become devoid of any 
independence. As put by Olivier, the control over workplace forums by majority trade unions 
blurs “the distinction between the (collective bargaining) role of trade unions and the 
consensus seeking functions of workplace forums ….”222 
 
 
The threshold of 100 employees in a workplace for a workplace forum to be established is 
also another criticism. Olivier states that “why the legislature opted for such a high threshold 
is unclear and unjustified, especially in view in which businesses organize themselves in 
South Africa”.223 The author further argues that “the apparent irony is that workplace forums 
as envisaged by the Act [LRA] cannot be introduced … where they are perhaps most 
needed”.224 The other criticism is directed at the failure of the LRA to “exclude the possibility 
that employees may embark on strike action if agreement on a matter meant for consultation 
cannot be reached”.225 This is a glaring oversight as it is essential in cooperative models that 
economic weapons should not be used when parties fail to reach agreement. The use of 
economic power strains the relationship of the parties as it introduces “adversarial elements 
into the relationship”.226 
 
                                                            
221 See s 8(2). 
222 M Olivier “Workplace Forums: Critical Questions from a Labour Law Perspective (1996) 17 ILJ 803 at 812. 
223 Olivier 1996 ILJ 809. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Olivier 1996 813. 
226 Ibid. 
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Although workplace forums have failed in their current form, they offer trade unions an 
opportunity to establish collective bargaining at workplace or plant level. Du Toit states that 
“since bargaining councils are voluntary, their existence depends on employers’ willingness 
to join them or unions’ ability to persuade employers to do so”.227 A decline in the strength of 
unions means that their ability to coax unwilling employers to join these institutions is 
diminished which also means a reduction of incentives for employers.228 He goes on to state 
that this will mean the collapse of the bargaining council system which will not mean that 
unions will automatically revert to bargaining at plant-level since diminished bargaining 
strength at sectoral level will also mean that they will experience hurdles in initiating 
bargaining at any level.229 The author opines that if such situations arise, “the establishment 
of workplace forums may give unions footholds in workplaces which they might otherwise 
be unable to secure …” eventually leading to the creation of “negotiating relationships” 
which will result in the re-establishment of “a basis for collective bargaining at workplace 
level”.230 
 
 
The author argues that trade unions can use the failure of the current workplace forum to their 
advantage but cautions that this “radical reorientation” can only happen if there is shift of 
perception involving “reconceptualising such forums from Trojan horses of employer power 
to points of support for workplace bargaining and local union structures”.231 Such a shift, as 
argued by the author, can however only happen if trade unions become disillusioned with 
bargaining at sectoral level and no longer regard “bargaining councils as their primary 
focus”.232  
 
                                                            
227 D du Toit “What is the Future of Collective Bargaining (and Labour Law) in South Africa?” (2007) 28 ILJ 
1405 at 1428 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Ibid. 
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The question which the author poses about workplace forums is whether they “are a dead 
letter or an idea ahead of its time”.233 Given the fact that collective bargaining still remains an 
adversarial process in South African due to a variety of social and economic factors, such as 
high levels of unemployment, job insecurities, poor working conditions and the widening gap 
between the rich and the poor, trade unions will always be sceptical of the system of 
workplace forums as currently envisaged by the LRA. They will always think of it as a ploy 
to strengthen the power of management at the workplace and thereby diluting the power of 
workers to engage in militant collective bargaining for the improvement of their working 
conditions. The short answer is that workplace forums remain “an idea ahead of its time”. 
They cannot be dismissed as having failed because there is still hope that they can be utilised 
by unions as a stepping stone in building relationships to bargain at plant or enterprise level. 
They are essential in promoting participation by workers in corporate decision making and 
they benefit all employees in workplaces where they are established, regardless of trade union 
membership. As put by Summers, “the potential value of developing a non-adversarial forum 
is too great [and] the basic principle ought not to be denied because of imperfection in the 
details, nor dismissed as impossible to achieve”.234 
 
 
2.4 The non-statutory system of collective bargaining  
 
Collective bargaining does not only take place in terms of the statutory mechanisms. 
Employers and trade unions can opt to bargain at enterprise or plant level outside the 
statutory bargaining forums. The LRA does not place any restrictions on such a practice and 
parties to a bargaining council are not prohibited “from also entering into private bargaining 
relationships, provided that agreements do not conflict with council agreements”.235 This 
process, as put by Grogan,236 is triggered by a request from a trade union to “an employer or a 
group of employers” to be recognised “for its support among the workers of the industry or 
enterprise concerned”.  
                                                            
233 Ibid. 
234 Summers 1995 ILJ 813. 
235 Grogan Collective Labour Law 81-82. 
236 Ibid. 
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Upon satisfaction that indeed there is support for the union by the employees or workforce, 
the employer or a group of employees and the trade union concerned then start negotiations, 
the objective being to reach a recognition agreement which effectively means that the trade 
union is formally recognised and its “right to represent the interests of employees in a 
particular constituency or bargaining unit acknowledged”.237 The agreement also “sets out the 
rights and duties of the parties inter se, the procedures for the periodic negotiation of 
substantive agreements regulating wages and other terms and conditions of service and 
procedures for the resolution of disputes and grievances”.238 
 
The practice in the mining sector is the use of the centralised bargaining forum.  The forum 
“exists and operates by virtue of agreements between the parties and established practice, as 
adapted from time to time”.239 The employer party to the forum is the Chamber of Mines and 
although there are numerous trade unions with recognition agreements with various firms in 
the mining industry, the Chamber of Mines bargains only four unions namely, NUM, UASA, 
Solidarity and the South African Equity Workers’ Association (SAEWA).240 According to the 
study, bargaining takes place in bargaining units which comprise of miners, artisans and 
officials. Although bargaining used to take place at mine level, a change occurred in 2005 
which saw all bargaining units merging and a trend of bargaining at centralised level 
emerged. An agreement was reached in 1996 to the effect that bargaining on issues with 
“direct cost implications” must take place at the chamber level while bargaining on other 
issues such as organisation, operations and the workplace, should take place at mine level.241  
                                                            
237 Ibid. 
238 Ibid. According to Grogan, there is nothing stopping the parties from entering into agreements regulating 
such other matters as organisational rights even though these are regulated under the LRA. 
239 See Godfrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa” 63. 
240 Godfrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa” 63-64. The Chamber only engages in 
bargaining on behalf of coal and gold mining members “outside of the ambit of the Chamber’s bargaining are 
covered by company or mine-level collective bargaining”. 
241 Godfrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa” 66. The reality of the system is basically 
that members of the Chamber negotiate and “reach separate or individual deals with union parties, particularly 
in respect of wage rates” and the agreements concluded therefore reflect disparities in “wage rates and other 
conditions for different companies, although they are negotiated at the central forum”. There is also a tendency, 
according to the study, of concluding “framework agreements … at the central level which set parameters for 
negotiations at mine or company level”. 
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The criticism against this practice of bargaining, according to the study, is that it makes 
bargaining “complex”, “protracted” and “confrontational” and the justifications for the 
system by the Chamber is that a “one size fits all” approach is inappropriate and that a 
flexible system is “advantageous”.242 The formation of a bargaining council was mooted in 
2003 and a document was prepared by the Chamber which outlines contentious areas to be 
agreed upon.243 A bargaining council in the mining sector, which is one of the biggest 
industries contributing to the South African economy, will go a long way in promoting 
orderly collective bargaining and thereby reducing protracted industrial action which often 
scares away potential investors. 
 
Another sector which makes use of the system of the bargaining forum (and was a case study 
in the working paper by Godfrey et al) is the automobile industry. A bargaining forum, the 
National Bargaining Forum (NBF), was set up in 1990 and although it was characterised by 
adversarialism and instablility, it has gradually transformed with parties committing 
themselves to promote, inter alia, “the long term growth and viability of the industry and 
protection of jobs” and the elimination of “apartheid wage discrepancies”.244 The participants 
in the forum are NUMSA and the Automoblie Manufactures Employers’ Organisation 
(AMEO). AMEO comprises seven original equipment manufacturers which are Toyota, 
VWSA, General Motors, Nissan, BMW, Ford and Daimler Chrysler.245 One of the features of 
the agreement by the Forum which covers wide ranging issues is that it functions without a 
constitution, is voluntary, “has few rules and formalities” and “is not registered in any 
                                                            
242 Ibid. 
243 Godfrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa” 71-72. The contentious areas include the 
council’s scope, the criteria for the recognition of unions and employers’ organisations, the bargaining levels 
and topics, the definition criteria for small and medium employers and the best ways of serving their interests, 
how sub-contractors would be dealt with, how the council will discharge its function of resolving disputes, how 
non-parties will comply with agreements, the extension of agreements to non-parties and the exemption body as 
well as the procedure for exemptions from council agreements. 
244Godfrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa” 74. 
245Godfrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa” 78.  All employers are represented and at 
the time the Working Paper was written, NUMSA was representing over 25000 employees and was therefore 
representing “the vast majority of workers”. 
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way”.246 Another key feature of the agreement is that although it “effectively prohibits dual-
level bargaining”, it “does provide for the negotiation of incentive schemes at plant level, 
gives guidance as to how such negotiations should take place, and also provides for the 
negotiation of a range of variations within parameters set by the NBF agreement”.247 
 
The bargaining forum has been lauded by the parties as having brought “significant 
achievements”, “stability to the industry, as well as a greater predictability for employers”.248 
There is real hope that the forum “will remain stable into the future” and that it will continue 
producing “what are generally seen as very sophisticated, cutting-edge agreements”. 249 In 
their conceptual and empirical study, Godfrey, Theron and Visser state that in one of their 
interviews, it emerged that “the NBF agreement has been used by the Minister of Labour and 
the Governor of the Reserve Bank to impress the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank with regard to the sophistication of industrial relations in the country”.250 
 
Although the forum is currently quite stable, there are fears that such stability may not last 
long. The union party plans “to create a mega bargaining council” which will include “the 
metal and engineering sector (and its bargaining council), the tyre sector (and its bargaining 
council), and the automobile sector (and the NBF).251 The ambitious plan is to accommodate 
each sector “in a chamber within the mega council”.252 The employers, according to the 
study, seem to favour decentralised bargaining although they accept that “given NUMSA’s 
power and the sort of pressure the union would bring to bear on employers”; there is very 
                                                            
246 Ibid. Other features are that the forum has a dispute resolution function, that disputes regarding rights are 
settled “through arbitration and interest disputes” settled by conciliation and mediation failing which, the last 
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NBF” but are resolved at plant level and the CCMA. 
247 Godfrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa” 79. 
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little likelihood of this happening”.253 If these differences are not resolved in an amicable 
way, then the future of the forum is uncertain. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Collective bargaining in South Africa takes place at various levels and is a complex process. 
The LRA does not prohibit plant-level bargaining and bargaining outside the statutory 
system. Trade unions still remain active in the bargaining process and the organisational 
rights that they are equipped with by the Act, coupled with the right to strike, are essential in 
assisting them to make their demands.  Although the system of bargaining is now fairly 
entrenched, there is need to formulate deliberate strategies to ensure that it does not lose its 
vibrancy and that it remains the preferred method of resolving disputes. A constant review of 
the system is therefore important to identify and remedy its shortcomings. 
 
The policy document by Godfrey et al identifies many challenges which the system of 
collective bargaining is grappling with.254 The study made numerous reasoned policy 
recommendations on how to strengthen or revitalise the institution of collective bargaining to 
ensure that it does not lose its vibrancy and thereby remains the preferred method of 
resolving labour disputes in South Africa. Among the wide ranging recommendations is the 
proposition that the Department of Labour (DoL) should play a “proactive role in supporting 
bargaining councils” by developing “programmes to support and assist bargaining councils, 
disseminating best practices and coordinating systems and resources”.255  
                                                            
253 Ibid.  
254 The authors cite challenges such as the decline of trade union membership due to decentralised production 
and a shift to services as well as the current definition of workplace in the LRA, the decline of plant or firm-
level bargaining which they argue is evidence “that organisational rights have not been an adequate substitute 
for the duty to bargain”, the challenges faced by parties in maintaining the required representivity thresholds and 
the strict interpretation of this requirement when extending bargaining council agreements, the negative effects 
of extending agreements to small non-party businesses, the failure by legislature to revisit the statutory council 
system despite overwhelming evidence that  it is failing to achieve its intended purpose, the confusion regarding 
bargaining at plant level and bargaining councils and the failure of the legislature to revisit the workplace forum 
which still remains “a dead letter”. 
255 Godfrey et al “The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa” 104. 
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The study also proposes that there should be a more flexible approach in the interpretation of 
‘sufficient representivity’ for the purpose of extending bargaining council agreements.256 It 
argues that bargaining councils can also make efforts to meet the representivity thresholds by, 
for example, “incentivising participation”.257 Another recommendation, which is more 
drastic, is that the current system as envisaged by the LRA should be changed. The overhaul 
should start by re-introducing a justiciable duty to bargain which should replace 
organisational rights. Another recommendation is that the definition of ‘workplace’ should be 
revised given the fact there is now a shift from standard to non-standard employment.258  The 
level of bargaining, which is often a contentious issue, can be resolved by “providing that the 
Labour Court can make an ‘order’ recommending to the parties the level at which bargaining 
should take place”.259  
 
The introduction of the duty to bargain will only create confusion and inconsistencies in the 
collective bargaining jurisprudence. The courts are not an appropriate platform to make 
determinations on collective bargaining matters. The study also proposes a revisitation of the 
workplace forum model and the creation of a “vehicle … that can develop productivity 
agreements, build workplace democracy and reduce adversarialism”.260 The authors argue 
that workplace forums can be utilised by unions “to address the problem of non-standard 
employees” which pose challenges for union organisation”.261 These wide ranging 
recommendations, if adopted by the policy makers, could revitalise and strengthen the 
institution of collective bargaining. Maintaining the vibrancy of the system is a challenge and 
there must be constant engagement by all stakeholders to identify its shortcomings and to 
formulate deliberate strategies to improve its efficacy. 
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Du Toit states that the process of collective bargaining is inherently adversarial in nature and 
suggests that in order to resolve disputes; it is necessary to promote worker participation and 
to avoid adversarial exchanges common in the ordinary bargaining process.262 O’Regan 
argues that “[t]he process of collective bargaining accepts that management is the decision-
maker and merely attempts by negotiation to affect those decisions”.263 The author quotes 
Brannen,264 who states as follows: 
“[T]he development of collective bargaining does not in any central way impinge on 
the traditional forms of social relationships in industry. It does not challenge the basic 
division of the enterprise into the managers and the managed. Indeed, it might be seen 
as supporting that division …. The notion of management who have formal authority 
is exercised from the outside, so to speak, on those who have the right to give. In this 
sense the rights of management receive no major challenge from the process of 
collective bargaining …. Checks in the way managerial authority is exercised do not 
affect the principle; rather they underwrite it”.  
 
O’Regan also points out “that collective bargaining institutionalizes an adversarial approach 
to labour relations, which is not necessarily advantageous”.265 The author observes that: 
“Although autonomous worker organization and adversarial collective bargaining are 
essential, it may well be that co-operation within the enterprise should not be entirely 
excluded by collective bargaining”.266 
 
The above observations underscore the need to come up with innovative mechanisms to 
supplement the institution of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining cannot be the sole 
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panacea for a South African labour relations system with a history of adversarialism because 
by its very nature, it also institutionalises adversarial relations. O’Regan suggests that some 
challenges faced by the institution may be partly remedied by “increasing worker 
participation in decision-making in the enterprise ….”267 This is not to say, however, that 
worker participation must replace collective bargaining as the primary method of resolving 
labour disputes. It should play a supplementary role and parties should continue to explore 
other possible avenues offered by the new labour relations dispensation that would best serve 
their interests. 
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CHAPTER 3  
THE RIGHT TO ORGANISE: SCOPE OF ORGANISATIONAL RIGHTS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Collective bargaining is an important process in promoting the interests of workers and 
peaceful industrial relations. Its effectiveness to trade unions is however dependent on a 
variety of factors, such as their strength and organisation. Trade unions can only bargain 
effectively if they are provided with adequate trade union rights. The LRA provides trade 
unions with numerous organisational rights which supplement their right to engage in 
collective bargaining. 
 
The pre-1995 labour jurisprudence did not clearly define or grant organisational rights to 
trade unions. Trade union rights were often acquired through “the unfair labour practice 
jurisdiction of the Industrial Court”.268 Although the Act (old LRA) favoured a voluntarist 
approach to collective bargaining, the Industrial Court often used the wide unfair labour 
jurisdiction to coerce unwilling employers to the bargaining table, and in so doing, developed 
the duty to bargain jurisprudence. The intervention by the court in the bargaining arena meant 
that it was drawn to such issues as the determination of bargaining partners and topics.269 In 
Food & Allied Workers Union v Spekenham Supreme,270 the Industrial Court held that a 
voluntarist system of collective bargaining could not be relied upon without courts 
                                                            
268 Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Labour Relations Bill prepared by the Ministerial Legal Task Team, 
published in (1995) 16 ILJ 278 at 293. The Act only provided for a limited right to stop-order facilities.  
269 Explanatory Memorandum 292. The Ministerial Legal Task Team cautioned that “the fundamental danger in 
the imposition of a legally enforceable duty to bargain and the consequent determination by the judiciary of 
levels of bargaining, bargaining partners and bargaining topis, is the rigidity which is introduced into a labour 
market that needs to respond to a changing economic environment”.  It unanimously adopted a model allowing 
“the parties, through the exercise of power, to determine their own arrangements”. It argued that there was a 
“statutory impetus” for the exercise of such power in the form of “organisational rights and a protected right to 
strike”. 
270 (1988) 9 ILJ 628 (IC). 
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intervening if the overall intention of the then labour relations system was to curb industrial 
unrest.271  
 
The current labour relations jurisprudence does not expressly acknowledge the existence of a 
legally enforceable duty to bargain. It favours a system of voluntarism, albeit tampered by a 
variety of safeguards such as the right to have recourse to industrial action and a set of trade 
union rights. Mischke states that: 
“Organisational rights for trade unions are a pivotal part in the LRA’s scheme of 
promoting and protecting collecting bargaining: they are a necessary corollary to the 
LRA’s voluntarist collective bargaining approach, and provide trade unions with the 
essential elements for not only securing an organisational foothold in the employer’s 
business, but also laying the foundations for a future collective bargaining 
relationship.”272 
 
Grogan states that unions, as custodians of workers interests and with a primary purpose of 
engaging in collective bargaining on behalf of their members, should be protected by law to 
ensure that they are not rendered ineffective by employers and their associations, who are 
often in a stronger position during bargaining processes.273 The author further states that the 
law provides basic or minimum trade union rights which can be expanded through the 
                                                            
271 Para [629D-E]. The court also found that since the overriding consideration in labour relations was fairness, 
it was time for it to state “firmly and unequivocally that in general terms it is unfair for an employer not to 
negotiate bona fide with a representative union”. 
272 C Mischke “Getting a Foot in the Door: Organisational Rights and Collective Bargaining in terms of the 
LRA” (2004) CLL 13 (6) 51at 60. The author further states that “collective bargaining, in its essence, is about 
power, counter-balanced by the power of the other party. In the absence of organisational rights, it would be 
difficult indeed for a trade union to gain the power it needs to function effectively in representing the interests of 
its members”. 
273 Grogan Collective Labour Law 47. Mischke states that “[o]rganisational rights make it possible for a trade 
union to build up, consolidate and maintain a power-base of sufficient strength among the employer’s 
employees … it is only once the union has attained sufficient strength, that it can exercise sufficient economic 
power on the employer to compel the employer to bargain on wages and other terms and conditions of 
employment”.  
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process of collective bargaining.274 The importance of organisational rights cannot be 
overstated. They are fundamental in the exercise of the broader right to organise and to 
engage in collective bargaining. These latter rights would be nothing but hollow rights 
without the support of organisational rights. It is now trite law that the absence of a duty to 
bargain was not an oversight by the drafters of the LRA. Organisational rights constitute a 
firm base from where trade unions can build bargaining relationships with employers and to 
maintain a robust presence in the workplace.275 Statutory entitlement to these rights reduces, 
to a certain extent, the burden on trade unions of having to resort to coercive power to acquire 
and exercise them. The LRA provides for orderly acquisition of such rights, which leaves 
little room for disputes. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of various trade union rights and the 
procedure for their acquisition and exercise. It will highlight the importance of such rights to 
trade unions in the collective bargaining process, the procedure for the resolution of disputes 
regarding their acquisition and exercise and will also briefly comment on the obligations 
incurred by South Africa as a Member State of ILO and the SADC as well as the framework 
for the acquisition and exercise of organisational rights in other jurisdictions. 
 
3.2 The legislative framework: Acquisition and exercise of organisational rights 
under the LRA 
 
Mischke states that a constitutionalised right to organise in s 23 implies that organisational 
rights provided for by the LRA are anchored on the Constitution.276 The LRA gives effect 
and content to the right to organise by providing a detailed framework for the acquisition and 
exercise of organisational rights. The only requirements for the acquisition and exercise of 
such rights are that trade unions must be registered and achieve the required thresholds of 
representivity.  
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In terms of s 21(1) of the LRA, a trade union can initiate the process of acquiring and 
exercising any of the rights provided by the LRA by notifying the respective employer in 
writing about its intention. In terms of s 21(2), the notice of intention must be forwarded 
together with a trade unions’ certificate and trade unions are obliged to specify the 
workplaces where they wish to exercise the rights, their representative status and the facts 
relied upon to prove that they meet the required thresholds of representivity. The rights which 
a trade union wishes to exercise and the manner of exercise must also be specified. An 
employer is thereafter required to meet the trade union for the purpose of attempting to enter 
into a collective agreement as to how the right or rights will be exercised.277 Grogan states 
that the wording of the section is couched in “both permissive and peremptory            
language ….”278 
 
The employer must meet the union but is not obliged to enter into an agreement. In terms of   
s 21(4) and (5), the CCMA may be approached by either party, failing the conclusion of a 
collective agreement, and the party initiating the process must prove that it has served the 
other party with a referral copy. In attempting to resolve the attendant dispute, a 
commissioner of the CCMA is obliged to first attempt to conciliate the matter, failing which 
settlement by arbitration may be requested by either party.279 A trade union may call a strike 
in lieu of arbitration and such an action can be embarked upon after the lapse of the 
conciliation period.280 Failure by an employer to allow the union to exercise organisational 
rights as directed by the CCMA or a collective agreement leaves the union with no other 
option other than to approach the Labour Court for an order compelling the employer to 
allow it to exercise the rights.281 
 
                                                            
277 See s 21(3). 
278 Grogan Collective Labour Law 58. 
279 See s 21(7). 
280 See s 65(2) (a). 
281 See s 158(1) (b) and (c). 
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In terms of s 21(8) of the LRA, if a dispute between the a trade union and an employer is 
about whether the trade union meets the required representative thresholds to claim and 
exercise organisational rights, a commissioner is obliged to minimise the multiplication of 
trade unions in a workplace and to promote trade union representativity in a particular 
workplace. The financial and administrative burden attendant on the process of granting 
organisational rights, which is borne by employers, must also be minimised. The 
commissioner must also be guided by other considerations such as the: “nature of the 
workplace”, “nature of the one or more organisational rights that the trade union seeks to 
exercise”, “nature of the sector in which the workplace is situated”, and “organisational 
history at the workplace or any other workplace of the employer”.282 
  
A trade union which ceases to meet the required thresholds of representation may lose 
organisational rights previously enjoyed in a particular workplace. In terms of s 21(9), a 
commissioner may inquire about the representative status of a trade union which may include 
conducting a ballot of affected employees. Employers are obliged by s 21(10) to co-operate 
with the commissioner in making an inquiry about the representative status of the trade 
union. In terms of s 21(11), a trade union may lose organisational rights at the initiation of an 
employer which may apply to the Commission for the withdrawal of such rights. The 
provisions regulating referral of disputes to the CCMA apply in such a process. 
 
A registered trade union with a majority membership of employees employed by an employer 
or bargaining council parties may conclude a collective agreement with that employer 
stipulating the representativity thresholds for acquiring the right to access the employer’ 
premises, the right to have the employer deduct trade union levies or subscriptions and the 
right of employees who are office-bearers of a trade union to take reasonable leave to 
perform trade union functions. Section 18(2), however, provides that such a collective 
agreement will only have a binding effect if the representativity thresholds are equally 
applied to any trade union seeking to exercise the same organisational rights. The ss 12 and 
13 organisational rights are extended to all trade unions that are parties to a bargaining 
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council in workplaces falling within the scope of such council without any inquiry whether 
they meet the required thresholds of representativity. 
 
3.3 Unrepresentative unions: Are they entitled to acquire organisational rights? 
 
The LRA, in terms of s 21, provides a clear framework on how organisational rights should 
be acquired and how disputes regarding the claim and exercise of such rights should be 
resolved. The question whether the Act provides for an exclusive framework was once a 
contentious issue. The requirement that unions can only claim organisational rights if they are 
registered and representative means that unregistered and unrepresentative trade unions do 
not qualify for these rights and therefore cannot claim them. This issue was extensively 
explored in the Bader Bop case.283 As noted by Grogan, “[t]he Labour Appeal Court majority 
judgments stood or fell on the assumption that any union seeking to acquire organisational 
rights must follow the procedure prescribed by section 21 of the LRA”.284 The silence of the 
Act on how unregistered and unrepresentative unions should acquire organisational rights can 
easily be read to mean that these rights are not extended to these unions and that s 21 
provides for an exclusive framework. Another assumption is that whilst representative trade 
unions are automatically granted these rights, trade unions which do not meet the thresholds 
of representivity are permitted to acquire such rights through the ordinary process of 
collective bargaining and strike action.285 
 
The pertinent issues raised in Bader Bop were, amongst other things, whether the Act 
provides for an exclusive framework for the acquisition of organisational rights and the exact 
meaning of s 20 of the LRA which provides that organisational rights can be regulated 
through collective agreements, notwithstanding the fact that there is a process prescribed by   
s 21 of the Act. The interpretation accorded to this provision by NUMSA was that a trade 
union which could not make use of the framework provided for by the Act due to its lack of 
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representivity can still proceed to attempt to claim organisational rights albeit outside the 
statutory framework and through collective bargaining. The interpretation adopted by the 
Constitutional Court was that the LRA: 
“[E]xpressly confers enforceable organisational rights on … unions that are either 
sufficiently representative (ss 12, 13 and 15) or majority unions (ss 14 and 16). These 
are enforceable rights and the mechanism for their enforcement is also provided by 
part A. That mechanism is conciliation and arbitration. Unusually, in the overall 
scheme of the Act, unions and employers are given a choice between arbitration and 
industrial action should conciliation fail. There is nothing in part A of chapter III, 
however, which expressly states that unions which admit that they do not meet the 
requisite threshold membership levels are prevented from using the ordinary 
processes of collective bargaining and industrial action to persuade employers to grant 
them organisational facilities such as access to the workplace, stop-order facilities and 
recognition of shop stewards. These are matters which are clearly of ‘mutual interest’ 
to employers and unions and as such matters capable of forming the subject of 
collective agreements and capable of being referred to the CCMA for conciliation, the 
condition precedent for protected strike action.”286  
 
The Constitutional Court effectively found that s 20 was not merely a “clarificatory” 
provision as ruled by the Labour Appeal Court, but a “dominant provision … to which all 
other provisions are subject”.287 The Constitutional Court adopted a broad interpretation, 
which recognised two procedures for acquiring organisational rights.288 The first procedure is 
obviously that which is provided for by s 21 and the second is that which is provided by          
s 134.289 An unrepresentative trade union is not bound to follow the s 21 procedure if there is 
no dispute about its representativeness. A union which admits that it does not meet the 
required thresholds of representativity can proceed “to refer a dispute in terms of section 134, 
and to strike in support of a demand that the employer enter into a recognition agreement 
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regulating those rights”.290 The Constitutional Court chose or adopted an interpretation that 
sought not to limit the rights of minority unions to engage in collective bargaining and to 
strike.291 
 
Chicktay disagrees with the approach and interpretation adopted by the Constitutional 
Court.292 The author criticises the judgment of the court as “it sought to bastardize the 
language of the Act and maintain its validity”.293 He contends that the judgment of the court 
is “clearly mistaken” and attempts to advance this argument by stating that the emphasis on 
the ‘representivity’ requirement by the LRA means that the drafters clearly intended that 
minority unions are not entitled to these rights and therefore cannot make use of the right to 
recourse to industrial actions in support of a demand to acquire such rights.294 The author 
argues that extending the application of s 20 to unrepresentative trade unions effectively 
renders the provisions on representivity meaningless and that the correct procedure which the 
court should have adopted was to have found s 21 and s 65(2) unconstitutional, as such 
sections failed to extend the right to organise to minority unions.295 The author goes on to 
state that minority unions were not sufficiently protected by the ruling of the court as it 
merely found that they can strike in support of demands to acquire such rights without any 
other safeguards, such as the right to refer disputes regarding acquisition for such rights for 
arbitration.296 
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Although the judgment of the Constitutional Court must be applauded for extending some 
protection to unrepresentative unions, it is doubtful whether the right to strike will be an 
effective weapon or a guarantee that minority unions will successfully claim and exercise 
organisational rights as majority unions. Chicktay correctly asserts that while strikes have 
proven to be useful weapons for trade unions with majority memberships, they can actually 
be ineffective and erode the leverage of a minority union to pursue its interests at the 
workplace.297 The court missed an opportunity to fully canvass the issue, as expected from a 
court with a final say on constitutional matters, and overlooked certain important 
considerations, such as the importance of organisational rights to small unions; which do not 
have the collective strength to engage and bargain effectively with employers.  
 
Failure by the court to pronounce as unconstitutional the absence of a clear framework for the 
acquisition and exercise of organisational rights by unrepresentative unions is a glaring 
oversight. Although an established trade union may find it easy to bargain with an employer 
through the threat or reality of a strike or by being a party to a bargaining council, the same 
cannot be said for a small union which, as put by Mischke, may find it a difficult task to build 
a presence at an employers’ organisation without some legislative intervention.298 The 
relevant provisions of the LRA are therefore defective in that they only recognise 
representative trade unions as qualifying for acquiring organisational rights and 
unrepresentative trade unions are left to use the onerous and tedious means such as collective 
bargaining and industrial action. 
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3.4 The impact of International Labour Organisation standards and the SADC 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights 
 
In terms of s 3(a) of the LRA, the relevant international law obligations applicable to South 
Africa must be taken into account when interpreting the provisions of the Act. The ILO 
played a significant role in the drafting of the 1995 LRA and its most important principles, 
such as the right to freedom of association, the right to organise, the right to engage in 
collective bargaining and organisational rights, are included in the Act. The FFCC of the ILO 
made numerous recommendations in 1992 about the state of South African labour relations in 
response to complaints lodged by COSATU against the LRA of 1956 and its proposed 
amendments. 
 
The complaint by COSATU was that the industrial relations system which existed then was 
“incompatible with the principles of freedom of association” and that they were measures and 
acts being “taken or susceptible of being taken by the government against trade unions and 
their members ….”299 Although the Commission made recommendations on wide ranging 
matters, the most important for the purposes of this chapter were those concerning freedom of 
association and the right to organise. On the complaint by COSATU about the interference of 
the legislature on the constitutions of trade unions, the Commission reiterated the principles 
of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEACR) which stated that it was not usual for the laws regulating trade unions to prescribe 
the contents of constitutions of trade unions in the form of detailed interventions such as how 
trade unions should manage their funds, the eligibility criteria for trade union office and how 
officials should be elected. Legislative interventions were however not to be dismissed as 
anti-trade union measures especially if they were purely a formality and public authorities did 
not enjoy an unfettered discretion to approve the rules.300 
 
                                                            
299 See “Prelude to Change Industrial Relations Reform in South Africa” (1992) 13 ILJ 739 at 740. See also S 
Saley, P Benjamin “The Context of the ILO Fact-Finding and Conciliation Report on South Africa (1992) 13 
ILJ 731. 
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Although the Commission found s 8(1) of the old LRA to contain prescriptions and topics 
which trade union constitutions were to contain, it made a general finding that they were not 
a grave inroad on the freedom of trade unions to determine the contents of their own 
constitutions and rules. It however found s 8(4)(a)(iv) of the Act to be “too widely expressed” 
and that it gave “the Registrar an unfettered discretion to allow or disallow a particular 
provision in a trade union constitution”. The Commission also examined section 4(5) (a) (ii) 
of the Act, which stated that the Registrar had discretion not to register a trade union when 
satisfied that such a union’s constitution had provisions offending “the provisions of any law 
or … calculated to hinder the attainment of the objects of any law or … unreasonable in 
relation to the members of the public”.301  Its recommendation was that the provision gave 
rise to the risk of interference in what a trade union constitution should contain.302 
 
On the protection of the right to organise, the Commission reiterated the argument advanced 
by the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) that trade unions cannot function freely 
and independently when there is “a climate of violence and uncertainty”.303 It found that there 
was overwhelming evidence of violence against trade unions and recommended that all 
necessary steps be taken by the government to make sure that the principles of ILO on 
freedom of association are implemented.304  
 
The Commission also found that there were restrictions on access especially in mines, farms 
and the domestic sector. It found that the sectors where there was restriction of access 
employed “very large numbers of the South African workforce” and that the exclusion of 
domestic workers and farm workers by the LRA meant that trade unions had no legislated 
right to contact workers, which also meant that proceeding against employers for flouting fair 
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labour practices was not possible. Its recommendation was that the LRA should extend its 
protection to these “categories of workers” and that “workers, and trade unions seeking to 
represent them, should be assured by law of the opportunity to function freely and undertake 
the activities envisaged by Article 3 of Convention No 87”.305 An important recommendation 
by the Commission was that all impediments to organisational rights be removed.306 
 
The most important ILO conventions on the right to organise and organisational rights are the 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention and the Right to 
organise and Collective Bargaining Convention.307 Article 2 of the former Convention 
provides that “[w]orkers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right 
to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations 
of their own choosing without previous authorisation”. Article 3 of the same Convention 
states that “[w]orkers’ and employers’ organisations shall have the right to draw up their 
constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organise their 
administration and activities and to formulate their programmes”. It further states that “public 
authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the 
lawful exercise thereof”. 
 
 Article 2 of the Right to organise and Collective Bargaining Convention states that: 
“[w]orkers’ and employers’ organisations shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts of 
interference by each other or each other’s agents or members in their establishment, 
functioning or administration”. It further provides that: 
“[A]cts which are designed to promote the establishment of workers’ organisations 
under the domination of employers or employers’ organisations, or to support 
workers’ organisations by financial or other means, with the object of placing such 
                                                            
305 Paras 695, 696 and 697. 
306 Paras 697-719. 
307 1948 (No.87) and 1949 (No.98) respectively. 
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organisations under the control of employers or employers’ organisations, shall be 
deemed to constitute acts of interference….” 
 Article 3 provides that “[m]achinery appropriate to national conditions shall be established, 
where necessary, for the purpose of ensuring respect for the right to organise….”  
 
The SADC Charter of Fundamental Social Rights also has provisions on freedom of 
association and organisational rights. Article 4 provides that “Member States shall create an 
enabling environment consistent with ILO Conventions on freedom of association, the right 
to organise and collective bargaining …” for the purposes of, amongst other things, ensuring 
that workers and employers of the SADC region have the right to form and join trade unions 
and employers organisations respectively. The Article also provides for organisational rights 
for trade unions and lists such rights to include accessing “employers’ premises for union 
purposes subject to agreed procedures”, deducting “trade union dues from members’ wages”, 
electing trade union representatives and “the right of trade unions to disclosure of 
information”. Article 5 provides that “Member States shall take appropriate action to ratify 
and implement relevant ILO instruments and as a priority the core ILO Conventions”, and 
that “Member States shall establish regional mechanisms to assist Member States in 
complying with the ILO reporting system”. South Africa, as a Member State of SADC, is 
obliged to respect and promote the rights provided by the Charter. 
 
3.5 The scope of organisational rights 
 
3.5.1  The right to access employers’ premises 
 
Accessing employers’ premises by trade union officials and representatives is important in 
the exercise of the broader right to organise. Trade union officials or representatives must 
maintain reasonable contact with members. Such contact not only enables officials or 
representatives to keep abreast with developments at the workplace but also allows them the 
opportunity to recruit new members. Entitlement to this right is extended to all trade unions 
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which are registered and representative.308 The right serves the purpose of ensuring that the 
interests of trade union members are effectively served and that unions maintain and increase 
their support base.309 The broad right to organise cannot be a practical right if trade union 
officials or representatives do not maintain reasonable presence at the workplace or 
employers’ premises. Grogan states that “no union, whatever its support base, can effectively 
serve its members’ if it cannot meet them in the workplace”.310 
 
In terms of s 12(1), officials of representative trade unions can access the premises of 
employers for the purpose of communicating with members, to recruit new members or to 
serve the interests of members. Section 12(2) provides that access can also be for the purpose 
of holding meetings with employees outside their working hours. Section 12(3) provides that 
the premises can also be used to hold an election or ballot provided for in a union’s 
constitution. The potential for disruptions or undue interruptions of operations is averted by 
reasonable limitations of this right. The LRA provides that the exercise of the right is limited 
by “any conditions as to the time and place that are reasonable and necessary to safeguard life 
or property or to prevent the undue disruption of work”.311 The reasonableness of this 
limitation cannot be overemphasised. Trade unions owe it to their members to maintain a 
robust presence at the workplace in order to effectively serve their interests but this should 
not prejudice the employer. The right to access employers’ premises is not heavily regulated 
save for an exception with regard to the domestic sector, where the Act provides that “the 
right to access does not include the right to enter the home of the employer without 
consent”.312 Employees falling within the category of the “domestic sector” are described by 
                                                            
308 A representative trade union is described in s 11 as “a registered trade union, or two or more registered trade 
unions acting jointly, that are sufficiently representative of the employees employed by an employer in a 
workplace”.  
309 Grogan Collective Labour Law 49. 
310 Ibid. 
311 See s 12(4). 
312 See s 17(2) (a). 
78 
 
the LRA as those performing domestic work in the home of their employers or on property 
where the home is situated.313 
 
To prevent unnecessary disputes, one would expect that a trade union entitled to this right, 
takes the initiative to engage an employer on whose premises the right is to be exercised on 
how best to exercise such a right. There can be no doubt that accessing the premises for 
whatever purpose as provided in the Act should be done with due regard to the sensibilities 
and needs of the employer. A practical solution to avoid potential disputes would be to 
conclude collective agreements on how such a right should be exercised. This would certainly 
leave little room for conflict. There is obviously no need for a far reaching policy intervention 
on how this right should be exercised. Parties can enter into agreements on how this right 
should be exercised and disputes can be resolved through the CCMA. 
 
3.5.2 The right to collect union fees 
 
Trade unions rely on membership subscriptions for funding. Section 13 provides for the 
“deduction of trade union subscriptions or levies”. The Act provides for stop-order facilities. 
The drafters of the LRA were obviously aware that unions have to be assisted to collect 
subscription fees.  Trade unions cannot effectively represent their members’ interests without 
proper mechanisms to collect union fees. Stop-order facilities are a convenient way of 
collecting union fees and the Act provides that employees “may authorise the employer in 
writing to deduct subscriptions or levies payable to that trade union from the employee’s 
wages”.314 A written authorisation from an employee obliges the employer to deduct and 
remit the authorised amount to the trade union no later than the fifteenth day of the month 
first following the date each deduction was made.315 After every monthly remittance an 
employer must furnish the union with a list of names of members from whom the deductions 
                                                            
313 See s 17(1). 
314 See s 13(1). 
315 See s 13(2). 
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have been made, details of the deductions so made, the period to which they relate and also 
copies of notices of revocation, if any.316    
 
The Act further provides that employees “may revoke an authorisation given in terms of 
subsec (1) by giving the employer and the representative trade union one month’s written 
notice or, or if the employee works in the public service, three month’s written notice”.317 
After receipt of the notice, the employer must continue with the authorised deductions “until 
the notice period has expired and then must stop making the deduction”.318 
 
The statutory obligation to assist in the collection of union fees might be viewed as 
burdensome by some employers. The drafters of the Act obviously recognised the importance 
of funding to unions. Without adequate funding, unions cannot provide adequate services to 
their members.  
 
3.5.3 The right to elect shop stewards 
The Act entitles members of trade unions acting alone or jointly representing the majority of 
employees in a particular workplace, the right to elect shop stewards.319 A union can elect 
shop stewards in a workplace where ten or more members of the trade union are employed. 
The role of a union representative as defined by s 14(4) is to render assistance to employees 
in grievance and disciplinary proceedings at their request, to monitor compliance of 
employment policies and collective agreements by employer and to report non-compliance or 
contravention to management, the union or any responsible authority. The constitution of a 
union should spell out the procedures for nomination, election, terms of office and removal 
                                                            
316 See s 13(5). 
317 See s 13(3). 
318 See s 13(4). 
319 See s 14(2). 
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from office of union representatives.320 In terms of s 14(5), shop stewards have a right to take 
reasonable leave to perform their functions and for training purposes. Employees who are 
office bearers of representative trade unions or federations of trade unions to which the 
representative trade unions are affiliated are “entitled to take reasonable leave during working 
hours for the purpose of performing the functions of that office”.321 An agreement can be 
entered by the trade union and the employer regulating the conditions of such leave.322  
 
Shop stewards are the lifeblood of trade unions. Grogan describes them as “the infantry of the 
trade union”.323 They are at the grassroots level and as such are abreast with developments at 
the workplace. To many employees, the presence of shop stewards at the workplace serves as 
a sign that their interests are well looked after. They however occupy a delicate position in 
that they are “a conduit between management and the workplace … and between the 
workforce and the union itself”.324 Trade union representatives therefore effectively serve 
both management and the trade union. This should naturally lead to disputes. In an attempt to 
protect union representatives from being victimised for performing their functions, the Code 
of Practice: Dismissal provides that any disciplinary action against shop stewards should be 
preceded by informing and consulting with their unions.325 There are a number of reported 
cases involving dismissals of union representatives. The suggestion by Grogan is that there 
must be an attempt to establish “the dominant reason for the dismissal” in such cases 
followed by a determination “whether that reason relates to the performance by the shop 
steward of his or her duties”. If a shop steward is dismissed for a reason related to the 
performance of his or her duties, then such a dismissal is “automatically unfair, and the shop 
steward will invariably be reinstated”.326  Grogan further states that even if the dominant 
                                                            
320 See s 14(3). 
321 See s 15(1). 
322 See s 15(2). 
323 Grogan Collective Labour Law 49. 
324 Ibid. 
325 Item 4 (2). 
326 Grogan Collective Labour Law 52. See also Kroukan v SA Airlink (Pty) Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ 2153 (LAC). 
Grogan states that the case attempts to formulate a “test for evaluating the evidence in cases in which the 
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reason for dismissal is related to the performance by the shop steward of his or her duties, the 
conduct must not be “unacceptable” or dishonest “in other respects”.327  
 
In the case of Adcock Ingram Critical Care v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & 
Arbitration,328 the utterances of a shop steward: “You can treat this as a threat … there will 
be more blood on your hands”, were a ground for dismissal by the employer.329                         
The utterances were made at a meeting whose agenda was to end a protracted violent 
strike.330 The finding of a presiding officer at a disciplinary hearing was that the words were 
to be construed as a threat and not just a mere warning. A commissioner of the CCMA found 
nothing wrong with the utterances and attempted to justify his finding by posing the 
following question: 
“Does this imply that the next time a vociferous and determined spokesperson acting 
on behalf of his/her constituency uses a threat as part of his negotiation tactic to put 
pressure on the management team to accede to his demands, that he too will run the 
risk of disciplinary action?”331 
 
The finding of the commissioner was confirmed by the Labour Court.332 The court 
emphasised the importance of parties treating each other as equals in the bargaining process. 
The court was of the view that it was quite natural for meetings for the purposes of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
employer purports to rely not only on the manner in which the shop steward conducted his activities as such, but 
also on alleged misconduct in the ordinary sense”. In the case, the reason for dismissing a shop steward was for 
his participation in the “litigation against management”. The court held that the dismissal undermined the 
protection that the Constitution conferred on union representatives or officials and employees against 
victimisation in exercise of their statutory and constitutional rights. 
327 Ibid. 
328 (2001) 22 ILJ 1799 (LAC).  
329 Para 1. 
330 Para 2. 
331 Para 6. 
332 (2000) 21 ILJ 1752 (LC). 
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bargaining to “degenerate” and added that giving “an employer the right to discipline an 
employee sitting as an equal opposite to him” defeats the whole purpose of such a meeting as 
it undermines “the whole process”.333 The court however cautioned parties not to seize such 
opportunities “to abuse or intimidate or license criminal acts”.334 A party aggrieved by the 
conduct of another may disengage from the “bargaining process for lack of any constructive 
discussion ... or if any criminal act is committed to call the police”.335  
 
The Labour Appeal Court heard an appeal against the decision of the Labour Court.336 The 
court held that the finding of the commissioner “that when one acts in a representative 
capacity anything goes” was improper.337 Whilst accepting that the reality of the bargaining 
process means that “meetings often degenerate”, the court pointed out that this “does not 
mean that one should jettison the principle that as in the workplace also at the negotiating 
table the employer and the employee should treat each other with the respect they both 
deserve”.338 It further stated that “assaults and threats thereof are not conducive to harmony 
or to productive negotiation” and although an aggrieved party may invoke criminal law, it “is 
the last thing one looks for in the bargaining process”.339 The court confirmed the option of 
pulling out of negotiations “in the face of abuse” mooted by the Labour Court but seemed to 
favour “the inhibitory effect of possible disciplinary action in case of serious transgressions” 
which it opined “would lubricate the process into civility ….”340 It is thus expected that union 
representatives should exercise their rights with care and that “employers may not abuse their 
disciplinary powers to deter shop stewards from exercising their functions in good faith”.341 
                                                            
333 Para 16. 
334 Ibid. 
335 Ibid. 
336 See particularly para 15 of the judgment. 
337 Para 14. 
338 Para 15. 
339 Ibid. 
340 Ibid. 
341 Grogan Collective Labour Law 53-54. 
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The delicate position occupied by shop stewards means that without protection, it is difficult 
for them to perform their duties fearing victimisation or dismissals. Trade union 
representatives are an integral and important part of the trade union movement and their 
functions must not be interfered with in any way. 
 
According to s 14(2), more than ten members in a workplace entitle them to elect two shop 
stewards. If members of a trade union are more than fifty in a workplace, members are 
entitled to elect two trade union representatives for the first fifty members and one more 
representative for every fifty additional members to a maximum of seven members. In 
workplaces where a union has more than three hundred members, such members can elect 
seven shop stewards and one additional shop steward for hundred members more provided 
that the number does not exceed ten. A union is entitled to ten shop stewards in a workplace 
where more than six hundred members are employed. A union is also entitled to one 
additional shop steward if there are two hundred additional members provided that the 
number of shop stewards does not exceed twelve. One thousand members in a workplace 
entitle a trade union to twelve shop stewards and one additional shop steward for every five 
hundred additional members to a maximum of twenty. 
 
3.5.4 The right to disclosure of information 
Du Toit et al sum up the importance of the right to disclosure of information as follows: 
“Orderly collective bargaining and the effective resolution of labour disputes 
presuppose attempts at rational conciliation as a precursor to any power play invoked 
as a last resort. And, in order to be rational, conciliation and negotiation must be 
intelligent, informed and predicated upon each side having had an opportunity to 
refute the factual basis and interpretation of the other side’s proposals or to 
recommend viable alternatives. Without the true facts adjustment is less probable, and 
premature or unnecessary industrial action the likely consequence. In which event the 
primary purpose of the legislation will have been undermined…. The sufficient 
disclosure of relevant information lies at the heart of the legislative endeavour to 
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bring about orderly collective bargaining, greater worker participation and the 
harmonious resolution of industrial disputes.”342 
 
Effective collective bargaining cannot take place in the absence of information relevant to the 
negotiations. The contention by trade unions is that “rational collective bargaining cannot 
proceed effectively unless it is informed” whereas employers, “on the other hand … regard 
the demand for greater disclosure as an intrusion upon the managerial prerogative and an 
unjustifiable invasion of privacy rights”.343 The Act provides that majority unions have a 
right to information.344 To claim this right, “a registered union or two or more registered trade 
unions acting jointly” must “have as members the majority of the employees employed by an 
employer in a workplace”.345 This right, like the right to elect shop stewards, can only be 
claimed by trade unions with a majority membership in a workplace. Employers are obliged 
to make available or disclose “relevant information” to representatives of trade unions for the 
purposes of assisting such representatives “to perform effectively the functions referred to in 
s 14(4)”.346 The section also obliges employers when “consulting or bargaining with a 
representative trade union” to “disclose to the representative trade union all relevant 
information that will allow the representative trade union to engage effectively in 
consultation or collective bargaining”.347 
 
The Act however provides that employers are not obliged to disclose information “that is 
legally privileged”, that cannot be disclosed “without contravening a prohibition imposed on 
the employer by any law or order of any court”, “that is confidential and, if disclosed, may 
                                                            
342 D Du Toit et al The Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1998) 148. 
343 Ibid. The authors state that the misgivings by employers are that “disclosure is frequently administratively 
burdensome, can be compromising and personally embarrassing, or may undermine the security, 
competitiveness or viability of the enterprise”. 
344 See s 16. 
345 See s 16(1). 
346 See s 16(2). 
347 See s 16(3). 
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cause substantial harm to an employee or the employer” and information “that is private 
personal information relating to an employee, unless that employee consents to the disclosure 
of such information”.348 Section 17(2)(b) provides that the right does not apply in the 
domestic sector.  
 
In National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd,349 the court 
held that the purpose of disclosure should be to make the process of collective bargaining 
meaningful.350 The approach adopted by the court in National Union of Metalworkers of SA v 
Metkor Industries (Pty) Ltd,351 per Roth AM, was that  “it seems to … be lawful, just and 
equitable that management should be obliged to disclose only such information as would 
reasonably enable employees to consider the consequences that that information held for 
them”.352 This construction was criticised by Du Toit et al as being too conservative. The 
authors argue that “[t]he policy of the new law stretches beyond this cautious reticence”. 
They state that “[t]he effective interaction required by section 16 must be construed in the 
light of the Act’s objectives to promote orderly collective bargaining and employee 
participation in decision-making in the workplace”. They describe the test as formulated in 
the case as too narrow and that “the greater the extent of discussion, the greater the prospects 
of a harmonious workplace”.353 
 
With regards to confidential information, an employer must inform a trade union 
representative or union in writing that any information disclosed is confidential. By so doing, 
such information is confined to the negotiations. Employers can also ask trade unions to give 
undertakings to preserve confidential information. In Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v 
                                                            
348 See s 16(5) (a)-(d). 
349 (1993) 14 ILJ 642 (LAC). 
350 Para 652B. 
351 (1990) 11 ILJ 1116 (IC). 
352 Para 1124A. 
353 See Du Toit et al The Labour Relations Act 150. 
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National Union of Metalworkers of SA,354 the court held that an employer’s failure to make 
available to a trade union some confidential information in the absence of an undertaking by 
such a trade union to preserve confidentiality was not unfair, unreasonable or improper.355 
 
In the United Kingdom, the ACAS Code of Practice for the Disclosure of Information to 
Trade Unions for Collective Bargaining Purposes356 provides various factors to be considered 
in attempting to determine the relevance of information. The Code provides that: 
“The absence of relevant information about an employer’s undertaking may to a 
material extent impede trade unions in collective bargaining, particularly if the 
information would influence the formulation, presentation or pursuance of a claim, or 
the conclusion of an agreement. The provision of relevant information would be in 
accordance with good industrial relations practice.”357 
The Code provides that in determining what information is relevant “negotiators should take 
account of the subject-matter of the negotiations and the issues raised during them; the level 
at which negotiations take place … the size of the company; and the type of business the 
company is engaged in”.358 The United Kingdom Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidated) Act, (TULRCA)359 provides, like the South African LRA, for restrictions on 
the general duty to disclose information by employers. The Act provides that an employer is 
not required to disclose information “which would be against the interests of national 
security”, which when disclosed will contravene “a prohibition imposed by or under an 
                                                            
354 (1994) 15 ILJ 1247 (A).  
355 Para [1255A]. 
356 Available at http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/2/q/CP02_1.pdf (accessed on 08 April 2010). Also see H 
Gospel et al “The Right to Know: Disclosure of Information for Collective Bargaining and Joint Consultation” 
(2000) Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science. Available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/cep/cepdps/dp0453.html (accessed on 12 April 2010). The authors state that the 
disclosure of information in the UK in 1970s was mainly for the purpose of collective bargaining and that a shift 
occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, with “a new emphasis on disclosure as part of joint consultation at work”. 
357 Item 9 of the Code. 
358 Item 10. 
359 1992. 
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enactment”, “which has been communicated to him in confidence, or which he has otherwise 
obtained in consequence of the confidence reposed in him by another person”, “which relates 
specifically to an individual (unless that individual has consented to its being disclosed)”, 
“which would cause substantial injury to his undertaking for reasons other than its effect on 
collective bargaining” or which has been “obtained by him for the purpose of bringing, 
prosecuting or defending any legal proceedings”.360 
 
 TULRCA provides that:  
“An employer who recognises an independent trade union shall, for the purpose of all 
stages of collective bargaining about matters, and in relation to descriptions of 
workers, in respect of which the union is recognised by him, disclose to 
representatives of the union, on request, the information required by th[e] section.”361 
The Act provides that such information might include that “without which the trade union 
representatives would be to a material extent impended in carrying on collective bargaining” 
with the employer and that “which it would be in accordance with good industrial relations 
practice that he [the employer] should disclose to them [trade union representatives] for the 
purposes of collective bargaining”.362 It further states that to determine “what would be in 
accordance with good industrial relations practice, regard shall be had to the relevant 
provisions of any Code of Practice issued by ACAS, but not so as to exclude any other 
evidence of what the practice is”.363 
 
The ACAS Code of Practice lists information which might cause substantial injury to the 
employer as including, “cost information on individual products, detailed analysis of 
proposed investments, marketing or pricing policies; and price quotas or the make-up of 
                                                            
360 S 182(1) (a)-(f). 
361 See s 181(1). 
362 See s 18(2) (a) and (b). 
363 See s 181(4). 
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tender prices”.364 It further provides that “substantial injury may occur if, for example, certain 
customers would be lost to competitors, or suppliers would refuse to supply necessary 
materials, or the ability to raise funds to finance the company would be seriously impaired as 
a result of disclosing information”.365 The onus that disclosure will be detrimental to the 
company’s interests rests with the employer.366  
 
The LRA provides for a framework for dispute resolution. A party may refer a dispute to the 
CCMA which must first attempt to resolve it through the process of conciliation, failing 
which the dispute can be arbitrated.367 The Act provides guidelines as to how a commissioner 
should attempt to resolve “any dispute about the disclosure of information contemplated in 
subsec (6)”.368 A commissioner is obliged to determine first the relevance of the information 
requested. If such information is relevant but is that which is “contemplated in subse (5) (c) 
and (d)” of s 16, the commissioner is obliged to attempt to: 
“[B]alance the harm that the disclosure is likely to cause to an employee or employer 
against the harm that the failure to disclose the information is likely to cause to the 
ability of a trade union representative to perform effectively the functions referred to 
in section 14(4) or the ability of a trade union to engage effectively in consultation or 
collective bargaining”.369  
 
A commissioner may order that the information requested be disclosed if “the balance of 
harm favours the disclosure of the information” on conditions aimed at minimising any harm 
which might be caused to an employee or employer.370 The Act also obliges a commissioner 
                                                            
364 Item 14. 
365 Item 15. 
366 Ibid. 
367 See s 16(6), (8) and (9). 
368 See s 16(10). 
369 See s 16(11). 
370 See s 16(12). 
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to “take into account any breach of confidentiality in respect of information disclosed in 
terms of this section at that workplace and may refuse to order the disclosure of the 
information or any other confidential information which might be otherwise be disclosed for 
a period specified in the arbitration award”.371 Any dispute concerning “any alleged breach of 
confidentiality” may prompt the commissioner to make an order withdrawing “the right to 
disclosure of information in that workplace … for a period specified in the arbitration 
award”.372  
 
TULRCA also provides for a dispute resolution mechanism. It provides that a trade union 
may refer a complaint about the failure by the employer to disclose any information in terms 
of s 181 to the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC).373 If the Committee opines that the 
complaint may be settled by conciliation, such complaint shall be referred to the Advisory, 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) which “shall seek to promote a settlement of 
the matter”. The complaint shall be referred back to the CAC if it is withdrawn or there is no 
settlement and; there are no further prospects (according to ACAS) of settlement through the 
conciliation process.374 In terms of s 183(3) of TULRCA, a complaint which is not referred to 
ACAS or is referred but conciliation is unlikely, shall be heard and determined by the CAC, 
which must then declare whether it is well-founded or not and giving reasons for its decision. 
If the complaint is well-founded, the CAC shall make a declaration specifying “the 
information in respect of which the Committee finds that the complaint is well founded”, the 
date when such information was refused to be disclosed or confirmed and the period, which 
should not be less than a week from the date of the declaration, “within which the employer 
ought to disclose that information, or, as the case may be, to confirm it in writing”.375 
 
                                                            
371 See s 16(13). 
372 See s 16(14). 
373 S 183 (1) (a)-(b). 
374 S 183(2). 
375 S 183(5) (a)-(c). 
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The ACAS Code of Practice provides for the “joint arrangements for the disclosure of 
information”. It provides that “[e]mployers and trade unions should endeavour to arrive at a 
joint understanding on how the provisions on the disclosure of information can be 
implemented most effectively”.376 In terms of the Code, trade unions and employers “should 
consider what information is likely to be required, what is available, and what could 
reasonably be made available” as well as “the form in which the information will be 
presented, when it should be presented and to whom”.377 It also provides that parties should 
agree on procedures to resolve disputes “concerning any issues associated with the disclosure 
of information”.378 
 
The ACAS Code also attempts to list information which might be relevant in certain 
negotiations.379 For example, in pay and benefits negotiations, it lists such information as 
“principles and structure of payment systems; job evaluation systems and grading criteria; 
earnings and hours analysed according to work-group, grade, plant, total pay bill; details of 
fringe benefits and non-wage labour costs”. In conditions of service negotiations, it lists such 
information as “policies on recruitment, redeployment, redundancy, training, equal 
opportunity, and promotion; appraisal systems; health, welfare and safety matters”. It also 
lists financial information as including “cost structures; gross and net profits; sources of 
earnings; assets; liabilities; allocation of profits; details of government financial assistance; 
transfer prices; loans to parent or subsidiary companies and interest charged”. Grogan gives 
examples of potentially relevant information as including information about an employer’s 
finances, how the employer distributes funds, any planned future investments and plans for 
production and marketing.380 The criteria is how the information requested is relevant “in 
                                                            
376 Item 22. 
377 Ibid. 
378 Item 23. 
379 Item 11 of the Code. 
380 Grogan Collective Labour Law 55. Personnel files may be claimed by trade union representatives “to acquire 
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relation to the purpose for which is sought”.381 Trade unions must not be refused access to 
information without compelling reasons.  
 
The Act promotes the participation of employees in workplace matters through workplace 
forums. Such forums are formed by way of an application by a representative trade union, 
defined as “a registered trade union, or two or more registered trade unions acting jointly, that 
have as members the majority of the employees employed by an employer in a workplace”.382 
In terms of s 79, the general functions of workplace forums include, promoting the interests 
of all employees in a workplace, enhancing workplace efficiency, to be consulted by an 
employer on various matters and “to participate in joint decision-making” about various 
matters. The Act also provides that “unless the matters for consultation are regulated by a 
collective agreement with the representative trade union”, workplace forums can be consulted 
on proposals on, inter alia, matters such as how the workplace should be restructured which 
might include new technology and methods, “changes in the organisation of work”, “partial 
or total plant closures”, “mergers and transfers of ownership in so far as they have an impact 
on the employees”, “dismissal of employees for reasons based on operational requirements”, 
“product development plans and “job grading”.383 
 
The importance that the LRA attaches to the participation of employees in workplace matters 
naturally means that representative trade unions must have access to information to allow 
them “to engage effectively in consultation” with employers. Although the right to disclosure 
of information is an important right, it should be claimed and exercised in a manner which 
takes into account the sensitivity and confidentiality of certain information to employers. 
 
 
 
                                                            
381 Ibid. 
382 See s 78(b). 
383 See s 84(1). 
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3.6 Conclusion 
Any labour relations dispensation that does not accord trade unions organisational rights will 
be setting them up them for failure. The provision by the South African Labour Relations Act 
of basic organisational rights and adoption of a broader approach by the courts when 
determining the content of such rights affirms the importance attached to such rights. One of 
the objectives of LRA is to promote peaceful labour relations and this cannot be achieved if 
trade unions are not capacitated to make meaningful contributions on labour matters affecting 
their members. There exists a clear procedure for the acquisition and exercise of 
organisational rights and the Act goes further to provide a mechanism for dispute resolution. 
The dispute on whether minority unions can seek to claim organisational rights outside the 
statutory framework has since been resolved by the Constitutional Court in the Bader Bop 
case. The court emphasised that an interpretation which does not attenuate the right to 
collective bargaining and the right to strike was to be preferred. Although future disputes on 
the acquisition and exercise of organisational rights cannot be ruled out, the Act is clear and 
there already exists detailed judgments which will make the resolution of such disputes an 
uncomplicated process. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TRADE UNIONISM AND INDUSTRIAL ACTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The effectiveness of the institution of collective bargaining to trade unions is dependent on 
adequate trade union rights and the threat or reality of industrial action. Industrial action, 
particularly in the form of strikes, is an important weapon to promote and protect the interests 
of trade unions and workers in general. It has a long history in South African labour relations 
dating back to more than a hundred years.384 Industrial action has assumed such prominence 
in South Africa that trade unions find it impossible to engage or negotiate with employers 
without making constant threats to strike, protest or picket. 
 
The pre-1995 labour relations dispensation recognised the symbiotic relationship between 
industrial action and the collective bargaining process. In Num v East Rand Gold & Uranium 
Co Ltd,385 the court, referring to the LRA of 1956, stated that it was underpinned by the 
philosophy that good labour relations and resolution of disputes could only be achieved 
through the process of collective bargaining. It also observed that strikes were generally 
accepted as an essential part of the collective bargaining machinery. In Food & Allied 
Workers Union v Spekenham Supreme386, the court stated, amongst other things, that the main 
objective of labour legislation was counteracting the inequality inherent in the employment 
relationship.   
 
Commenting on the pre-1995 labour jurisprudence, Brassey387 stated that the institution of 
collective bargaining, being the preferred means of achieving peaceful labour relations, could 
                                                            
384 See generally, J F Myburg “100 Years of Strike Law” (2004) 25 ILJ 962-976. 
385 (1991) 12 ILJ 1221(IC) at 1237. 
386  (1988) 9 ILJ 628 (IC) at 637. 
387 M S M Brassey “The Dismissal of Strikers” (1990) 11 ILJ 213 at 235. 
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not thrive without recourse to strikes and other related actions. The threat by the parties to 
resort to industrial action drives the collective bargaining process. Put differently, without the 
threat or reality of industrial action, the bargaining process would be sluggish. The author 
observes that there was a striking paradox in the manner in which legislation attempted to 
promote peaceful labour relations. Although supporting collective bargaining as the preferred 
means of achieving peaceful labour relations, it also recognised that industrial action was an 
essential element and formed part of the collective bargaining machinery. It therefore 
discouraged acts designed to be anti-industrial action measures, such as dismissals by 
employers, of workers who participated in strikes. It effectively protected “industrial warfare 
in order to promote peace.388 
 
Under the LRA of 1956, employers were restrained from dismissing workers engaged in 
strikes using the “unfair labour practice jurisdiction”. One of the considerations by the courts 
was whether the exercise of the right was in good faith and whether the strike action served 
the function of promoting collective bargaining.389 Dismissing employees who participate in 
strikes is generally considered a disproportionate counteraction which should be discouraged 
by all means. 
 
As put by Van Niekerk et al, the right to industrial action is a weapon which redresses the 
inequality that exists between labour and capital.390 The most accepted argument for granting 
employees a protected right to strike is that it is an integral part of the process of collective 
bargaining as the threat or reality thereof often coerces employers, who are generally 
regarded as occupying a powerful position in the employment relationship, to give in to their 
demands. In Numsa v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd,391 Ngcobo J suggested that collective bargaining 
cannot yield results without the right to strike. The learned Judge likened the importance of 
the right to the collective bargaining process to “what an engine is to a motor vehicle”. 
                                                            
388 Ibid. 
389 See J Grogan Collective Labour Law 122.  
390 Van Niekerk et al Law @ Work 371. 
391 (2003) 24 ILJ 305 (CC) at 335. 
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In Betha v BTR Sarmcol,392 the SCA heard an appeal against the decision of a court a quo 
which made an analogy to the effect that the struggles between employers and employees 
resembled a “battle and warfare” and that strikes and dismissals were ultimate weapons of 
trade unions and employers respectively. The finding of the court a quo was that recourse to 
strike action by a trade union automatically legitimised recourse to dismissals by employers. 
The SCA per Olivier JA stated that this was not a proper construction of the law. It associated 
itself with the argument of counsel of the Appellants that strikes are instruments which are 
legitimate in the collective bargaining process and that they weaken the resistance of 
employers when there is an impasse in negotiations. Dismissals on the other hand ended the 
employment relationship and the two actions cannot, therefore be equivalent, as found by the 
court a quo. The court held that the right to dismiss striking workers was “not a reciprocal 
right, but an extraordinary one” and should be exercised only when there are compelling 
circumstances. 
 
The Constitution and the LRA provide for a clear and regulated right to engage in strikes and 
other forms of industrial action but there is some divergence of views on the effectiveness 
and future role of industrial action in South Africa. The prevalence or high incidence of strike 
action in post-apartheid South Africa has exposed organised labour to the general criticism 
that it wields too much power at the expense of business. The LRA provides that its purposes, 
are, amongst other things, to “promote orderly collective bargaining”, “to promote employee 
participation in decision-making in the workplace” and also “the effective resolution of 
labour disputes”.393 The adversarialism which still exists in the bargaining process, and often 
culminates in industrial action, is to a certain extent indicative of the fact that labour and 
business are becoming polarised and that strikes and other forms of industrial action will soon 
become the preferred method by labour to further their rights and interests.  
 
This chapter will focus on the various forms of industrial action, how they are regulated by 
legislation and how they are used by trade unions as weapons to bring pressure on employers 
                                                            
392 (1998) 19 ILJ 459 (SCA) at 514. 
393 S 1(d) (ii) (iii) and (iv). 
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or employer’ organisations to accept their demands. It will attempt to explore the 
effectiveness of industrial action and its role in shaping employment relations in South 
Africa. 
 
4.2 Constitutional and legislative framework 
The Constitution is the reference point for the right to strike. Section 23(2)(c) of the 
Constitution provides all workers have a right to strike. The LRA gives effect to this right by 
providing a detailed framework on how it should be exercised. It defines a strike as: 
“The partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or obstruction of 
work, by persons who are or have been employed by the same employer or by 
different employers, for the purpose of remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute 
in respect of any matter of mutual interest between employer and employee ….”394 
 
The LRA extends the right to strike to all employees and provides that such an action must be 
preceded by the referral of a dispute to the CCMA or council.395 A certificate must be issued, 
following the referral, to the effect that the dispute was not resolved.396 The receipt of the 
referral of the dispute by the council or Commission must be followed by 30 days, or any 
extended period agreed by parties.397 The LRA also provides that a 48 hour notice must be 
given to an employer before a strike commences, unless such notice must be given to a 
council, when the dispute is about a collective agreement to be concluded in that council, or 
to an organisation of employers, if the employer belongs to such an organisation.398 
 
 
                                                            
394 S 213. 
395 S 64(1)(a). 
396 S 64(1)(a)(i). 
397 S 64(1)(a)(ii). 
398 S 64(b)(i) and (ii) respectively. 
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Section 64(d) of the LRA provides that in cases where the State is the employer, the proposed 
strike must be preceded by seven days notice. The 48 hours notice where the State is not the 
employer can only be made after an advisory award has been made in terms of s 135(3)(c) in 
cases where the issue in dispute is the refusal by an employer to bargain. The provisions of     
s 64(1) do not apply if the dispute has been dealt with according to a council’s constitution, in 
cases where parties are members of a council,399 if the strike is in conformity with the 
procedures set out in a collective agreement,400 if the strike is a response to a lock-out by an 
employer which is not in compliance with the relevant provisions of the LRA,401 or if the 
employer is not in compliance with the requirements of s 64(4) and (5).402  
 
Subsections (4) and (5) provide that trade unions or employees, who refer disputes to the 
CCMA or council about changes to the terms and conditions of employment unilaterally 
effected by the employer, may in such referrals require the employer not to proceed to effect 
the envisaged changes for a period specified in subsec (1). In cases where changes have 
already been effected, a trade union or employee may request the employer to reverse such 
changes. In terms of s 64(5), when a referral notice is served on employers, they must comply 
with the requests set out on such referrals within a period of 48 hours.  
 
The LRA provides numerous limitations on the right to strike. If an issue is covered by a 
collective agreement which prohibits a strike in the event that a dispute arises, the 
participation in a strike or any conduct that contemplates or furthers a strike by any person 
bound by such an agreement is prohibited.403 Persons bound by collective agreements which 
require that certain issues in dispute should be arbitrated are also prohibited from taking part 
in a strike and other related actions regarding the specified issues in dispute.404 When a party 
                                                            
399 S 64(3) (a). 
400 S 64(3) (b). 
401 S 64(3) (c). 
402 S 64(3) (e). 
403 S 65(1) (a). 
404 S 65(1) (b). 
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has a right to refer an issue in dispute for arbitration or to the Labour Court,405 or a person 
performs an essential or maintenance service,406 the participation in a strike or related actions 
is also prohibited. 
 
In terms of s 65(2)(a), a person may participate in a strike or any conduct which contemplates 
or seeks to further a strike, notwithstanding s 65(1)(c), if the issue in dispute relates to 
organisational rights in terms of sections 12 to 15 of the LRA. A trade union electing to issue 
a strike notice in terms of s 64(1) for an issue relating to organisational rights cannot refer 
such a dispute to arbitration as per s 21 of the Act for twelve months from the date such 
notice was issued.407 
 
The LRA also provides that: 
“Subject to a collective agreement, no person may take part in a strike … or in any 
conduct in contemplation of furtherance of a strike … if that person is bound by … 
any arbitration award or collective agreement that regulates the issue in dispute; or … 
in any determination made in terms of section 44 by the Minister that regulates the 
issue in dispute; or … any determination made in terms of Wage Act and that 
regulates the issue in dispute, during the first year of that determination.”408 
 
4.2.1 Secondary strikes 
The LRA also regulates participation in secondary strikes. It defines a secondary strike as:  
“a strike, or conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike, that is in support of a 
strike by other employees against their employer but does not include a strike in 
                                                            
405 S 65(1) (c). 
406 S 65(d) (i) and (ii). 
407 S 65(2) (b). 
408 S 65(3) (a) (i)-(ii) and (b) respectively. 
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pursuant of a demand that has been referred to a council if the striking employees, 
employed within the registered scope of that council, have a material interest in that 
demand.”409 
 
The LRA prohibits such strikes unless the primary strikes are in compliance with the 
provisions of s 64 and 65.410 An employer of the employees planning a secondary strike or an 
employers’ organisation, if the employer belongs to such an organisation, must have been 
issued with a notice in writing proposing such a strike seven days before it commences.411 
The LRA prohibits participation in a secondary strike unless “the nature and extent of the 
secondary strike is reasonable in relation to the possible direct or indirect effect that the 
secondary strike may have on the business of the primary employer”.412 The LRA also allows 
an employer to approach the Labour Court for an order interdicting or limiting a secondary 
strike that does not comply with s 66(2) subject to the provisions of s 68(2) and (3).413 In 
terms of s 66(4), an investigation as to whether there was compliance with the provisions of s 
66(2) can be undertaken by the CCMA upon request by any person who is a party to the 
proceedings as per s 66(3), and the role of the Commission in such an instance would be to 
assist the Labour Court in determining whether the secondary strike was in compliance with 
the relevant provisions of the LRA. 
 
4.2.2 The protection granted to employees participating in protected strikes 
A strike that is protected in terms of the LRA or any conduct in contemplation or seeking to 
further a protected strike does not constitute a breach of the employment contract.414 The 
LRA defines a protected strike as a strike that is in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 
                                                            
409 S 66(1). 
410 S 66(2) (a). 
411 S 66(2) (b). 
412 See s 66(2) (c). 
413 S 66(3). 
414 See s 67(2). 
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IV.415 Employers are however not obliged to remunerate employees for services not rendered 
during a protected strike but the LRA states that employers must continue any payment in 
kind if the remuneration of an employee includes such payment, if so requested by the 
employee.416 An employer is, however, allowed to recover the monetary value of any 
payment made in kind to the employee after the strike by instituting civil proceedings in the 
Labour Court.417 In terms of s 67(4), employees are protected from dismissals for reasons of 
participating in a protected strike or any conduct which contemplates or furthers a protected 
strike. The LRA provides that an employer can, however, dismiss an employee for the latter’s 
misconduct during the strike or for reasons based on operational requirements.418  
 
In South African Chemical Workers Union v Mediterranean Textile Mills,419 the CCMA had 
to decide whether the dismissal of certain employees for reasons of misconduct during a 
strike constituted an unfair dismissal. The employer dismissed some employees belonging to 
the South African Chemical Workers Union (SACWU) for serious misconduct calculated to 
intimidate members of another trade union, the South African Clothing and Textile Workers 
Union (SACTWU), not to continue working for the employee during the strike. Such 
intimidation took the form of use of firearms and the shooting of the homes of some 
employees resulting, inter alia, in death and injury of the family of one employee. The 
CCMA held that “while s 187 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 declares it to be an 
automatically unfair dismissal to dismiss for striking per se, it is clear that that does not 
prevent an employer from dismissing an employee guilty of misconduct during the strike”. It 
stated that “the freedom to strike does not mean that strikers have the right to prevent the 
employer from carrying on business in whatever way it chooses”. It further stated that “the 
                                                            
415 See s 67(1). 
416 See s 67(3) (a). 
417 S 67(3) (b). 
418 S 67(5). 
419 (2001) 22 ILJ 533 (CCMA).  
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fact that the Act does not prohibit replacement labour in all circumstances is an indication 
that an employers’ right to carry on business persists throughout the strike”.420 
 
The LRA provides that no civil proceedings may be brought against persons who participate 
in protected strikes or conduct contemplating or furthering a protected strike.421 An employer 
who is coerced through strikes or any conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike to 
conclude a collective agreement cannot thereafter attempt to resile from the agreement on the 
ground that he was forced to conclude it under duress.  Generally, duress renders a contract 
voidable but it is not a concept that can be invoked in industrial disputes. Industrial action is 
an integral part of the bargaining process and therefore does not constitute a breach of 
contract or delict.422  
 
4.2.3  Unprotected strikes 
Section 68 of the LRA regulates unprotected strikes or strikes or conduct contemplating or 
furthering a strike that is not in compliance with the relevant provisions of the Act. The LRA 
grants the Labour Court exclusive jurisdiction over such matters and provides that the court 
can interdict or make an order prohibiting persons from continuing to embark on such a strike 
or any conduct which furthers or contemplates such a strike.423 The court can also make an 
order that “just and equitable compensation” be paid for losses which are attributable to the 
strikers.424 In making such an order, regard must be had to such factors as; whether there was 
an attempt by a person who participated in a strike to comply with the relevant provisions of 
                                                            
420 Para 556-F, G and H. 
421 S 67(6).  
422 See generally A Landman “Protected Industrial Action and Immunity from the Consequences of Economic 
Duress” (2001) 22 ILJ 1509. 
423 S 68(1) (a) (i). 
424 S 68(1) (b). 
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the Act, whether the strike was planned, whether it was embarked upon to protest an unjust 
conduct and whether an order made in terms of s 68(1) (a) was complied with.425 
 
The LRA further provides that unprotected strikes or conduct contemplating or furthering a 
strike “may be a fair reason for dismissal” and that the determination of the fairness of such a 
dismissal must be done in accordance with the Code of Good practice for dismissals.426 In 
terms of the Code, participating in strikes not in compliance with the relevant provisions of 
the LRA constitutes misconduct but this does not necessarily mean that employees who 
participate in such strikes must be dismissed. The Code provides that there must be an 
enquiry into the fairness, in the substantive sense, of such dismissals. Factors such as the 
extent of the seriousness of violations, the efforts made to comply with the provisions of the 
Act, and the question whether or not the strike was embarked upon to protest an unjust 
conduct by the employer party, provide important guidelines when determining the 
substantive fairness of dismissals.427 The Code further provides that the employer should 
clearly communicate the intention to dismiss employees to a trade union official as soon as 
possible and should also clearly communicate what he requires of the employees and the 
possible sanctions in the event of non-compliance. The affected employees must be allowed 
enough time to make a decision whether to comply or not to comply with the ultimatum.428 
 
There is continuing debate on whether the LRA adequately gives effect to the constitutional 
right to strike. Maserumule429 argues that the LRA fails to expressly give effect to the right to 
strike as it only emphasises “the limited circumstances under which the right to strike may be 
exercised and the penalties for exercising the right other than as prescribed”.430 The author 
criticises the Labour Courts and the LRA for being overly preoccupied with the limitations on 
                                                            
425 S 68(1) (b) (ii)-(iv).  
426 See s 68(5). 
427 Item 6(1) (a)-(c) of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal. 
428 Item 6(2) of the Code. 
429 P Maserumule “A Perspective on the Developments in Strike Law” (2001) 22 ILJ 45. 
430 Ibid. 
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the right to strike and in the process failing to adequately give effect to or protecting the 
right.431 He argues that the jurisprudence that has emerged on the right to strike emphasises 
the limitations attendant on the right and overlooks the importance of having a framework 
that gives effect to the right.432 
 
Commenting on the LAC judgment in BSA v COSATU,433 the author opines that the overall 
impression created by the judgment was that the court exhibited a concern about the 
negatives associated with strikes and the importance of exercising this right in a responsible 
manner.434 The case involved a planned strike by COSATU in relation to minimum 
employment standards legislation, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA). The 
LAC interdicted the planned action on grounds of non-compliance with s 77 of the LRA. 
Maserumule argues that the approach adopted by the court overstated the limitations inherent 
on the right and in the process failed to address the issue on how the current legislative 
framework attempts to give effect to this right.435 The author further argues that cases decided 
after BSA v COSATU followed this reasoning and blames the LAC decision for setting the 
trend where the approach by the courts when deciding on disputes about the exercise of the 
right to strike elevate the importance of the limitations inherent on the right and in the process 
deny workers the right to effectively exercise the right. 
 
 
The LRA gives effect to the right to strike by providing a clear and detailed framework on 
how the right should be exercised. It reiterates the constitutional provision that all employees 
have the right to strike, but as expected from a law which seeks to give effect, substance and 
content to this right, it also outlines the procedures to be followed for such action to be 
protected. It further grants immunities to employees who participate in protected strikes. 
There is no justification for the criticism of the decision of the LAC since it merely 
                                                            
431 Maserumule 2001 ILJ 46. 
432 Ibid. 
433 (1997) 18 ILJ 474 (LAC). 
434 Maserumule 2001 ILJ 47. 
435 Ibid.  
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interpreted and applied the provisions of the LRA and cannot formulate its own procedures or 
requirements. The LRA clearly provides for a positive right to strike and the procedures to be 
followed for strikes to be followed are meant to provide some clarity on the subject so as to 
avoid disputes. 
 
4.2.4 The right to picket 
The LRA also provides registered trade unions with the right to “authorise a picket by its 
members and supporters for the purposes of peacefully demonstrating … in support of any 
protected strike; or … in opposition of any lock-out”.436 The picket can be in any place 
accessible to the public but not inside employer’ premises unless the employer grants such 
permission.437 The CCMA, must, upon request by a registered trade union or employer, 
facilitate the conclusion of an agreement by the parties on rules regulating the exercise of the 
right to picket either in support of a protected strike or in opposition to a lock-out.438 In the 
event that parties fail to reach an agreement, the Commission is obliged by the LRA to 
establish its own rules regulating the exercise of the right to picket and it must be guided by 
factors such as “the particular circumstances of the workplace or other premises where it is 
intended that the right to picket is to be exercised”, or “any relevant Code of Good 
Practice”.439 
 
Disputes relating to the right to picket may be referred to the Commission in writing which 
must attempt to settle the dispute by way of conciliation, failing which a party to the dispute 
may refer it for adjudication in the Labour Court.440 The right to picket is also regulated by a 
Code of Good Practice on Picketing which provides guidelines on how it should be 
                                                            
436 S 69(1) (a) and (b). 
437 See s 69(2) (a) and (b) respectively. Section 69(3) further provides that the employer should not unreasonably 
withhold such permission. 
438 S 69(4). 
439 S 69(5) (a) and (b). 
440 See s 69(8) (a)-(d), (9), (10) and (11) respectively. 
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exercised.441 The Code provides that “it applies only to pickets held in terms of section 69 of 
the [LRA] Act”.442 It provides that a registered trade union must authorise the picket in terms 
of its constitution and that such “authorisation applies only to its members and supporters”.443 
It states that a picket in terms of s 69 of the Act is intended to generate support from the 
public to support striking workers or to oppose a lock-out.444  
 
The Code provides that picketing is normally in support of primary strikes but also makes 
provision for picketing in support of secondary strikes and states that such pickets must 
comply with secondary strikes requirements.445 The Code states that the parties, a registered 
trade union and employer, should make efforts to formulate rules regulating pickets and that 
such rules may be contained in a collective agreement.446 It also provides that an employer 
may not withhold, unreasonably, the permission sought by a registered trade union to have 
the picket on the employer’s premises and lists numerous considerations in determining the 
reasonableness of the decision of an employer to withhold permission.447 It also makes 
provision for the appointment of a convenor by the registered trade union whose role is “to 
oversee the picket”, the appointment of marshals for monitoring the picket and how picketers 
should conduct themselves as well as the role of the police.448 
 
                                                            
441 GN 765, Government Gazette 18887, 15 May 1998. 
442 Item 1(5). Item 1 (7) states that a picket which is for any other purpose other than supporting “a protected 
strike or a lock-out is not protected by the Act” and that its “lawfulness … will depend on compliance with 
ordinary laws”. 
443 Item 2 (1) and (2). 
444 Item 3(1). 
445 Item 3(2).  
446 Item 4(1) and (2). 
447 Item 5(1) (a)-(h). 
448 Items 6 and 7. Item 8 states that participation in a protected picket does not constitute a delict or breach of 
contract and that employees participating in a protected picket are immune from disciplinary action unless their 
conduct during the picket amounts to misconduct in which case an employer is allowed to take appropriate 
disciplinary action. 
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4.2.5 Protest action 
The LRA also provides all employees, excluding those engaged in essential or maintenance 
services, with the right to participate in protest action if such an action has been sanctioned 
by a registered trade union or a federation of trade unions and such a union or federation of 
unions has served NEDLAC with a notice outlining “the reasons for the protest action” and 
its nature.449 The reasons for the protest action must have been considered by NEDLAC or 
any other forum appropriate for use by the parties to resolve the matter.450 It defines a protest 
action as: 
“The partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or obstruction of 
work, for the purpose of promoting or defending socio-economic interests of workers, 
but not for a purpose referred to in the definition of a strike.”451 
 
The action must be preceded by 14 days notice to NEDLAC by a trade union or federation of 
trade unions informing the forum that it intends to proceed with the action.452 The LRA 
grants the Labour Court exclusive jurisdiction “to grant any order to restrain any person from 
taking part in protest action or in any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a protest 
action that does not comply with subsec (1). Section 77(2)(b) provides that in the event that 
the action complies with the relevant provisions, the Labour Court can grant a declaratory 
order having regard to such factors such as “the nature and duration of the protest action”, 
“the steps taken by the registered trade union or federation of trade unions to minimise the 
harm caused by the protest action; and, also, “the conduct of the participants in the protest 
action”.  
 
Section 77(3) extends the s 67 protections enjoyed by employees who participate in protected 
strikes or conduct in contemplation or furtherance of strike action to persons taking part in 
                                                            
449 See s 77(1) (a) and (b) (i)-(ii). 
450 S 77(c). 
451 S 213. 
452 S 77(d). 
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protest action or any conduct contemplating such an action, which complies with the relevant 
provisions of the LRA. 453The LRA further provides that employees who participate in a 
protest action in violation of a Labour Court order or who act in contempt of such an order 
forfeit the protections of the Act.454 
 
The inclusion of the right to participate in protest action was obviously premised on the 
recognition that workers should have a right to influence policies that affect their socio-
economic interests. The role of trade unions in post-apartheid South Africa has also shifted 
from being merely organisations for workers that advance the interests of their members at 
workplace level. They are important social partners and they have an important role in 
influencing socio-economic changes at policy level. 
 
4.3 The ILO jurisprudence and practice in foreign jurisdictions 
 
4.3.1 ILO standards 
 
Although the ILO conventions do not expressly provide for a positive right to strike, the 
jurisprudence developed by the CEACR and the CFA recognises the existence of the right to 
strike. As put by Servais: 
“The ILO organs of control have had numerous occasions to take a position on the 
subject. They have built up a body of principles, recognizing that the right to strike 
constitutes an intrinsic corollary to the right to organize and a fundamental right of 
workers and of their organisations.”455 
The author states that the recognition of the legitimacy and importance of the right to strike to 
further and defend the interests of workers by the CFA is to be found in Article 3 and 10 of 
                                                            
453 See also generally BSA v COSATU on the argument about the legality of protest action by Maserumule.. 
454 S 77(4) (a)-(b). 
455 J-M Servais “The ILO law and the freedom to strike”. 
http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/conferences2/StrikeSymposium09_Servais.pdf (accessed 01 June 2010). 
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the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention.456 The 
former provides, inter alia, that organisations for workers “have the right … to organise their 
administration and activities and to formulate their programmes”. Article 10 defines 
“organisation” to mean a workers’ organisation to further and defend workers’ interests. 
 
The interpretation by the CFA recognises strikes for the purposes of promoting and defending 
the interests of workers. Political strikes and those planned long before the commencement of 
negotiations are not protected by the CFA principles.457 Generally, there is some consensus 
among members of ILO Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, on the right 
to strike although some divergence of views among the delegates namely, the Employers’ 
Group, the Worker’ Group and the Government delegates, are inevitable.458 The Worker’s 
Group fully accept the interpretation adopted by the Committee of Experts citing that it 
cannot be alienated form the broader right to freedom of association and that it is recognised 
and protected by the Constitution of the ILO and its conventions.459 The argument by the 
Employers’ Group is that industrial action, in the form of strikes for workers and lock-outs 
for employers, “could perhaps be acknowledged as an integral part of international common 
law and, as such, it should not be totally banned or authorized only under excessively 
restrictive conditions”.460 The Group further argues that since there is no explicit provision on 
the right to strike in the ILO Conventions, particularly Convention No. 87 and 98, “the 
Committee of Experts should [not] deduce from the text of these Conventions a global, 
precise and detailed, absolute unlimited right”.461 The government delegates generally agree 
                                                            
456 Ibid. 
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458 See B Gernigon et al “ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike”. 
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with the approach or interpretation of the Committee of Experts on the right to strike whilst 
also raising some concerns about the exercise of the right, particularly in public service.462 
 
 
The right to strike has been recognised by the CFA since 1952 which stated that its 
recognition is premised on the principle that it is a legitimate weapon by workers to protect 
and promote their interests.463 The CFA has stated that striking is not just a ‘social act’, but a 
right to be enjoyed by workers and their associations. It has also reduced the excessive 
restrictions on the exercise of the right as well as the categories of workers excluded from 
exercising the right. It has emphasised that the objective of the right is to promote and defend 
socio-economic interests of workers which therefore means that strikes for purely political 
reasons are excluded and, has also “stated that the legitimate exercise of the right to strike 
should not entail prejudicial penalties of any sort, which would imply acts of anti-union 
discrimination”.464 
 
 
The CFA has accepted numerous procedures as conditions for the exercise of the right to 
strike. They include giving prior notice before embarking on a strike, using the machinery of 
conciliation, mediation and voluntary arbitration as a pre-condition to declare strikes 
provided that such proceedings are not cumbersome, taking decisions regarding strikes by 
secret ballot, establishing minimum services in some cases and guaranteeing non-strikers the 
freedom to continue to work.465 
 
 
On the utilisation of the machinery of conciliation, mediation and arbitration the Committee 
of Experts has stated that: 
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“In a large number of countries legislation stipulates that the conciliation and 
mediation procedures must be exhausted before a strike may be called. The spirit of 
these provisions is compatible with Article 4 of Convention No. 98, which encourages 
the full development and utilization of machinery for the voluntary negotiation of 
collective agreements. Such machinery must, however, have the sole purpose of 
facilitating bargaining: it should not be so complex or slow that a lawful strike 
becomes impossible in practice or loses its effectiveness ….”466 
 
In terms of the Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation,467 if parties opt to 
use the conciliation and arbitration machinery, industrial action by the parties should be 
discouraged during such processes and parties should accept the arbitration award. With 
regards to compulsory arbitration, the CFA has stated that “it is only acceptable in cases of 
strikes in essential services in the strict sense of the term, in a case of acute national crisis, or 
in the public service ….”468 The approach by the Committee of Experts is that compulsory 
arbitration cannot be imposed by legislation as an alternative to strike action except in cases 
of essential services or when there has been an interruption of a non-essential service for too 
long that the safety, life or health of the population, in whole or in part, is endangered.469 
 
A party cannot request for compulsory arbitration to be imposed by authorities as this erodes 
the voluntaristic nature of the principle of collective bargaining and the freedom of partners 
to determine their own bargaining processes.470 Authorities should not, at their own initiative, 
impose compulsory arbitration since this intervention cannot be reconciled with the 
voluntaristic nature of the negotiation process enunciated in Article 4 of the Right to organise 
and Collective Bargaining Convention No. 98.471 It however recognises “that there comes a 
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time in bargaining where, after protracted and fruitless negotiations, the authorities might be 
justified to step in when it is obvious that the deadlock in bargaining will not be broken 
without some initiative on their part”.472 
Regarding the quorum and majority for taking decisions regarding strikes, the general 
approach of the CFA is that requiring that a strike can only be declared “by over half of all 
workers involved … is excessive and could excessively hinder the possibility of carrying out 
a strike, particularly in large enterprises”.473 Also, requiring “that an absolute majority of 
workers should be obtained for the calling of a strike may be difficult, especially in the case 
of unions which group together a large number of members”.474 
 
 
The approach adopted by the CFA is that the responsibility of declaring strikes as illegal 
should lie with an independent body and not with government. The CFA maintains that 
persons contemplating or participating in legitimate strikes should not be penalised, that 
dismissing workers for reasons of participating in a legitimate strikes violates the Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 98 and also “constitutes serious 
discrimination”, that the principles of freedom of association require that workers 
participating in a strike or other related actions should be protected from dismissals and that 
recourse to measures such as dismissing such workers and refusing to reinstate them gravely 
erodes the principle of freedom of association.475 The body of principles that have been 
developed by the Committee of Experts and the CFA over the years now constitute a rich 
jurisprudence on the right to strike. The most basic principles regarding the right to strike 
include the following:476 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
employers or employers' organisations and workers' organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and 
conditions of employment by means of collective agreements”. 
472 Ibid. 
473 Gernigon et al “ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike”. 
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i. It is a fundamental right for workers and their organisations and is protected in 
so far as it is exercised peacefully. 
ii. It should be enjoyed by workers in all sectors, public or private, and the only 
category of workers who might not exercise it are “members of the armed and 
police forces, public servants who exercise authority in the name of the State 
and workers employed in essential services in the strict sense of the term (the 
interruption of which could endanger the life, safety or health of the whole or 
part of the population), or in situations of acute national crisis”. 
iii. Strikes for purely politically reasons are not covered. 
iv. Workers and trade unionists should be protected from acts such as dismissals 
for being participants or organising legal strikes “through prompt, efficient 
and impartial procedures, accompanied by sufficiently dissuasive remedies 
and sanctions”. 
v. “The protection of freedom of association does not cover abuses in the 
exercise of the right to strike regarding lawfulness, or consisting of acts of a 
criminal nature; any sanctions imposed in the event of abuse should not be 
disproportionate to the seriousness of the violations”. 
vi. Picketing can only be restricted when “it ceases to be peaceful, and picketing 
should not interfere with the freedom to work for non-strikers”. 
vii. “The obligation to give prior notice, the obligation to engage in conciliation, 
have recourse to voluntary arbitration, comply with a given quorum and obtain 
the agreement of a given majority where this does not cause the strike to 
become very difficult or even impossible in practice and the secret ballot 
method to decide strike action are all acceptable conditions for the exercise of 
the right to strike”. 
 
 
4.3.2 Foreign jurisdictions 
The failure by the ILO Conventions to provide an explicit right to strike might be reason why 
there is no consistency in the application of the right by Member States. There have been 
many complaints regarding the right, with the Committee of Experts holding in the majority 
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of cases that some Member States are still failing to adequately give effect to and protect the 
right. 
 
Some major reforms have been effected on the right to strike in certain countries. In Australia 
for example, participation in industrial action was not protected prior to 1993.477 The system 
which existed prior to the promulgation of the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 was that 
of compulsory conciliation and arbitration premised on the idea that parties to an industrial 
dispute would not embark on industrial action if there was “an alternative forum for the 
resolution of disputes ….”478 Following the recommendations of the ILO Committee on 
Freedom of Association in 1991 to the effect that the compulsory conciliation and arbitration 
system could not be reconciled “with international standards on free collective bargaining and 
the right to strike”, “[t]he perceived need for change within the Australian labour relations 
system led to the passage of the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993”.479 
 
The Industrial Relations Reform Act modified the compulsory conciliation and arbitration 
model and included the right to freely engage in collective bargaining and “an express right 
to take industrial action”.480 One of the objectives of promulgating the Industrial Relations 
Reform Act as stated in the Explanatory Memorandum, was “to give effect to Australia’s 
obligations under the ILO Conventions, as interpreted by the ILO Supervisory 
Committees”.481 The Workplace Relations Act 1996 sought to consolidate the transformation 
precipitated by the Industrial Relations reform Act, which envisaged “a new voluntary 
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collective bargaining model, with industrial action assuming a central role as a potential 
weapon available to both employers and employees in collective bargaining”.482 
 
The changes brought by the 1993 and 1996 legislation articulated the role of industrial action 
in the collective bargaining process and participation in such action was protected from tort, 
breach of contract and State liability if the prescribed legislative processes for such action to 
be protected were followed.483 Although facilitating “industrial action by parties to collective 
bargaining in a relatively straightforward, accessible manner”, the process “attracted ILO 
criticism over excessive restrictions on the form, content and voluntariness of bargaining     
… and extensive litigation over aspects of the operation of the provisions in practice”.484 
 
Although stating “that the provisions for the right to strike were a valid exercise of the 
external affairs power” in terms of s 51(xxix) of the Australian Constitution, the High Court 
in Victoria v Commonwealth,485 held that the ILO Conventions, the ILO Constitution and the 
approach or interpretation adopted by the CEACR and the CFA did not form the basis for the 
recognition of the right to strike by Australian legislation. The court reasoned that the basis 
for the inclusion of the right to strike provisions was the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Article 8(1) of the ICESCR provides that 
“[t]he States Parties to the … Covenant undertake to ensure … (d) [t]he right to strike, 
provided that it is in conformity with the laws of the particular country”. 
 
The Work Choices Act 2005 made some sweeping changes to the Australian labour relations 
system.486 The role of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) in the 
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determination of conditions of employment and resolution of labour disputes has been 
reduced, accessing workplaces by trade unions and organising industrial action has been 
made difficult and employers have been shielded from claims arising from unfair 
dismissals.487 As summed up by McCrystal:488  
“Overall, the package of changes contained within the Work Choices Act represents a 
regressive step which has reduced the availability of protected action, increased the 
likelihood of sanctions for unprotected action, and provided employers with 
significant advantages in collective bargaining”. 
As argued by the author “[t]his does not represent a ‘right to strike’ designed to even the 
balance of power between employers and employees, but constitutes a legal entrenchment of 
the dominant position of employers”.489 
 
The absence of an explicit right to strike provision in the ILO Conventions means that some 
Members States would see this as an opportunity to provide for a right to strike which is 
overly restricted to the point that it is not practically exercisable. In the United Kingdom, 
there is some confusion on the issue whether the right to strike exists.490 “[T]he statutory 
provisions which permit” the organisation of industrial action and participation in such action 
are framed in terms of immunities from the tortious and criminal liability that would 
otherwise attach”.491 The argument that the immunities provided by the statutory provisions 
do not give rise to a positive right to strike has been countered by some who suggest: 
“[T]hat the negative protection afforded by the statutory immunities ought to be 
regarded as equivalent to the positive protection of the right found in other 
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jurisdictions; that the choice to frame the law in terms of statutory immunities, rather 
than rights, was down simply to a technique of drafting”.492  
The basis for arguing that the right to strike is recognised in the United Kingdom is the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), particularly Article 11 and the Human 
Rights Act 1998. 
 
4.4 Levelling the collective bargaining field: Justifications for a constitutionalised 
right to strike in South Africa 
The inclusion of a right to strike and the absence of a right to lock-out in the Constitution was 
a contentious issue in the certification process.493 Section 23(2)(c) of the Constitution 
provides that all workers have a right to strike. Its predecessor, the Interim Constitution of 
1993, provided for both the right to strike for all employees and the right to have recourse to 
lock-outs by employers.494  
 
The main objection against the inclusion of the right to strike and the absence of a right to 
lock-out in the New Text was that effective collective bargaining could not take place without 
some exercise of economic power by parties against each other and that this meant that the 
New Text should also expressly provide for a right to lock-out. The court dismissed this 
objection by reasoning that the New Text was not required by the Constitutional Principles, 
particularly CP XXVIII, to “expressly recognise any particular mechanism for the exercise of 
economic power on behalf of workers or employees …” and that it sufficed that the New 
Text specifically provided for the right to bargain collectively. The recognition of the right to 
bargain collectively implied that the right to recourse to economic strength existed within this 
right and that there was no need for the New Text to define the right and how it should be 
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exercised.495Another objection to the New Text was that including the right to strike and 
omitting the right to lock-out meant that the right by employers to engage in collective 
bargaining was “accorded a less status than the right of workers to engage in collective 
bargaining”. The court evaluated this argument and dismissed it on the ground that the New 
Text did not diminish the right to engage in collective bargaining by employers and that it 
also did not diminish their right to use their economic strength against workers because the 
New Text expressly recognised the broad right to bargain collectively.496  
 
The objectors also raised the argument that the inclusion of the right to strike and exclusion 
of the right to lock-out violated the Constitutional Principle of equality. The court dismissed 
the argument on ground that it was premised on a wrong construction that a lock-out should 
be treated as an equivalent of a strike. It therefore followed, if such an argument was to be 
accepted, that equal treatment of workers and employers meant that the New Text should 
expressly recognise both the right to strike and the right to lock-out.497 The court dismissed 
this argument by stating as follows: 
“The argument that it is necessary in order to maintain equality to entrench the right 
to lock-out once the right to strike has been included, cannot be sustained, because the 
right to strike and the right to lock-out are not always and necessarily equivalent.”498 
 
The objectors also argued that including the right to strike implied that the LRA, which 
protected the right to lock-out, was unconstitutional. The court found the argument to be 
based on a “false premise” and held that the overarching framework was going to remain the 
Constitution given effect by the LRA, and developed by labour courts under constant 
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constitutional scrutiny to ensure that the rights of both employers and workers are 
protected.499  
 
The certification of the Constitution, particularly in relation to labour relations, was a painful 
exercise as the court had to evaluate representations from all stakeholders. The debate about 
the desirability of having a constitutionally protected right to strike is still ongoing. There is 
an argument that constitutionalising the right does not afford it greater protection but 
effectively places upon it “unacceptable limitations”.500 The inclusion of the right to strike in 
the Constitution and the provision for recourse to lock-out by employers in the LRA, as 
opposed to a right to lock-out, might be viewed by employers as calculated to elevate the 
powers of employees in the bargaining process. It however simply counteracts the 
inequalities which existed in the bargaining power of employers and employees in the pre-
1995 labour relations dispensation where the majority of employees were at the mercy of 
their employers and had no ammunition to militantly pursue their demands. 
 
4.4.1  The effectiveness of the right to strike 
The role of trade unions in employment relations has changed since the advent of a new 
labour relations dispensation, precipitated by the Constitution and the centre-piece labour 
legislation, the LRA. There have been significant changes in employment relations 
management, with trade unions seizing the opportunities presented by a new labour relations 
dispensation and making significant gains in their fight to improve the terms and conditions 
of work on behalf of their members. 
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Apart from influencing changes at workplace level through the ordinary process of collective 
bargaining, trade unions also play a recognisable role in the tripartite relationship, lobbying 
for better working conditions on behalf of workers at policy level. Although wielding 
significant power at policy formulation level, their primary role of promoting the interests of 
workers at grassroots level, has not been diminished. Innovative institutions to enhance co-
operation between labour and business have been created, such as NEDLAC and workplace 
forums, but the inevitability of competing interests often means that parties often resort to 
their economic power or strength to make their demands. 
 
The current legislative framework allows for a voluntary system of collective bargaining 
backed by the freedom of parties to resort to coercive power. The role of the courts in the 
bargaining arena is very limited and in practice they have been wary of interfering in the 
bargaining process. In Stuttafords Department Stores Ltd v SACTWU,501 the court stated as 
follows: 
“The LRA 1995 requires a party which wishes to resort to a protected strike or lock-
out to take much trouble. However, once the requirements of the Act for such strike or 
lock-out to be protected have been complied with, the Act protects that lock-out or 
strike, and generally speaking any judicial interference or claims. The policy is that 
the courts should stay away from the collective bargaining arena and should not be 
available for assistance to any one of the parties who may seek the assistance of a 
court when it feels the pinch. If one of the parties cannot bear the pain in the fight, it 
can do one of three things: 
(I) it can conclude a compromised agreement with the other party in settlement of 
the dispute and ensure its own survival; 
(II) it can capitulate and accede to the other party’s demands; 
(III) it can continue with the fight and risk destruction-annihilation. 
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Such a party cannot be allowed to seek the intervention of the courts to escape the 
consequences of a protected lock-out or strike.”502 
 
Strikes are an essential weapon for employees and trade unions in South Africa. The 
inclusion of the right to strike in the Constitution and exclusion of the right to lock-out should 
not have come as a surprise to business. The partnering of one of the major trade union 
federations, COSATU with the ANC, meant that the trade union movement was going to 
militantly lobby for a labour friendly Constitution and legislation. COSATU used industrial 
action for both political and economic reasons before the advent of democracy and there still 
exists some attachment with strikes which has gradually developed into a culture that is now 
firmly entrenched in the South African labour relations landscape and which will 
undoubtedly take many years to be wiped out. 
 
Although the procedures imposed by the LRA are onerous, they are fairly clear. This has 
however not reduced disputes regarding the legality of strikes. Further regulation by means of 
legislation is not desirable since this might place unintended restrictions. A possible practical 
solution to avoid litigable disputes regarding the right might be a Code of Good Practice 
negotiated by labour and business at Nedlac, and outlining guidelines to be observed by 
parties when disputes relating to strikes and other related actions arise. The government 
should also play an active role in disputes which are potentially detrimental to the economy. 
 
The task of attempting to critique the effectiveness of strikes is quite complex. The majority 
of collective agreements signed in South Africa, especially in the months preceding the 2010 
soccer World Cup, were preceded by threats or reality of strike action. Among the most 
prominent strikes were the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) and the 
Transnet strike. The Eskom strike was averted by an early offer. The unions, NUM, NUMSA 
and trade union Solidarity committed themselves to continue negotiations but rejected an 
offer of 8% wage increase, 5% increase in allowances and a once-off payment to every 
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employee of R12000.503 The unions were negotiating for a 15% wage increase and a housing 
allowance. The power utility offered a nine percent wage offer and a R1500 per month 
housing allowance. The unions however “vowed to lobby for a change to the law which 
describes all Eskom staff, including cleaners and security guards as, essential workers to 
ensure their right to strike is not curbed”.504 The parastatal had raised the issue that the 
planned strike action was illegal since its services are classified as essential.505 
 
Venter506 projected that high incidences of “wildcat strike at shopfloor level” were to be 
expected in the months preceding the World Cup and pondered the question whether the 
“[g]reat expectations of “premium” increases due to World Cup and perception of 
improvement in economy” will mean that some employers will easily give in to hefty wage 
demands or risk strike action. Generally, trade unions and employees managed to negotiate 
better deals in the majority of strikes which occurred in 2010. The protracted public sector 
strike was a manifestation of hardening of attitudes of both government and the trade union 
movement. It was evidence that there are some fissures in the corporatist structures and that 
the parties need to go back to the drawing board to restore the integrity of the institution of 
collective bargaining. 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
Although the inclusion of the right to strike in the Constitution and the LRA was a major 
victory for the trade union movement, there is need to rethink its effectiveness as the ultimate 
weapon to organised labour to protect and further the interests of workers. The rationale for a 
right to strike was to counteract the inequality which existed in the bargaining power of 
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employers and employees in the pre-1995 labour relations dispensation where the majority of 
employees were at the mercy of their employers and had no ammunition to militantly pursue 
their demands. The traditional view that the withdrawal of labour by workers is the most 
important weapon at the disposal of organised labour against employers does not hold in a 
contemporary labour relations dispensation. 
There are many factors that affect the employment relationship and trade unions cannot 
remain spectators and confine themselves to the traditional role of fighting for better wages 
and working conditions for their members. O’Regan states as follows: 
“As an exercise of power, strikes are effective only in certain circumstances. In a 
depressed economy where jobs are scarce and there is a large pool of unemployed 
labour, the threat of withdrawal of labour loses its edge.”507 
 
There is an over-reliance on the right to strike in South Africa and trade unions sometimes 
neglect to calculate the long term costs of embarking on such action. Employers often give in 
to the demands of labour even if this has catastrophic consequences for their enterprises. This 
in turn becomes a good reason or an excuse for them to retrench and casualise labour, leading 
to high levels of unemployment which in turn affects the strength of unions. This is however 
not to say that industrial action is no longer an effective method of protecting and promoting 
the interests of workers. Industrial action, particularly in the form of strikes, should be used 
with great caution and trade unionists should always fight off the urge to call for such actions 
especially if they have serious negative economic repercussions for the country and they have 
short term benefits for workers.  
 
Public perception about industrial action, particularly strikes, has changed. There is a 
growing belief that most strikes do not serve the interests of workers but are merely an 
attempt by trade unions to display that they wield significant power and that in spite of their 
participation in various structures that promote corporatism, they are not a quiescent 
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movement. One newspaper posed the following question regarding the protracted 2010 public 
sector strike: 
“Some months ago, we posed the question of who Cosatu represents. Was it the entire 
working class, or was it only the employed working class? The consequence being 
that the working class representatives should work towards growth of a country’s 
economy, while the employed workers’ organisation will forever focus on getting 
more out of employers.”508 
 
Describing the coverage of the public sector strike, one commentator stated as follows: 
“In the main … the media’s coverage of the strike has been in the style of embedded 
journalism. Volunteers that have gone to state hospitals have been interviewed and 
given the chance to tell their stories, but not striking workers. The plight of learners 
missing exam preparations and people being denied emergence services has been 
highlighted. Economists have been citing figures indicating that service delivery may 
have to be traded off against salaries. Whether radio, television or print. They all lined 
up to condemn the strikers and unleashed a tide of anti-striker sentiment amongst their 
listeners, viewers and readers.”509 
 
The involvement by trade union members in violent strikes has damaged the reputation of the 
labour movement. The negative publicity which the labour movement received during the 
public sector strike requires aggressive lobbying to change the perception of the public about 
trade unions. The Democratic Alliance (DA), an opposition party, initiated a process of a 
private members bill which seeks to impose penalties on trade unions for any damages arising 
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out of illegal behaviour of their members during strike action.510 The proposed Bill seeks to 
give courts jurisdiction to even award punitive damages and to make declaratory orders to the 
effect that an otherwise protected strike ceases to be one due to failure by members of a trade 
union to observe good practices.511 It has received wide ranging criticism from trade unions. 
The first obvious criticism is that proper procedures were not followed as the current 
arrangement is that any labour legislation must be initiated through Nedlac. The national 
spokesperson for COSATU, Patrick Craven, made a comment that the Bill was “an anti-trade 
union measure”.512 Another criticism levelled against the Bill is that it is unnecessary as 
illegal conduct by striking trade union members is already dealt with under common law.513 
 
The afore-going observations underscore the need for the trade union movement to work 
towards the restoration of credibility and confidence not only among members but the public 
at large. Whilst the primary function of trade unions is to service the needs of their members, 
they must be careful not to engage in actions that diminish their popularity. They must not 
engage in self-destructive actions unless this is absolutely necessary. There is a need to 
restore the reputation of the right to strike in South Africa, which has been tarnished by 
violence and the inability of trade union leaders to rein in members responsible for such acts.  
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CHAPTER 5 
TRADE UNIONISM AND EMERGING CHALLENGES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The trade union movement in South Africa has seized the numerous opportunities offered by 
the current labour relations system and is probably the envy of other trade unions worldwide, 
for its resilience in fighting for the rights and interests of workers. Despite the shortcomings 
inherent in the institution of collective bargaining and industrial action, such opportunities 
remain the most widely used by unions to promote the interests of their members and workers 
in general. 
 
The advent of democracy, although bringing about many benefits to trade unions, poses new 
challenges. It is ironic that trade unions risk being irrelevant in a new democratic 
dispensation; with institutions and numerous opportunities which they can make use of to 
protect and promote the rights and interests of their members. In order to remain a vibrant 
force, trade unions must redefine their role and come up with innovative strategies to contend 
with various pressures which have diminished trade union power in other countries. 
 
This chapter will attempt to explore the state of trade unionism in South Africa, how the 
labour movement has seized the opportunities offered by a new constitutional democracy to 
further the rights and interests of its members, the extent of the effects or forces of 
globalisation on the South African and global trade union movement, how South African 
trade unions are attempting to redefine their role and reinvent themselves in the face of 
numerous challenges; and their future role in shaping relations of work in South Africa. 
 
5.2 Trade unionism, democracy and corporatism in South Africa 
Trade unions were actively involved in the struggle for democracy in South Africa. Black 
trade unions strongly resisted the policies of the apartheid government and their functions 
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extended beyond promoting and protecting the interests of their members at shopfloor level. 
The question to be asked 15 years after democracy is whether the democratic dispensation 
has presented trade unions with favourable conditions to retain, consolidate and extract new 
gains for their members. 
 
The current labour relations system, ushered by a new constitutional order and numerous 
pieces of legislation, promotes, amongst other things, a corporatist system of managing 
employment relations.514 Du Toit describes corporatism as concept which envisages a more 
pro-active role by labour, as it promotes consultations between social partners on matters of 
mutual interests at both macro and micro-levels.515 Habib points out that the development of 
a corporatist system of labour relations can be traced back to attempts by the apartheid 
government to diminish the strength and effectiveness of trade unions.516 The resilience 
displayed by trade unions in the face of numerous anti-trade union measures in the apartheid 
era, in the form of disruptive strikes, was a lesson that disenfranchising labour from processes 
where social and economic matters are debated fuelled tension and labour unrest. During the 
early years of democracy, it was difficult to tell which labour relations model was to become 
dominant or prominent. Whilst some commentators speculated that corporatism was going to 
emerge as the preferred model of labour relations, some argued in favour of strategic 
unionism and tripartism.517 The overarching concept is social dialogue; which recognises the 
importance of involving all social partners in the debate about social and economic issues. 
 
The watershed moment leading to a corporatist labour relations trend was the passing of the 
amendments to the LRA of 1988 which sought to suppress trade union activities and erode 
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the gains already made by trade unions.518 The reaction by COSATU and NACTU was 
massive lobbying against the amendments which eventually led to the signing of the historic 
Laboria Minute by the two trade union federations, SACCOLA, the NMC and the 
Department of Manpower. The parties agreed that no processes leading to the amendment of 
the LRA would be debated by parliament unless firstly deliberated upon by the social 
actors.519 The major outcome of the agreement was the participation of the parties in 
negotiations leading to the amendment of the 1988 LRA to the promulgation of the 1991 
LRA described as “the first Act in parliament that was the product of trilateral negotiations 
between the state, capital and black trade unions”.520  
 
Another event indicative of a shift to corporatism was an agreement signed by COSATU and 
the Minister of Manpower obliging the parties to enact a statute which was going to extend 
minimum labour conditions and labour rights to workers in the farming and domestic sectors. 
COSATU seized this opportunity to also make contributions on a draft statute that was going 
to extend labour rights to workers in the public sector.521 Prior to the establishment of Nedlac, 
trade unions, particulary COSATU, actively participated in the NMC and the National 
Training Board (NTB). Maree points out that COSATU joined the NMC to attempt to assert 
the role of labour in the determination of labour related issues.522 COSATU and NACTU 
wanted the NMC to be restructured from just being a “purely advisory body to a bargaining 
                                                            
518 Habib “From Pluralism to Corporatism”. Habib points out that unions won numerous gains after the 
recommendations and implementation of the Wiehahn Commission. 
519 See J Maree “Trade Unions and Corporatism in South Africa” 
http://digital.lib.msu.edu/projects/africanjournals/pdfs/transformation/tran021/tran021003.pdf (accessed on 17 
August 2009). See also L van der Walt, “Against Corporatism: The Limits and Pitfalls of Corporatism for South 
African Trade Unions” http://web.wits.ac.za/NR/rdonlyres/68146294-4DFF-4CA5-946A-
3540D432FBBC/0/againstcorp.pdf  (accessed 19 August 2010). This agreement was called the Laboria Minute 
and as stated by the author “it established the principle that the labour movement participate in shaping the 
industrial relations system, including labour law, collective bargaining institutions, and multipartite forums, a 
principle that assumed an institutional form in the shape of a restructured, tripartite, National Manpower 
Commission….” 
520 Ibid. 
521 Ibid. 
522 Ibid. 
128 
 
forum with the power to negotiate labour market policy”.523 COSATU withdrew from the 
forum in 1991 due to delays in restructuring the forum and extension of labour rights to 
public sector, farm and domestic workers.524 The labour movement (COSATU) lobbied that 
all draft labour legislation be debated by the NMC before being submitted to parliament and 
that if consensus ensued between the parties, the draft legislation should be presented to 
parliament unchanged.525 The social partners finally agreed on the transformation of the 
forum in 1992 and the process of extending labour laws to workers in the farming and 
domestic sectors, as well as the input of COSATU on labours laws affecting the public sector, 
gained impetus when an accord was reached in the same year, which also bound the Minister 
of Manpower to these commitments.526 
 
COSATU also participated in the NTB and this was to ensure that the unions played a role in 
the formulation of a training system for workers.527 The corporatist trend was further 
enhanced with the establishment of the National Economic Forum (NEF) in 1992. The forum 
was established after a stand-off between the government and COSATU about the envisaged 
Value Added Tax (VAT) system and the unilateral changes to the economy effected by the 
government.528 The union proposed the establishment of a forum that was going to facilitate 
tripartism on matters of economic policy but the government was firm on its resolve not to 
entertain representations on matters of public policy.529 COSATU entered into an agreement 
with business leading to the formation of the NEF and the government relented and agreed to 
participate in the NEF, launched formally in October 1992.530 
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As pointed out by Habib, the adversarial system which used to be the hallmark of the labour 
relations system of apartheid South Africa was dismantled in the 1990s by efforts aimed at 
facilitating a corporatist model of labour relations.531 The author further points out that the 
political negotiations during the same period spilled into the arena of labour relations as the 
social partners began an earnest debate on economic policies and how South Africa was 
going to enter the global economy.532 
 
Corporatism did not only manifest itself at national level. In 1991, NUM organised a mining 
summit in response to massive retrenchments in the mining industry. The summit was 
attended by representatives from state, labour and capital. The trade union made a proposition 
for measures, both immediate and long-term, in response to the crisis in the sector.533 
Although the achievements of the union were minimal, the major outcome was the setting up 
of a Committee mandated to attend to the concerns raised by the trade union.534 
 
Another forum which was established and indicated a shift to corporatism was the Textile-
Clothing Working Group. Like the mining industry, the textile and clothing industries were 
experiencing huge job cuts and retrenchments.535 The Ministry of Trade and Industry played 
a central role in attempting to redress the challenges faced by the industries by calling for the 
establishment of group with a mandate to formulate long-term strategies and transitional 
plans for the industries.536 The working group known as the Hatty Commission, consisted of 
representatives from SACTWU, the Department of Trade and Industry, the textile and 
clothing industry, the Board of Trade and Industry as well as other representatives from 
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numerous public sectors with the status of observers.537 Other forums established were the 
Textile and Clothing Panel and a Task group which were to play the role of formulating 
strategies to restructure the clothing and textile industry to make it competitive and viable.538 
 
A strong indicator that South Africa had embraced the concept of corporatism in its labour 
relations system was the establishment of Nedlac. The establishment of this institution 
signalled that corporatism did not just remain an abstract concept but a practical reality. It 
resulted from a merger of the NMC and NEF and it was established by the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council Act 35 of 1994. Its formation was premised on 
the understanding that it was going to serve the purpose of facilitating negotiations on matters 
of social and economic policies and agreements, and in so doing, promote the growth of the 
economy, the involvement of all social actors in the determination of economic policies and 
the achievement of equity for all South Africans in the social and economic spheres.539 Its 
core purpose is therefore to change the relationship of the three social actors, that is, 
government, labour and business, often characterised by rivalry, to a relationship where there 
is co-operation in the formulation of policies in order to achieve the greater goals of 
“nationally unity, reconciliation and, development”.540 
 
The trade union movement has achieved numerous gains through its participation in Nedlac. 
In its 2008/9 annual report, the overall convenor of government, Les Kettledas articulated 
that the government’s position was that challenges facing South Africa and adversarialism 
which is inherent in the relations of social partners can only be resolved through social 
dialogue and highlighted some of the achievements of this process as including the unity of 
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purpose displayed by social actors in tackling the electricity crisis and the global financial 
meltdown.541 
 
The overall convenor for business, Raymond Parsons cited, amongst other things, the co-
operation of social partners in coming up with strategies employed to cushion South Africa 
from the effects of the global financial meltdown, as being a good example of the 
effectiveness of social dialogue.542 The overall convenor for labour counted the successes of 
the institution as including coming up with strategies to strengthen the competitiveness of the 
economy and the South African industrial capacity.543 
 
The first major achievement of Nedlac was the drafting of the LRA of 1995. Van der Walt 
states that it was designed to promote a co-operative labour relations system and the global 
competitiveness of the South African economy.544 Its hallmark features are an accessible 
dispute resolution system which emphasises conciliation as the means of resolving disputes, 
and the promotion of worker participation at workplaces through the innovative workplace 
forums.545 
 
The trade union movement won numerous gains through its participation in the drafting of 
the LRA of 1995. As put by Du Toit et al, “[t]he previous Act [LRA] ... favoured employers 
and the new Act seeks to shift this balance onto a more even keel through the uniform 
extension of employee rights….”546 The negotiations leading to the promulgation of the LRA 
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1995 were protracted and there were many contentious issues. Although the parties reached 
an agreement at Nedlac, business and labour were not in complete agreement about the form 
of the Act.547 The prominent misgiving from the business community is that the Act infringes 
the prerogatives of management and is the cause of labour market rigidities, whilst trade 
unions argue that it does not satisfactorily empower workers.548 
 
In its 1997 September Commission Report,549 COSATU made a finding that the role of 
Nedlac was still vague and that there was still debate about the legitimacy of the institution 
with other social actors, business and government, preferring to isolate the trade union 
movement from negotiations on economic and labour market policies. The Commission also 
noted that some trade unions were displaying an “ambivalent attitude” towards the processes 
of the institution. 
  
Whether the tripartite relationship at Nedlac will endure remains to be seen. In its 2008/2009 
annual report,550 numerous challenges affecting the institution were highlighted. Chief 
amongst them were adversarialism, the inflexibility of government departments when it 
comes to timeframes to finalise issues, the tendency of side-stepping the institution on key 
issues, the difficulties in enforcing compliance of the Act exacerbated by the absence of a 
protocol on how to deal with such an issue; and the fact that stakeholders, both internal and 
external, now have a negative perception about the institution.  
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The “resurfacing of adversarialism” threatens the effectiveness of the Nedlac and defeats the 
whole purpose of corporatism. There must be a serious effort on the part of the social actors 
to attempt to revitalise corporatist institutions. The negligible use of institutions like Nedlac 
can only fuel adversarial relations between the social actors and the labour movement risks 
losing some of the gains already made. 
 
5.3 Corporatism: A panacea for a labour relations system with a history of 
adversarialism? 
The various institutions set up after the inauguration of democracy to facilitate social 
dialogue were meant to ease tensions between the state, labour and business. As articulated in 
the Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Labour Relations Bills, an adversarial labour 
relations system was a hindrance to economic growth; “an approach uncomfortably 
suggestive of the view that strikes are the main cause of economic problems”.551 As aptly put 
by Habib, the articulation of issues by the labour movement “is [now] constrained by its 
commitment to the post-apartheid state’s ideology of national unity and reconciliation”.552 
Whether the corporatist arrangements which feature prominently in the post-apartheid labour 
relations landscape “benefit or jeopardise the interests of the labour movement” is a subject 
of great debate.553  
 
A challenge besetting the labour movement in a contemporary labour relations system where 
social dialogue is preferred over adversarialism is how to compromise with other social 
actors but ensure that their independence is not eroded. Although it is still early days to 
predict the future of corporatist structures in the South African labour relations landscape, 
there are signs of discontent among the social partners which often degenerate into industrial 
action, in the form of protest action and strikes (mainly by the unions affiliated to COSATU), 
and mudslinging in the media. As noted, one of the challenges highlighted by Nedlac in its 
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2008/2009 annual report is the “[r]esurfacing of adversarialism of the past” as social partners 
are starting to display “rigidities in the engagements”.  
 
Hepple once stated as follows: 
“Where power bargaining by trade unions preceded political independence and 
democracy, the consequences for the newly independent regimes have been profound. 
The new governments have had to deal with explosive demands for wages and the 
redistribution of resources. They have tended to respond to this by establishing forms 
of state corporatism in which trade unions have been registered and tightly regulated 
by the state and, where possible, kept under close control by the ruling party.”554 
 
The observation by Hepple, made before the advent of a parliamentary democracy, holds true 
of the South African labour relations transition in some respects. Even before the advent of 
democracy, the then apartheid government was beginning to show some willingness to 
entertain representations from the labour movement on matters of economic and social 
policy. Participation of unions in various forums such as the NMC and the NEF has already 
been highlighted. After the apartheid government had accepted most of the recommendations 
of the Wiehahn Commission, black trade unions made negligible use of the post-Wiehahn 
Commission industrial institutions partly because they thought that such institutions were a 
ploy by the state to co-opt them and to diminish their strength. 
 
Tripartism and corporatism appear to be the only favourable forms of engagement in a 
democratic state but unions have to be cautious that participation in such institutions does not 
diminish their independence. As put by Hepple, “[i]f trade unions are to retain credibility 
with their own members, and with workers generally, they have to remain an independent 
force”.555 The author further points out that the role of trade unions in a democratic society 
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“is complex and many sided”.556 The author argues that the role of trade unions in a 
democratic society is paradoxical. He observes as follows: 
“It is in their role towards the economic order of a democratic society that trade 
unions reveal their central contradiction. Unionism is a natural form of collective 
worker resistance to the power of capital. Yet this very form of organisation makes it 
possible to channel conflict into manageable demands on which compromise can be 
reached through collective bargaining. This contradictory mixture of roles as both the 
natural opposition and the natural ally of capital explains the ambiguous attitudes of 
both right and left to trade unions.”557[Own emphasis] 
 
By participating in the formulation of policies of a capitalist society through various 
corporatist structures, it can be argued that trade unions are perpetuating the current capitalist 
economic order. In essence, their main function is how best to cushion the workers from all 
the negatives associated with capitalism. They are therefore not challenging the system as 
such, but merely countering the negative implications of capitalism on workers. Whilst 
corporatism is currently the preferred method for easing tensions between the major social 
actors, the labour movement must be careful that by participating in various corporatist 
structures it is not merely legitimising the policies of the state and the interests of business. It 
must use the various forums to continue to militantly lobby for the promotion and protection 
of the rights of workers. 
 
The view of Van der Walt paints a rather gloomy picture about the attractiveness of 
corporatist structures in South Africa. The author states that: 
“There is … little basis for claims that corporatist forums can provide a site for 
reconstruction and redistribution, let alone a route to social-democracy or socialism 
… [C]orporatism imposes a range of costs on the labour movement, including an 
erosion of trade union democracy, the development of tensions between the leadership 
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and the rank-and-file and the involvement of the unions in the co-management of 
capitalism. It is suggested that the trade unions should abstain from corporatist 
arrangements, and instead focus their energies on the consolidation of workplace 
organisation and rely on struggle as a means of pressing demands-both reformist and 
transformative.”558 [Own emphasis] 
 
Van der Walt takes issue with claims from some commentators that corporatism is necessary 
for the achievement of growth and upliftment of society and that it can help in the 
consolidation of democracy through “matching political reforms with economic advances” 
and that “union engagement in macro-economic policy can constitute a ‘radical reform’ 
which will reshape the South African political economy in the direction of social-
democracy”.559 The author argues that corporatism weakens “union democracy” and widens 
the “gap between union leaders and union members”.560 In the case of South Africa, there is 
not much evidence that there is tension between union leaders and members. Trade union 
leaders, although engaging with the state and business in various corporatist structures, 
appear to have resisted the divide and rule tactics often associated with such engagements. 
Trade unions, particularly COSATU, have reiterated that they are autonomous bodies whose 
primary function is to service the interests of their members. To some, the 2010 public 
service strike was a grand display of resilience by the trade union leadership and a sign that 
ordinary union members have no reason to believe that their leaders have lost credibility as a 
result of participating in corporatist structures defining economic and social policies. 
 
In South Africa, corporatism has strengthened the labour movement in many respects. Trade 
unions must however be vigilant as participation in corporatist structures also diminishes 
their strength to a certain extent, and also legitimises the interests of the state and capital. 
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5.4 The ANC, SACP and COSATU Alliance: Implications for the South African 
labour movement 
The ANC, mindful of the support that it could get from the labour movement, particularly 
COSATU, entered into a strategic alliance with the labour movement and the SACP. 
COSATU had displayed great organisational strength during a period when opposition 
political parties, including the ANC, were banned by the apartheid government. The labour 
movement pledged its support for the ANC in the 1994 elections and the trade-off was that 
the former was going to embrace labour-friendly policies and allow the labour movement to 
engage it on matters of social and economic policies. 
 
The first major agreement between the alliance partners was on the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme which, as put by Du toit et al, “heralded a new vision of growth 
based on empowerment of the workplace”.561 Kochan points out that: 
“The RDP serve[d] as an important experiment in development policy not only for 
South Africa, but for all developing and advanced industialized economies as they 
struggle with the desire to promote the multiple objectives of economic growth, 
creation of good quality jobs and improvement in living standards.”562 
 
The RDP was a highly ambitious policy document which sought to redress the past 
imbalances in the job market, to improve the standard of living of the formerly 
disenfranchised and to promote economic growth. Du Toit et al state that the “[t]he RDP set 
out to design a strategy for rebuilding the economy and developing the human resources of 
the country, focusing on the basic needs of the people”.563 The undertaking by the ANC was 
that the programme was to be implemented through the formulation of detailed policies and 
other programmes.564 The ANC committed itself to formulating labour legislation 
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guaranteeing equal rights to all workers, organisational rights for trade unions, the 
participation of workers in decision-making at the workplace, a collective bargaining system 
at the national, industry and workplace level and the right of workers to engage in strike 
action and other forms of industrial action on socio-economic issues.565  
 
The ANC unilaterally formulated and adopted the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
Programme (GEAR) in 1996. In one of its discussion documents, COSATU points out that 
the main justification for GEAR by its proponents was “that it gave effect to the realisation of 
the RDP”. The proponents of the GEAR programme argued that “the economy could not 
sufficiently generate sufficient resources to finance the programmes outlined in the RDP 
unless ‘more deep-rooted reform’ are given attention”.566 For government, the RDP was 
merely an overarching policy and there was a need to formulate other comprehensive policies 
in order to achieve its numerous commitments. 
 
The aspirations of the ANC, COSATU and SACP tripartite alliance set out in the RDP were 
consolidated in the LRA of 1995. The labour movement won many gains through the central 
role played by COSATU in the tripartite alliance in lobbying for labour friendly legislation. 
The willingness by the new democratic government to involve the labour movement in the 
processes of policy formulation was to be understood in the context of South Africa’s history 
of polarisation and adversarialism between the state, labour and capital. The newly elected 
government was aware of the dangers of alienating the labour movement from socio-
economic processes and its alliance with one of the largest trade union federations was 
obviously a political strategy to appease the labour movement. As correctly observed by 
Habib, the ANC government was aware that it was politically and economically vulnerable 
and it embraced corporatism to avert the possibility of opposition.567 
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The victory of the ANC in the 1994 elections meant that the expectations of workers rose and 
employers and trade unionists were suddenly confronted with the challenge of negotiating 
improvements to conditions of workers.568 The leadership of the ANC government, mainly 
from various trade unions affiliated with COSATU, were “particularly vulnerable to rank and 
file pressures because of the need to solidify their positions and demonstrate their 
competence”.569 The overall effect was that the labour movement made and consolidated 
numerous gains during the early years of democracy. 
 
Although the adoption of GEAR might have been seen as a shift from the RDP, it was a 
necessary intervention as the latter programme was too broad and merely formed a basis for 
South Africa’s future macro-economic policies.570 Buhlungu however states that the 
abandonment of the leftist RDP was “a clear indication of its adoption of the logic of free 
market economics”.571 The trade union movement is still bitter about the ANC’s unilateral 
adoption of a neo-liberal GEAR framework and this is going to be a matter of contestation for 
many years to come. The trade union movement states as follows: 
“Immediately before the democratic movement could settle on the levers of state 
power, the under handed and hidden policy contestation came to the open in 1996, 
with the emergence of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Framework 
(GEAR).”572 
 
The Tripartite Alliance woes were diagnosed as early as 1997. The September Commission 
acknowledged that the alliance was not working and cited a number of reasons for this which 
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included the following; the failure by Alliance partners to meet frequently and the meetings 
which yielded little or no results on matters of policy formulation, the general lack of unity of 
purpose by partners and the neglection of the RDP with emphasis being placed on the new 
unilaterally adopted GEAR policy.573 
 
The recommendations of the Commission were, amongst other things that, the labour 
movement was to play a pivotal role in defining the direction of the transition. COSATU 
argued that embracing the ideals of neo-liberalism did “not mean there is no space to develop 
and implement progressive social and economic policies”.574 The labour movement has 
legitimate fears about its future and credibility and cautions that its legitimacy amongst its 
members and workers in general will be compromised if it cannot “demonstrate concrete 
gains in terms of worker rights and socio-economic progress ….”575 
 
COSATU faces an enormous task of asserting its influence in the tripartite alliance. This has 
been revealed by the protracted 2010 public sector strike where the state displayed an 
intransigent attitude even when, as put by Gentle, it was aware that “the leaderships of the 
COSATU public sector unions were drawn into … [the] strike reluctantly”.576 Despite all its 
shortcomings, the future of the Alliance cannot be predicted with certainty. In its discussion 
document, COSATU highlights that there is an urgent need to rethink how the Alliance 
should function and insists that its mandate is to lobby for a Pact with other Alliance 
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partners.577 COSATU’s strategies regarding the future of the Alliance are still vague but its 
belligerent attitude points that the Alliance will undergo a major overhaul in the near future.  
 
Despite all its flaws, significant gains have been made through the Alliance. They include the 
adoption of labour friendly legislation, efforts to cushion workers from the consequences of 
the 2008 economic downturn and strides in attempting to close the inequality gap among 
workers. The closeness of COSATU to the ruling party however has numerous negative 
implications for the labour movement. The trade union is increasingly becoming embroiled in 
politics and plays a pivotal role in the ANC leadership succession debates. It has also lost 
many of its leaders to the ANC government which is a drain on the federation’s human 
resources.  
 
The tensions between the tripartite alliance members are also exposing the entire labour 
movement to the risk of losing the gains made in the last fifteen years. The government is 
increasingly becoming frustrated with the hardening attitudes of COSATU affiliated unions 
on matters of socio-economic issues and during collective bargaining. The hardening of 
attitudes will ultimately spill over and affect future bargaining tendencies of unions, the 
government and employers in general. The accusations that trade unions, particularly those 
affiliated with COSATU, wield too much power are an indication that government and 
employers are losing patience with the labour movement.  
 
The joining of forces by government and employers is not good news for workers. The main 
problem within the Alliance is the unhealthy preoccupation by the parties, particularly 
COSATU and the ANC, to assert their role and influence. COSATU is insisting that although 
it forms part of the Alliance, it is an autonomous organisation and this should not impede its 
efforts to extract as many gains as possible for its members. The ANC, on the other hand, 
appears to be losing patience with the engagement tactics of the labour movement and is 
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always insisting that the alliance is an ANC-led alliance and that the other parties should not 
impede its efforts to efficiently govern the country.  
 
The power struggles in the Alliance are exposing the labour movement to the criticism that its 
involvement in politics is compromising its efforts to effectively champion the rights and 
interests of ordinary workers. The closeness of COSATU to the ruling party, though not 
essentially a bad thing, should not jeopardise the integrity and credibility of the trade union 
movement. Woods observes that a challenge that besets the trade union movement is how “to 
retain the integrity of a union voice whilst continuing to compromise with both state and 
capital”.578 
 
Slabbert and Swanepoel  observe as follows: 
“The danger of the political system in South Africa is currently that the gap between 
expectations of the masses and economic relations as a result of a variety of factors is 
widening, thus creating an ideal breeding-ground for conflict in the workplace and in 
the broader community. The freedom struggle is not over for the ‘workerist’ faction of 
COSATU who strives for a socialist labour party…. There is consequently little doubt 
concerning the complexity of the political system and the impact thereof on 
employment relations.”579 [Own emphasis] 
Perhaps the cause of the tensions between COSATU and the ruling party is the absence of an 
appropriate neutral level where there can be a frank and robust debate on socio-economic 
matters. Most of the engagements and interactions between the tripartite alliance partners are 
at a political level and even pure labour and other socio-economic matters end up being 
overly politicised. This does not help the efforts of the trade union movement of attempting to 
come up with policies aimed at countering the numerous challenges that they face. 
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5.5 The negative impact of globalisation on the trade union movement: A global and 
South African perspective 
Buhlungu states that some of the challenges facing the labour union movement stem from the 
“insertion of South Africa into the global economy and the effects which that insertion entails 
for workplace reorganization and labour market restructuring”.580 The impact of globalisation 
on trade unions is a hotly debated topic. Bezuidenhout sums up implications of globalisation 
as follows: 
“Globalization is associated with increased reliance on the regulation of economic 
relations by markets. National governments turn to liberal approaches to 
macroeconomic management, implying privatisation, monetary liberalization, 
reduction in import tariffs, labour market flexibility and fiscal discipline.”581 
 
Globalisation is not always associated with negative implications on workers and the trade 
union movement. As put by the Global Research Network, globalisation is also associated 
with positives for workers such as enabling them “to negotiate with companies on a global 
level and to address global issues such as gender discrimination and sustainable development 
with actors from around the world.”582 
 
The September Commission pointed out that globalisation undermines trade union solidarity 
as “the balance of class forces between capital and labour” shifts. The Commission also 
observed that: 
“The increased mobility of capital, reinforced by the programmes of multilateral 
economic institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), has the same effect, weakening the influence of the state 
                                                            
580 Buhlungu “Gaining Influence but Losing power”. 
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Africa” http://www.swopinstitute.org.za/files/bezuidenhout%20dp11500.pdf (accessed 12 September 2010). 
582 See the executive summary of “Trade Unions responses to globalisation: A review by the Global Union 
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on the national economy and so undermining labour’s claims or government as a 
vehicle for redistribution”.583 
 
In the South African context, the adoption of GEAR in 1996 was an indication that South 
Africa, like many other democracies, was succumbing to the pressures of the world economic 
institutions such as the IMF, WTO and the World Bank to embrace policies which underpin 
globalisation. As put by Bezuidenhout, the state began to exercise some restraint in 
restructuring the economy, an indication that the markets were to take over that role, and the 
dominance of the “language of the market” resulted in the closing “down … of the space 
available for the labour movement to insist on including social concerns in economic 
policy”.584 
 
As outlined by COSATU,585 “GEAR sought to introduce numerous changes in the South 
African economic landscape such as fiscal reforms, exchange control relaxations, the 
influence of trade and industrial policies by the market, the restructuring of the public-sector 
and the “promotion of public-private partnerships”, the expansion of social and economic 
infrastructure and a flexible labour market.  
 
Although the main criticism by COSATU was that the ANC unilaterally adopted the 
macroeconomic policy and in the process flouted the ideals which informed the establishment 
of Nedlac, it also raised numerous objections on the content of the macroeconomic 
framework.  COSATU’s numerous criticisms are premised on the argument that the historical 
context of South Africa could not be reconciled with “the philosophical underpinnings of 
GEAR”.586  
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It is not clear if the anger directed at GEAR by COSATU, its arch critic, is because it was 
sidestepped during consultations leading to its adoption or, because it sought to embrace the 
forces of globalisation at the expense of the interests of the working class. There is however 
some truth in the allegations by the labour movement that some of the adjustments that 
GEAR sought to introduce were not fully explained and that the macroeconomic policy has 
failed to deliver a vibrant economy which benefits all South Africans. Whilst the aspirations 
of the RDP policy framework, with an inclination or bias in social development issues, were 
to reconstruct and develop, GEAR emphasised on such issues as “stringent and monetary 
targets” which inevitably resulted in significant cuts in government spending in the period 
between 1996 and 1999 and limited the government’s ability to create jobs “through public 
works-the building of houses and provision of services.”587 
 
On privatisation and restructuring of public enterprises, another goal of the GEAR policy 
framework in compliance with the standards of world economic institutions such as the IMF 
and the World Bank, the labour movement raised the objection that this was going to negate 
the social and economic interests of the workers and the poor. COSATU’s objection was 
premised on the argument that the main goal of privatisation being to maximise profits and 
not to provide the services to the poor, was going to inevitably result in “job losses and 
increased costs for the services”.588 
 
The government accused the labour movement of misinforming the public and emphasised 
that its goal was to restructure public enterprises which cannot be equated to pure 
privatisation. It argued that restructuring and reforming public enterprises was actually one of 
the goals of the RDP and that it sought to achieve, among other things, a reduction in 
production and thus creating employment in the process, attracting “productive investment 
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588 Ibid. 
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into the economy” and opening “the economy to those who were shut out by apartheid”.589 
Government pointed out that contrary to the speculations by COSATU that the privatisation 
of public enterprises was going to lead to job losses, costly services, the envisaged reforms 
were likely to result in effective service delivery and that capital raised through this process 
was going to be invested in infrastructure development.590 
 
Reforming and restructuring public enterprises to make them profitable is not, per se, 
detrimental to the interests if this is done to ensure that state owned enterprise are not a drain 
on the fiscus and that such reforms are done to create employment and to improve the lives of 
the workers. The fact that there was some misunderstanding between the allied partners, 
COSATU and the ANC, on the nature and extent of the restructuring process shows that 
parties neglected to consult each other on this aspect, which further points to a lack of a 
political will by the government to be a central player in promoting cooperation when it 
comes to socio-economic policy changes, especially when these changes are in reaction to the 
forces of globalisation. 
 
On trade liberalisation, the argument by COSATU is that it diminishes “the power of the state 
to direct industrialization and has led to disintegration of productive structures at local level” 
as well as strengthening “the power of multinational corporations”.591 COSATU points out 
that the continual loss of jobs in the secondary sector is partly attributable to liberalisation of 
trade and that “[t]he policies of the past 16 years have thus failed to promote labour-intensive 
industrialization, in line with historical positions of the democratic movement”.592 The labour 
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movement correctly argues some sectors have been decimated as a result of liberal trade 
practices, particularly the clothing and textile sector.593 
 
Trade union Solidarity has a different view on the issue of trade liberalisation. In its response 
to Nedlac’s “Framework for South Africa’s Response to the International Economic 
Crisis”,594 in which social partners agreed for a “strong, robust use of accepted trade 
measures, to ensure that the crisis does not cause job losses in the real economy” and to 
promote the procurement of goods and services from local suppliers, trade union Solidarity 
pointed out that this contradicted the calls by government for removals of barriers to trade in 
order to develop the competiveness of the South African economy in the global market.595 
The union argued that developing the competitiveness of the South African economy is not 
possible if the country shields itself from fully participating in a global economy through its 
reliance on protectionist measures. It however pointed out that protectionism was not 
essentially a bad economic decision, especially if such an action is necessitated by the need to 
protect newly established industries, otherwise known as “infant industries”. These 
industries, including other sectors hard hit by the global economic downturn, were to be 
protected, albeit temporarily. The union cautioned that protectionist measures have long-term 
consequences. It cited the example of the textile industry, and how the measures employed to 
protect this sector after the Anglo-Boer War, were still in place notwithstanding that there has 
been “no sustained growth in the sector or in employment in the sector to show for it”.596 
 
The findings of COSATU on the issue of relaxing exchange controls, another indicator that 
South Africa is conforming to neo-liberal ideologies favoured by international economic 
institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, was that it has essentially facilitated capital 
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trade-and-industry-reform.pdf (accessed 10 September 2010). 
596 Ibid. 
148 
 
outflows as many South African companies have delisted from the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) bourse and listed with the London Stock Exchange.597 As put by the labour 
movement: 
“Gencor, Liberty Life, Anglo-American, De Beers, Old Mutual, SA Breweries, 
Investec and Didata are all big firms that have accumulated capital by exploiting 
South African and regional labour through the migrant labour system and apartheid 
repression. They have now found a way to eschew the responsibility of financing 
industrial diversification in South Africa”.598 [Own emphasis] 
The trade union movement also points out that investment is deterred, especially in the 
manufacturing sector, by volatile exchange rates and that removing exchange rate controls 
“entrenches the power of global financial capital to hold domestic state policy hostage”.599 
The observation by trade union Solidarity is that the fluctuation of the exchange rate means 
that it cannot be relied upon as “the only thing that can provide a firm foundation for 
sustained development of the South African economy”.600 
 
In his address to the Manufacturing, Engineering and Related Services SETA (MERSETA) 
Annual General Meeting, the President of NUMSA, Cedric Gina, remarked as follows on the 
shortage of skills, another challenge facing workers and trade unions in South Africa: 
“The GEAR policy played a major role in the shortage of skills. It is the GEAR policy 
that tried to compel state owned enterprises to prioritize profitability and productivity 
for the whole economy, thus cutting down on massive apprenticeship. It is GEAR 
policy that called for foreign direct investment with no conditions in terms of transfer 
of skills, just like China is demanding from foreign direct investments. It is GEAR 
policy that compromised the intellectual property of South African products. It is the 
GEAR policy that cut the tariffs even lower than the WTO standards for sensitive 
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products. The neo-liberal approach to economic development has affected the 
country, including in the issue of skills.”601 
 
The globalisation discourse continues to attract diverse opinions from government, business 
and labour. COSATU is resolute that neo-liberalism exacerbates the plight of the workers. 
Unfortunately the trade union movement attributes its tenaciousness (neo-liberalism) on what 
it calls “the balance of power”. It attempts to articulate its point as follows: 
“This balance of power finds expression in the economists’ training in universities, 
short courses and training that politicians are offered by the IMF, World Bank and 
private banks. Having imbibed these courses, the appetite for alternative views about 
the economy that are in line with the political philosophy of the liberation is 
completely suppressed. But more importantly, the underlying class interests that have 
coalesced exert pressure on the state to solidify class compromise in state policy, so 
that the state acts to co-ordinate national activity in a predictable manner, in line with 
the interests contained in that class compromise.”602 
 
Although there is some truth in the allegations by the trade union movement that neo-liberal 
ideals have been accepted without a framework to counter the accompanying negative 
effects, the unfortunate trend is that trade unions have not taken a pro-active role in 
cushioning workers from such effects, preferring instead to lobby for support against macro-
economic policies adopted by the government which champion the virtues of neo-liberalism, 
such as GEAR.  This path of engagement has proven unhelpful, particularly to workers; as it 
should be accompanied by strategies form the labour movement on how to combat the 
negative effects of neo-liberal economic policies. Trade unions must vigorously engage 
business and government on the recently launched South African Decent Work Programme, 
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an ILO initiative, to ensure that it does not remain a political rhetoric but ultimately translates 
into concrete gains for the South African workforce. They must intensify efforts to ensure 
that the Decent Work Agenda does not remain an obscure ILO concept but gradually 
becomes a practical reality for workers. The Decent Work Country Programme can avert the 
problems of falling standards of employment and precarious working conditions currently 
being faced by the majority of the South African workforce. The key priorities of the 
programme are “strengthening fundamental principles and rights at work”, “promotion of 
employment”, “strengthening and broadening social protection coverage” and “strengthening 
tri-partism and social dialogue”.603 The programme is an excellent opportunity for trade 
unions to lobby for the Decent Work Agenda to be included in the country’s economic and 
social policies. 
 
Trade unions must accept the reality that globalisation is now a fairly entrenched and 
irreversible process. They must be proactive in exploring opportunities offered by the process 
of globalisation, opportunities that can be explored to benefit their members and workers in 
general. In his address at the Sixteenth World Congress of the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), on “The Impact of Globalisation on Workers and Their Trade 
Unions” in 1996,604 Michel Camdessus, then Managing Director of the IMF, stated as 
follows: 
“[M]arkets are ruthless and will challenge vigorously those that do not adapt. The 
world’s common good will be greatly helped by the unions using their strength and 
their place at the table to help workers adapt and to engage employers and 
governments in dialogue to ensure-inter alia-that those who are unemployed through 
structural change are helped to retrain, to find new jobs, and to carry their entitlements 
from job to job”. 
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Trade unions have a big task of reassessing their role in a globalised world and extracting the 
best for their members and workers in general from the process of globalisation. Camdessus 
made numerous propositions to counter the negative impact of globalisation on workers. His 
most important observation was that: 
“A harmonious society requires the appropriate degree of emphasis on the market 
mechanism, on the role of the state, and on internal and external solidarity; a right 
emphasis which can better derive from another tripartite approach-this time, one of 
dialogue between employees, employers, and government.”605 
 
There is a school of thought to the effect that the traditional role of labour law, which is to 
protect workers, should be balanced against a new role; to promote rather than hinder job 
creation. Labour law, although not effectively relinquishing its traditional role “of protecting 
both work and the worker, must be much more watchful to the market and to the enterprise, 
in order not to impede job creation”.606 Put succinctly, “[l]abour law is not only subordinated 
to the economic reality, as it has always been. It is used as an instrument of economic 
policies, in order to reach certain economic objectives and job creation goals.”607 
  
The question to be posed is whether this trend has emerged in South Africa, and if so, the 
extent to which South African labour law has embraced this new role, as well as the 
implications for trade unions. As put by Bravo-Ferrer and Royo, “[c]hanging labour law into 
an instrument for employment policies means an increase of its own ambivalence of being 
both a workers’ law, a law which protects them unilaterally from the employer, and an 
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enterprise’ law, a law at the service of the enterprise’ demands”.608 In the South African 
context, there has been a robust debate about the impact of labour law on such issues as job 
creation and productivity of enterprises. Suggestions have been made that South African 
labour laws are rigid and must be relaxed to achieve the broader goal of employment 
creation.  
 
Although the idea has not been openly accepted, in the form of a major overhaul of the 
current labour legislative framework to embrace the job creation role, it has not been openly 
rejected either. Bravo-Ferrer and Royo state that this “new balance” manifests itself in 
practices such as “a more favourable attitude towards temporary work, either fixed-term 
contracts or work through a temporary help-agency; a complete set of new, flexible rules 
governing working time ….”609 These practices, although not consolidated in labour 
legislation, are common in South Africa. The adoption of a liberal GEAR policy by 
government, which was a shift from the RDP policy, might be viewed as an acknowledgment 
that labour laws should be sensitised to other priorities such as the competitiveness of the 
economy and the creation of employment opportunities. 
 
There have been attempts to amend labour laws to rid them of negative aspects. In its 
response to the proposed amendments of labour laws in 2000, which included propositions 
such as the consultation of every employer by bargaining councils before the extension of 
collective agreements to non-parties, the getting “rid of the premium for Sunday work” and a 
“facilitated consultation” in retrenchment processes as opposed to “compulsory negotiations”, 
COSATU reacted strongly and accused the Minister of Labour and the team charged with 
overseeing the process of being “stampeded by the hysteria generated by some in business 
and the media around the claim of “labour market inflexibility”, which threat[ened] to plunge 
[the] country into a period of protracted conflict”.610 Although there has been no major 
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overhaul of the labour legislative framework, the debate about the rigidity of labour laws is 
still ongoing and trade unions must be vigilant to ensure that proposed amendments do not 
erode the rights and interests of their members and workers in general. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The South African trade union movement is still a force to be reckoned despite the numerous 
challenges that it is facing. Buhlungu states that although the role of the labour movement in 
the processes of development has been diminished worldwide, “the SA labour movement 
continues to enjoy a high profile as a central player in shaping developments in the economic 
and political landscape”.611 The author however states that: 
“But a closer assessment shows that the labour movement in the country is in a 
paradoxical situation. On the other hand, it exercises an incredible amount of 
influence in the new democracy and has embarked on spectacular forms of mass 
action to advance the interests of its members …. On the other hand, however, the 
movement is losing its organisational vibrancy and appears unable to take advantage 
of opportunities presented by the democratic dispensation.”612 
 
The observation by Buhlungu underscores the need for the trade union movement to urgently 
confront the negative forces that are threatening its vibrancy if it is to play a significant role 
in shaping work relations in the future. Trade unions must influence changes in the 
employment and labour relations landscape, instead of merely reacting to such changes. They 
must take proactive steps to encourage workers to join unions by incentivising membership, 
such as intensifying their efforts to provide skills training programmes for their members.  
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They must also intensify their internal training programmes to ensure that the officials who 
participate in negotiations with government and business, be it at the workplace or policy 
formulation level, have the special skills required in such negotiations. Most of the strikes are 
a result of poor bargaining on the part of union officials and this is blamed on their lack of 
expertise on certain bargaining topics. Trade unions must also accept the reality of non-
standard employment and intensify their efforts to organise atypical workers. They must also 
accept that globalisation is an irreversible process and come up with innovative strategies to 
counter some of its negative implications on workers.  
 
The proliferation of trade unions and the “big-brother attitude towards other unions”613 by 
COSATU affiliated unions makes it difficult for the labour movement to effectively protect 
and promote the interests of their members. The bully tactics of trade unions with big 
memberships, towards smaller unions, ultimately weakens the entire labour movement. 
Solidarity in the trade union movement is essential and unions must cooperate when they 
engage with each other during collective bargaining negotiations and formulation of policies 
at the level of Nedlac. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The future of trade unions in South Africa cannot be predicted with certainty. It is however 
doubtful that they will relent to numerous pressures that have diminished the strength of 
labour movements elsewhere in the world. The level of interactions and engagements by 
labour with the other social actors remains impressive. COSATU is by far the most vibrant 
trade union federation when it comes to the drawing of various discussion documents on 
various policy issues and lobbying for the protection and promotion of workers’ rights. This 
is, of course, partly attributable to its accessibility to the ruling party and that it is the largest 
union federation in South Africa. 
 
The trade union movement is struggling to survive in an economy which is increasingly being 
defined by macro-economic policies embracing neo-liberalism and globalisation. In a 
desperate attempt to increase the competitiveness of the economy in the global market and to 
attract investment, the interests of the working class are in danger of being marginalised. 
There is therefore a need for a vibrant labour movement which does not merely react to 
policy changes but takes proactive steps to influence and define such policy changes. Judging 
from the number of discussion documents that COSATU has produced on various socio-
economic matters, it is certainly not a quiescent movement; an important characteristic for 
any trade union movement which wants to remain vibrant and relevant in an ever changing 
political, socio-economic landscape and the world of work. 
 
This chapter will explore whether the current South African labour legislative framework 
offers a sound environment for trade unions to thrive, the overall state of trade unionism in 
South Africa; and how trade unions can maintain their vibrancy in an ever changing labour 
relations landscape. 
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6.2 The current labour relations dispensation and its benefits to trade unions: An 
overview 
The labour movement played an important role in the processes leading to the enactment of 
various pieces of labour legislation making up the current labour relations dispensation. The 
centrepiece of labour legislation is the LRA, which was a result of protracted negotiations 
between government, labour and business. It is a dramatic shift from the pre-1995 LRA and 
was enacted to, amongst other things; effectively regulate the numerous labour rights 
provided for by the Constitution, and to effectively give effect to the numerous obligations 
acquired by South Africa by virtue of its membership of the ILO.614 The numerous labour 
rights provided by the Constitution, which the LRA seeks to give effect to, include “the right 
to fair labour practices”,615 “the right to form and join trade unions” and employers’ 
organisations by workers and employers respectively,616 and the right of employers and 
workers “to organise and bargain collectively”.617 
 
The LRA bolsters the strength of trade unions by providing numerous organisational rights 
which serve the purpose of ensuring that they effectively engage with employers during 
bargaining and other related negotiations. It provides for a clear procedure for the acquisition 
and exercise of such rights thereby minimising potential conflicts between trade unions and 
employers. It also provides a framework for collective bargaining, a process which remains 
voluntary with the jurisdiction of the courts to make pronouncements on the processes of 
bargaining severely limited to the extent of being non-existent. To strengthen the 
effectiveness of the bargaining process in the absence of a justiciable duty to bargain, the 
LRA allows the parties to resort to their economic strength to pursue their demands. The Act 
grants all employees with a right to strike and employers with a right to lock-out. The 
conspicuous absence of the right to lock-out in the Constitution and the protracted debate 
about its inclusion underscored the fact the there was an acknowledgment that the previous 
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labour relations landscape favoured employers and did not acknowledge that there was a 
disparity in the bargaining strength of employers and employees, with the former enjoying 
limited economic strength and often being at the mercy of employers during the bargaining 
processes. 
 
The constitutionalisation of the right to strike was a victory for the labour movement. It 
represented a shift from the old labour relations dispensation where the right was severely 
limited with employees enjoying limited protection for participating in industrial action. The 
limitations placed on the right to strike under the old labour relations dispensation can lead 
one to easily conclude that the right to strike is unfettered under the current labour 
dispensation. Apart from prescribing certain procedures for a strike to have legal status, the 
LRA does not place onerous limitations on the right. The detailed and unambiguous 
framework regulating the right to strike means that there is certainty regarding the exercise of 
the right which is of critical importance even to employers since strikes have serious negative 
economic repercussions. The prevalence of strikes should therefore not be used by business 
or potential foreign investors as a scapegoat for citing productivity challenges and 
unattractiveness of South Africa as an investment destination.  
 
The South African legal environment is sound and there is no uncertainty regarding the 
labour relations terrain. The apprehension by business and prospective investors that labour 
wields too much power because of the existence of a constitutionalised right to strike and a 
labour relations system which does not seek to curtail the right (but rather regulates it by 
providing numerous procedures), although legitimate, is to some extent misplaced because 
the overall reality is that there is a sound labour relations system with a clear legal framework 
and accessible institutions which can be approached by parties for redress in the event that 
their rights are infringed upon.  
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As put by Buhlungu et al:618 
“South African labour legislation is highly progressive, making provision for 
centralised bargaining, and a system of dispute resolution that enjoys a high degree of 
legitimacy….” 
 
The LRA, in its current form, is arguably a perfect model for a labour relations statute. It is 
framed in a way which impliedly acknowledges the past injustices towards labour and 
attempts, in a number of ways, to level the playing field by empowering employees with 
numerous rights and creating a bargaining environment which is voluntaristic, thereby 
averting the possibility of a purely legalistic jurisprudence developed by the courts on 
bargaining processes, which proved to be cumbersome (to be applied consistently) under the 
previous labour relations dispensation. There are however numerous challenges in the world 
of work which are not addressed by the LRA and other pieces of labour legislation. The 
problems of atypical or non-standard employment and labour brokering pose a serious threat 
to the gains made by labour. Although it is still too early to judge its successes, the South 
African Decent Work Country Programme, an ILO initiative facilitated through the 
institution of Nedlac, is a commendable step towards ensuring that the Decent Work Agenda 
is sensitised and that practices that erode the already precarious conditions of work are 
discouraged. Trade unions can seize the opportunities presented by this ILO initiative to 
ensure that the Decent Work Agenda is implemented and features prominently in the 
country’s labour and socio-economic policies.  
 
The overall picture is that South Africa has a progressive and sound labour legislation 
framework, in the form of the LRA and other supporting pieces of legislation like, the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA)619 and the Skills Development Act (SDA),620  which 
                                                            
618 Buhlungu et al “Trade Unions and Democracy in South Africa” 16-17. 
619 75 of 1997. The BCEA seeks “to balance the protection of rights of employees against the demands for 
higher productivity, improved efficiency and the promotion of flexibility. Protection [is] … is gained through 
extending employment security, work security, job security and income security to unorganised and vulnerable 
workers by setting a floor of minimum rights covering workplace issues ….” See C Cooper “Globalisation, 
Labour Law and Employment: The South African Case” in M Biagi (ed) Job Creation and Labour Law: From 
Protection towards Pro-action (2000) 241. Basson et al state that the BCEA limits the bargaining powers of 
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attempts to strike a balance between the rights and interests of employers and employees. In 
addition to providing clear rights, it establishes an institutional framework to adjudicate 
disputes in the form of the CCMA and the labour courts. The bargaining system envisaged by 
the LRA, although with all its flaws as highlighted in chapter 2, remains the preferred method 
through which the labour movement can improve their existing rights and interests and make 
new demands on employers. The innovative workplace forums, although ineffective, can be 
overhauled and reinvented at the initiation of trade unions because they represent an 
opportunity for increased participation by labour in managerial decisions. As put by Cooper, 
“in eschewing workplace forums unions have foregone the opportunity to shape the nature of 
work at the workplace and enhance worker security”.621 Although the argument that such 
forums are “a threat to collective bargaining and union power” is valid,622 trade unions can be 
pro-active by defining the nature of such forums to avoid problems regarding demarcation of 
issues and such forums usurping their role. 
 
Trade unions need to come up with sophisticated and less adversarial ways in order to 
effectively engage employers on delicate issues such as the restructuring and productivity of 
enterprises, as these often negatively impact workers. Bargaining processes must be 
decentralised to enterprise level and workers must have a say on issues that directly affect 
them. Increasing the participation of workers on unique issues that affect them at their 
workplaces, although to some extent reviving the individual employment relationship, does 
not diminish the strength of unions in that it promotes democracy, an important virtue for the 
trade union movement. The labour movement must come up with strategies which reflect the 
changing nature of employment relationships and which cater for the unique needs of 
individual member employees. Although industry wide bargaining has many benefits to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
employers as a way of preventing them from unilaterally determining the nature of the employment relationship 
in relation to individual employees. See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 291. 
620 97 of 1998. As put by Cooper: “International experience shows that a well trained workforce is central to 
high growth economies”. South Africa has a small pool of highly skilled workers and this has a negative impact 
on the economy as it culminates in low productivity, “and a lack of new investment and employment 
opportunities”. The SDA is aimed at addressing the problem of lack of skills in South African economy. See 
Cooper “Globalisation, Labour Law and Employment” 244.  
621 Cooper “Globalisation, Labour Law and Employment” 239. 
622 Ibid. 
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trade union movement, it can be strengthened by enterprise level bargaining and other forms 
of worker participation. 
 
Nedlac continues to play an important role in promoting social dialogue and containing the 
inevitable conflict that exists between the state, business and labour. It constitutes a platform 
for all parties to jointly determine and influence labour market and industrial relations 
policies. As already highlighted, the institution has inherent shortcomings. Buhlungu et al 
argue that the engagement at the level of Nedlac: 
“[H]as not led to an institutionalized process of regular dialogue, negotiation and deal 
making as is commonly associated with corporatist countries…. [A]greements 
between state, labour and unions remain ad hoc and episodic, with many new 
government policies simply being imposed”.623 
 
The effectiveness of the body has however been revitalised by recent critical engagements. In 
February 2009 the social partners agreed on a document titled “Framework for South Africa’s 
Response to the International Economic Crisis”.624 The social partners agreed to jointly take 
action on a number of critical areas such as:625 
i. “Financing growth and investment; 
ii. Addressing distressed sectors; 
iii. Avoiding retrenchment, and managing it; 
iv. Addressing the social impact of recession; 
v. Engaging with the international response to the crisis.” 
                                                            
623 Buhlungu et al “Trade Unions and Democracy in South Africa” 14-15. The authors also argue that the 
“robust economic growth and political stability [might] have reduced the need for major compromises by 
business and the state”. 
624 Available at http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=96381 (accessed 15 October 2010). 
625 See the “Address by Deputy President Kgalema Montlante at the 15th NEDLAC Annual Summit” 
http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=2055 (accessed 03 October 2010). 
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The partners also agreed on a set of principles which included protecting the most vulnerable 
groups such as poor workers and the poor in general.626 As articulated by Deputy President 
Kgalema Montlante, “[t]he main purpose of the Framework agreement was to save jobs; to 
prevent the needless loss of employment and businesses.”627 
 
The Deputy President reiterated that Nedlac, as one of the innovations of the democratic 
dispensation, counted many successes, such as contributing “to the development of an 
outstanding body of law, and many other really important legal and administrative 
innovations” and contributing in the avoidance of “some major potential mistakes in a range 
of economic laws and measures ….”628 Whilst acknowledging the various achievements of 
the body, the Deputy President emphasised that “Nedlac must build itself in such a way it 
becomes an indispensable cog in … [a] developmental societal machine … [and] to add so 
much more to the effectiveness of … institutions and … initiatives”.629 The social partners 
seem to have rediscovered the importance of canvassing issues at the level of Nedlac and the 
numerous benefits that can be derived by participating in such an institution. It is hoped that 
robust engagements are going to continue and that Nedlac is going to recapture its credibility 
and effectiveness in promoting peaceful labour relations in South Africa. 
 
Although there are many pressures on the labour legislative framework, it is unlikely that 
there is going to a major overhaul of the current system in the near future. This however 
largely depends on political, social and economic dynamics. The trade union movement has 
in the past successfully lobbied and won support from the ruling party against calls for labour 
market deregularisation by some sectors in business and opposition parties. Buhlungu et al 
observe as follows:630 
                                                            
626 Ibid. 
627 Ibid. 
628 Ibid. 
629 Ibid. 
630 Buhlungu et al “Trade Unions and Democracy in South Africa” 17. 
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“[D]espite the pressures from conservative sections of business and the opposition 
Democratic Alliance, the ANC has resisted demands for radical labour market 
deregulation. Indeed, earlier a number of loopholes in the 1995 Labour Relations Act, 
which, inter alia, allowed employers to escape the Act’s provisions by classing 
workers as independent contractors … have now been closed”. 
 
The current South African collective bargaining system has been the subject of intense 
criticism. The main criticism, particularly from the business sector, is that the system 
“introduces rigidity into the labour market by setting constraints on wage flexibility and 
workplace flexibility”.631 The thrust of the argument is that the setting of wages through the 
process of collective bargaining, a process which is not influenced by market forces, is an 
undue intervention in the market and has long-term negative implications. Such interventions 
increase labour costs which in turn adversely affects the efforts aimed at creating and 
retaining jobs.632 In the South African context, this argument has been rejected on the ground 
that “a spot market approach to wages would merely further encourage a low wage economy, 
thus exacerbating the problems of poverty and equality”.633  
 
The other counter argument is that “the view that lowering the wage rate would automatically 
lead to job creation is simplistic …. [E]ven if there is a correlation between wages and 
employment, other economic factors are equally, if not more, important”.634 Cooper cites 
previous research by ILO’s Country Review which found that there was no evidence to back 
the claim that wages were rigid and that they hindered employment.635 Perhaps the most 
important observation by the author is that: 
                                                            
631 Cooper “Globalisation, Labour Law and Employment” 239. 
632 Ibid. 
633 Ibid. 
634 Ibid. 
635 Cooper “Globalisation, Labour Law and Employment” 239-240. The author is however quick to point out 
that “[t]his is not to say that wage increases are sustainable over time if they are not accompanied by 
productivity enhancements”.  
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“[A] low wage regime or a cutting back of the hard won gains in relation to collective 
bargaining by unions through struggles in the 1970s and 1980s would breed 
resentment and lead to social and industrial unrest, which would have the effect of 
discouraging investment and new employment, and could lead to economic 
instability”.636 
The reluctance by the ruling party to initiate a process envisaging a major overhaul of the 
current labour legislative framework in response to the calls for labour market deregulation 
by some sectors in business and some opposition parties, particularly the Democratic 
Alliance (DA), means that the labour movement should not anticipate such a process, at least 
in the near future. It is also an indication that the state is not prepared for a major 
confrontation with labour and that it is merely deferring its role of being the initiator of key 
developments in the labour market and industrial relations policy arena. The calls for parties 
to rethink the current labour market and industrial relations legislative framework might 
therefore resurface, and the labour movement must always remain vigilant to ensure that it is 
prepared to make informed representations when the need to engage in such a debate arises. 
 
6.3 Organisational challenges and possible solutions 
Although the current labour relations legislative framework provides various rights and 
institutions which strengthens the effectiveness of trade unions in collective bargaining 
processes and other related negotiations, trade unions still have to embrace these favourable 
opportunities and translate them into concrete and practical gains. A sound labour friendly 
legislative framework, although constituting a firm base or platform for trade unions to build 
their presence and strength, and to effectively counter the historic imbalances in the collective 
bargaining process, has to be complemented with deliberate strategies and efforts by trade 
unions aimed at strengthening their organisational structures to effectively seize and make 
meaningful use of the numerous opportunities offered by the current labour relations 
dispensation. 
                                                            
636 Cooper “Globalisation, Labour Law and Employment” 240-241. The author argues that “there is little 
evidence that collective bargaining and other provisions of the LRA play a major role in increasing rigidities in 
the labour market such that they have a negative impact on job creation. If anything, collective bargaining 
should be strengthened to ensure a stable relations environment which will lead to increased productivity and 
skills, increased investment, and in turn, increased employment.” 
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Trade unions still have to come up with strategies to ensure that the labour friendly rights 
provided by the Constitution, the LRA and numerous labour legislation pieces are translated 
into a practical reality and not rendered meaningless due to poor organisation. The survival of 
trade unions will depend on the relations of the leadership and the rank and file. There has to 
be an intensified effort on the part of the leadership to resuscitate and sustain the militant 
spirit of members, to ensure that democracy prevails at all times and that members receive 
accurate information about bargaining processes, and other developments. The role of 
members in the final outcome of such processes should be strengthened. 
 
The leadership must maintain high levels of accountability to ordinary members and should 
be vigilant not to succumb to elements calculated at destroying its credibility and to alienate 
it from the rank and file. The events of 2010, particularly the threatened disciplinary action 
against the secretary general of COSATU by the ANC, and also the confusion regarding 
whether public sector trade union members accepted or rejected the final offer by government 
after the protracted strike, underscore the importance of unity between the leadership and 
ordinary members as internal squabbles, whether perceived or real, can be manipulated or 
exploited by other negotiating parties to their advantage. Strengthening the unity between the 
leadership and ordinary is critical to ensure that the organisations do not become 
dysfunctional. 
 
The greatest challenge threatening trade unions, particularly those affiliated with COSATU, 
is the exodus of experienced trade unionists to take up influential positions in both the private 
and public sector. There also seems to be no programme to attract highly skilled personnel 
and to encourage new members, especially young employees to acquire specialised skills on 
trade unionism and take up leadership positions. There are therefore no replacements for the 
highly capable leadership which is leaving the trade union movement to pursue other careers 
in the private and public sector. 
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Commenting on the human resource crisis facing trade unions, Buhlungu et al state as 
follows:637 
“Management are under increasing pressure-inter alia, in terms of Employment 
Equity legislation … to be seen to be advancing blacks into management; meanwhile 
the ending of apartheid has opened up new careers in government and the public 
sector. Both these phenomena have created a serious ‘brain drain’, with the position 
of shop steward becoming a good stepping stone to management or government.” 
The authors also argue that traditional organising methods are being abandoned and that there 
is now more focus on developing human resource skills which promotes “competitive 
individualism … depoliticized and stripped of its class identity”.638 The abandonment of 
traditional methods of organising in favour of conventional methods, which naturally mean 
that trade union officials must receive specialised training to effectively discharge their 
duties, is an inevitable process in a contemporary labour relations dispensation. Trade unions 
cannot continue to use strategies which proved to be effective in the pre-1994 labour relations 
dispensation. The labour relations dispensation which existed then, and which was influenced 
by the then prevailing social, economic and political factors, was generally characterised by 
strained relations and trade unions often won concessions through radical and militant 
actions. The post-1994 labour relations system ushered by the new Constitution and the LRA, 
has changed compared to its predecessor. It recognises and entrenches the right to freedom of 
association, to organise, to engage in collective bargaining and to engage in industrial action.  
 
The terrain has dramatically changed. Trade unions do not have to fight for recognition at 
workplaces anymore. They also do not have to fight for organisational rights and the right to 
engage in collective bargaining. There is no longer a fear of participating in strikes and other 
related actions. There is easy accessibility to the CCMA and labour courts, established by the 
LRA to adjudicate labour matters and these institutions have developed a progressive labour 
jurisprudence which balances the interests and rights of employers and employees. A 
different labour relations system obviously requires trade unions to reinvent themselves and 
                                                            
637 Buhlungu et al “Trade Unions and Democracy in South Africa” 21. 
638 Ibid. 
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come up with modern and sophisticated ways of protecting and promoting the gains already 
made. Traditional methods of organising will naturally become irrelevant in a modern labour 
relations landscape and trade unions should shift their focus to strategic and innovative ways 
of engaging employers in an ever changing world of work. 
 
6.4 Whither trade unions in South Africa? 
Buhlungu et al observe as follows:639 
“The South African labour movement has been a source of inspiration to unions 
worldwide. South Africa’s largest and most active union federation, the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU) has retained high levels of penetration in the 
private sector, and made concerted inroads into the public sector. At the same time, 
the federation has faced the challenges of coping with … and contesting-neo-liberal 
reforms, retaining and reenergising rank and file in the post-apartheid era, and in 
reaching out to potential members in the informal sector and other areas of insecure 
work.” 
Cooper states as follows:640  
“Although unions have been subject to intense pressures arising from the restructuring 
of the economy in the name of globalisation, nevertheless they have been proactive in 
their response to these pressures. Having fought hard for their rights, trade unions will 
not easily relinquish them.” 
 
The greatest challenge facing trade unions in South Africa is maintaining their credibility and 
trust earned during the 1970s and 1980s militant struggles against labour unfriendly policies. 
Whilst they still enjoy some trust and respect from members recruited during these periods, it 
remains to be seen if such trust and respect will trickle down to new recruits. There is also a 
                                                            
639 Buhlungu et al “Trade Unions and Democracy in South Africa” 2. 
640 Cooper “Globalisation, Labour Law and Employment” 241. 
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need to reenergise the old membership as they should constantly see the benefits of trade 
union membership.  
 
The consolidation of democracy and labour friendly practices, although a victory for the 
labour movement, does not automatically translate to long-term benefits for workers. Trade 
unions cannot afford the complacency that often comes with such achievements. The current 
labour dispensation, while exhibiting favourable conditions for trade unions to thrive and for 
the enhancement and protection of workers rights, is not an answer to fresh challenges facing 
trade unions and workers in general. Numerous challenges have emerged since the advent of 
democracy and a new labour relations dispensation and these challenges require trade unions 
to forego the traditional methods of survival in favour of sophisticated, innovative, and 
strategic tactics to ensure that gains already made are not eroded. 
 
The current state of trade unionism in South Africa is, to some extent, characterised by 
anxiety, disillusionment and a sense of despair. Protracted and violent strikes are an 
indication that there is some sense of panic by the labour movement that gains already made 
are going to be reversed and that business and government are increasingly becoming 
unresponsive to its demands. The anxiety is further fuelled or exacerbated by external 
pressures influencing the policies of the national economy, which have been highlighted in 
chapter 5. The labour movement is suddenly confronted with the reality that it cannot 
continue to completely trust the state to be the custodian of the interests and rights of 
workers. The reality of limited state influence on labour market practices means that the 
rights and interests of workers are not always going to be a priority. There is a shift in policy 
making and issues such as the competitiveness of the South African economy, the creation of 
employment opportunities and incentives to attract foreign investment, are now being 
prioritised. 
 
Trade unions cannot therefore continue to rely on the state to play a pivotal role in ensuring 
that the rights and interests of their members are protected and promoted. The labour 
movement must therefore formulate its own separate policies and aggressively engage the 
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state and business on these in order to secure and maintain a respectable presence in the 
South African labour relations terrain. South Africa’s largest labour federation, COSATU, 
has made great strides to this end by producing various discussion documents and articulating 
its position on socio-economic policies. Its accessibility to the ANC has proven beneficial 
and it has seized the opportunities presented by the tripartite alliance to militantly lobby for 
the protection and promotion of workers rights and interests. COSATU also occasionally 
reviews its organisational strength and weaknesses, an important exercise for any labour 
movement if it is to remain relevant in a changing labour relations landscape. As far back as 
1996, the federation established a Commission (the September Commission) briefed to 
“investigate the changed political and economic conditions in South Africa and assess 
whether COSATU’s policies and strategies were appropriate to these new conditions”.641 
 
The idea to establish the Commission was premised on the acknowledgment that:642 
“[T]he political transition to democracy in South Africa posed new challenges for the 
trade union movement, which had emerged during the struggle against apartheid. The 
economic challenge, too, was enormous. On the other hand, there was the imperative 
of national economic development to overcome the legacy of apartheid. On the other 
were increasing global economic pressures.” 
The discussion document produced by the federation in September 2010 titled, “A Growth 
towards Full Employment: COSATU Policy Perspectives”, is by far the most comprehensive 
policy document and it reflects a willingness by the labour movement to embrace the concept 
of strategic unionism, described by Von Holdt as: 
“[A] strategy that envisages a far-reaching transformation of the state, of the 
workplace, of economic decision-making and of the texture of civil society, a 
transformation driven by a broad based coalition of interest groups, at the centre of 
which is the labour movement”.643 
                                                            
641 See the “September Commission Report on the future of Trade Unions”. 
642 Ibid. 
643 See Von Holdt “Strategic Unionism: The Debate”. 
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 For such a process to be successful or effective it is essential that trade unions agree on 
major policy issues and in a country like South Africa, where trade union proliferation is rife, 
this may prove to be an enormous challenge. Trade unions must endeavour to promote a 
culture of solidarity as conflict on major employment issues, either at the level of policy 
formulation or during collective bargaining processes, weakens the strength of the entire 
labour movement. 
 
The ever-changing social, political and economic factors require that trade unions constantly 
re-assess their role and effectiveness and to formulate strategies on how to preserve the gains 
already made and to address emerging challenges. The failure to adapt and complacency are 
reasons for the demise of most trade unions worldwide. Whilst COSATU’s track record in 
engaging government and business is impressive, other COSATU non-affiliated trade unions 
seem to be content with a quiescent presence. They are however effortlessly benefiting from 
COSATU’s strategic alliance with the ruling party and the federation’s organisational 
strength. 
 
The vigilance of COSATU about developments that are likely to affect the interests and 
rights of its members was also displayed when news filtered that Walmart, an American 
public corporation which is the largest retailer in world, was bidding for Massmart. The 
Western Cape branch of COSATU made a statement to the effect that it was “opposed to 
retailer Walmart’s presence in South Africa …” and that it was surprised “that such an offer 
from Walmart to take over key strategic national companies in South Africa” was being 
entertained.644 The trade union federation argued that “Walmart was ‘notoriously anti-union’ 
and an affront to workers rights wherever it operated” and that “the undermining of rights in 
one chain of stores would force non-compliance in other chain stores and put South Africa on 
a downward spiral in terms of labour law compliance”.645 The South African Commercial, 
Catering and Allied Workers Union made a statement to the effect that in the event that such 
                                                            
644 See “Walmart not welcome” Fin24.com http://www.fin24.com/Companies/Walmart-not-welcome-20100928 
(accessed 28 September 2010). 
645 Ibid. 
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a takeover was successful; it was committed to ensure that workers’ rights were not 
eroded.646 Aggressive lobbying and vigilance are therefore essential characteristics for trade 
union survival. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
The South African trade union movement is under no illusion about the challenges that it 
faces. It is ironic that the challenges posing the greatest threats to the survival and vibrancy of 
trade unions surfaced after the inauguration of democracy and a new labour relations 
dispensation which, unashamedly, sought to redress past imbalances in the employment 
relationship and to advance the rights and interests of workers. 
 
The qualified observation by Buhlungu that although the South African labour movement 
continues to have an influence in shaping social and economic policies of a democratic South 
Africa, it is at the same time losing its vibrancy, something which is attributed to its failure to 
seize the opportunities presented by the new democratic and labour dispensation, is entirely 
true.647 The new social, economic and political space precipitated by the inauguration of a 
constitutional democracy, although bringing many benefits to the labour movement has 
generated new challenges which require sophisticated strategies and responses. 
 
The plight of the labour movement in South Africa is attributable to many factors which have 
been highlighted in chapter 5. Chief amongst them is the inability of South Africa to generate 
decent jobs. This means that there is rampant casualisation of jobs as most employers cannot 
afford to provide secure employment. Organising casual labour has proven to be a difficult 
                                                            
646 See “Bosses and Workers Diverge as Walmart eyes SA” BusinessReport 28 September issue 
http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=5664170 (accessed 28 September 2010). The article suggests 
that the strategies by SACCAWU may include “preparing a submission to the competition authorities on public 
interest grounds” and points to the fact that ‘[t]he Competition Act makes provision for entities such as trade 
unions to participate in transactions”; an opportunity which the South African trade union movement has not 
explored to its advantage. 
647 S Buhlungu “Losing its Vibrancy”. 
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task for trade unions. The strength of unions depends on their ability to recruit and retain 
members. External pressures such as globalisation are also threatening to erode the gains 
made by trade unions. The preoccupation to grow the competitiveness of the economy and to 
embrace the ideals of world economic institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, does 
not always translate into positive outcomes for the trade union movement and workers in 
general. Trade liberalisation policies have opened the South African economy to competition 
from international companies and local companies have closed down leading to huge 
retrenchments. The downsizing of state enterprises, an idea which is favoured by world 
economic institutions, is yet to be fully embraced by the government but it could lead to huge 
job losses and weaken the strength of trade unions. 
 
The public perception about trade unions is also changing. The involvement of trade union 
members in violent strikes has damaged the reputation of the labour movement. The negative 
publicity often received by trade unions during such strikes requires aggressive lobbying to 
change the perception of the public about trade unions. It is also the responsibility of trade 
unions to educate their members about issues such as good practices when engaging in strikes 
and other related actions. As already pointed out, the South African trade union movement 
has maintained a resilient presence in the face of numerous pressures and challenges. As put 
by Buhlungu et al, it is indeed “a source of inspiration to unions worldwide”648 and it is 
hoped that it will not succumb to numerous pressures and will continue to militantly shape 
work relations in South Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
648 Buhlungu et al “Trade Unions and Democracy in South Africa” 2. 
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